Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 021000Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC PHASE // RF STEPNOHORSK BREACH AND AD ATTRITION

SUMMARY: The kinetic main effort in Zaporizhzhia is accelerating, confirmed by RF claims of capturing Zelenyi Hai, directly flanking the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD). This ground pressure is synchronized with strategic AD attrition, evidenced by the 62-UAS mass strike overnight. The information environment is dominated by escalating RF threats against potential French military involvement and the critical uncertainty surrounding the upcoming Donald Trump statement (2100Z), which is the key immediate strategic decision point. Immediate UAF priority is denying RF consolidation in Zelenyi Hai and preparing strategic messaging contingencies.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains cold and clear, facilitating high-altitude ISR, UAS operations, and continued RF use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against East Kharkiv targets (confirmed by Air Force alert 08:21Z).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: AD assets are highly dispersed and strained, evidenced by the alerts regarding incoming UAS aimed at Kyiv and Kharkiv, following the 62-drone overnight saturation. Forward units (5 OShB) are currently managing kinetic and EW threats. UAF Intelligence (HUR) maintains effective deep strike capacity, confirmed by reported AD asset degradation in Donbas and potential maritime/deep-rear sabotage (Grozny/Midvolga 2). RF: RF is committed to the synchronized multi-domain assault: Kinetic push (Zelenyi Hai) combined with CRI/AD degradation (62-UAS attack) and high-volume IO (French threat). The successful mass-UAS attack confirms effective long-range strike coordination.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE KINETIC): RF intends to rapidly exploit the momentum gained from the Zelenyi Hai seizure to achieve a decisive breakthrough at Stepnohorsk NLT 021400Z DEC. This is designed to maximize leverage ahead of the diplomatic meeting window (Moscow talks/Dublin summit). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (AD ATTRITION): The proven capability to launch a 62-UAS saturation strike, simultaneous with KAB usage on key operational areas (Kharkiv), confirms RF capacity to sustain crippling AD resource depletion across the entire operational theater. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. Exploitation Speed: RF appears to be reducing the time between tactical breakthrough (Zelenyi Hai) and public IO amplification, aiming for immediate psychological and diplomatic leverage.
2. Deep Strike Targeting: The claimed drone strike on the 'Akhmat' base in Grozny (08:21Z, IF confirmed as UAF) indicates UAF is prepared to extend deep kinetic risk to RF internal security/force generation hubs, forcing RF to divert resources to internal defense.
3. Maritime Pressure: Reports of the attack on the tanker Midvolga 2 near Turkey confirm continued UAF efforts to destabilize RF's logistical and economic interests in the Black Sea.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF utilizes centralized state messaging (TASS) to highlight financial benefits for demobilized veterans, indicating an ongoing focus on long-term force generation and internal stability despite high attrition. The Grozny incident, if validated, poses a minimal logistical threat but a maximum psychological C2/security threat, potentially stressing rear area troop deployments. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing diplomatic pressure (Moscow talks), kinetic attacks (Stepnohorsk, 62-UAS wave), and the information domain (French threat amplification). The rapid coordinated amplification of the Zelenyi Hai success indicates a tight coupling between Vostok Group field C2 and strategic IO C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains defensive-attritional, with critical focus on AD asset management. The need to defend against the 62-drone wave (and subsequent alerts) severely compromises the ability to reinforce frontline SHORAD/MRAD capabilities at Stepnohorsk. Readiness in key maneuver units (5 OShB) remains high but is under peak duress.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. RF AD Degradation: HUR confirmed destruction of important RF AD elements in Donbas, directly mitigating the KAB/Air superiority threat.
2. Logistical Disruption: 53 OMBr 'Signum' confirmed successful logistics interdiction on the Lyman axis.
3. Deep Strike Projection (If confirmed): The reported Grozny drone strike, if UAF-executed, successfully projects military capability deep into RF territory, achieving strategic psychological effects.

