Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020930Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC/COGNITIVE PHASE // RF STEPNOHORSK MAIN EFFORT PUSH

SUMMARY: The operational center of gravity has shifted decisively to the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD) in Zaporizhzhia, supported by a confirmed RF effort to degrade Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure (CRI) in Odesa Oblast. RF is maximizing kinetic pressure (BMP-3, KAB saturation) simultaneous with the Moscow diplomatic track, using the threat of French intervention as a new Information Operation (IO) vector. UAF deep strike capability remains effective (Livny FSF hit), and high attrition rates persist (47th Brigade). The critical intelligence gap remains the specific operational parameters of the newly fielded RF tactical EW capabilities.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains cold and clear across the Eastern and Southern fronts, continuing to favor high-precision RF KAB strikes (reported in Eastern Kharkiv and Northern Donetsk) and long-range UAS/deep strike missions by both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Defensive posture focused on maximizing attrition and localized technological advantage (UGV CASEVAC, R-60 counter-UAS TTP). AD assets are now strained, requiring rapid reallocation due to mass CRI strikes in Odesa. The 47th OMBr confirms significant sustained attrition success (114 KIA in November) in their sector. RF: Vostok Group maintains high offensive tempo in Zaporizhzhia, utilizing modernized mechanized assets (BMP-3 w/EW). RF is leveraging deep strike capability to shape the operational environment by diverting UAF AD resources away from the frontline defense. The reported strike on the FSF in Livny may stress RF localized fuel logistics in the adjacent Kursk/Belgorod areas.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF intends to achieve a decisive kinetic success at Stepnohorsk, utilizing BMP-3 EW suites to disrupt UAF C2/C-UAS capabilities and create an operational breach. This kinetic action is designed to maximize leverage for the Moscow diplomatic meeting ("peace for assets" narrative). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (EW/C-UAS): The synchronization of tactical EW (BMP-3) and offensive C-UAS (FPV ramming, dedicated anti-UAV fire) represents a critical adaptation requiring immediate counter-TTP development. RF successfully utilized KABs