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. Stepnohorsk Flank: The confirmed RF advance on Zelenyi Hai creates an immediate tactical vulnerability for the 5 OShB.
2. Sustained AD Strain: The confirmed 62-UAS attack creates continued resource drain and stress on AD operators.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is Immediate Kinetic Response Capacity. Forces must be allocated immediately to conduct a high-density counter-fire mission to deny RF consolidation of Zelenyi Hai. This requires rapid prioritization of long-range fires away from other less critical tasks.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF SVR warning regarding French PMCs is now amplified as a critical component of the anti-NATO IO campaign. This is designed to establish legal precedent for targeting NATO personnel and pressure France ahead of the Dublin summit. RF channels are also actively magnifying the Zelenyi Hai capture claim to assert tactical dominance.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF counter-IO must urgently leverage the HUR AD success and 53 OMBr tactical wins to counteract the narrative of widespread tactical setbacks (Pokrovsk/Zelenyi Hai) and mass-UAS attacks on population centers. The focus on high-profile anti-corruption efforts (Procurator General’s detention of former energy official) aids in maintaining domestic trust and morale regarding internal governance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The decisive factor for the next 48 hours is the scheduled Donald Trump statement at 2100Z. This event poses a black swan risk capable of completely overturning the current diplomatic stability (Ireland/Moscow tracks). The existing RF IO campaign against NATO must be countered before the Trump statement introduces new variables.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: CONSOLIDATION OF ZELENYI HAI, FOLLOWED BY HIGH-INTENSITY ASSAULT ON STEPNOHORSK MLD (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will utilize the remainder of the morning (021000Z - 021400Z DEC) to consolidate gains in Zelenyi Hai (establishing forward command and fire points). This will be followed by a concentrated armor/mechanized assault (utilizing BMP-3 EW suites) supported by KAB/Artillery fires to achieve a localized breach into the Stepnohorsk MLD, forcing UAF C2 to commit the nearest available reserve.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: STRATEGIC AIR SUPERIORITY WINDOW & TRUMP PIVOT (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) The combined stress of the 62-drone attack and KAB saturation leads to a localized, cascading failure of UAF MRAD coverage in the Southern axis. This enables RF tactical aviation to conduct sustained, unmolested close air support sorties over the Stepnohorsk breach area. Simultaneously, the Trump 2100Z statement announces a significant policy shift (e.g., immediate funding freeze, demand for ceasefire), causing strategic paralysis within NCA and allied capitals, allowing the RF kinetic breakthrough to succeed unopposed.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. Counter-Consolidation Fire Mission (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): Execute concentrated artillery and long-range fires against confirmed/suspected RF assembly areas and C2 nodes within Zelenyi Hai NLT 021130Z DEC. Objective: Deny RF the ability to establish a stable launch platform for the main Stepnohorsk assault.
2. AD Asset Hardening (CRITICAL): Direct all AD units currently defending CRI/rear areas (Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv) to adopt Emission Control (EMCON) protocols during non-engagement windows and prepare hardened alternate positions. The 62-drone attack confirms persistent targeting of AD infrastructure.
3. Forward EW Focus: Prioritize EW assets and specialized FPV teams to target the Zelenyi Hai-Stepnohorsk corridor to pre-emptively blind RF C2 and ISR during the expected mechanized push.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. Trump Statement Contingency Planning (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): NCA/MFA must prepare three distinct communication strategies (Positive/Neutral/Negative) for the 2100Z Trump statement. Priority task: Ensure strategic messaging is immediately available to prevent RF IO from defining the narrative vacuum.
2. Amplify Disruption (IMMEDIATE): Immediately amplify the HUR success in destroying RF AD in Donbas and the 53 OMBr logistical disruption to pivot the narrative away from the Zelenyi Hai loss and the mass-UAS attack.
3. Neutralize French Threat: Reiterate the joint condemnation of the SVR threats (as previously recommended) NLT 021100Z DEC, ensuring key NATO allies stand unified against RF attempts at political coercion through threats of targeting non-combat personnel.

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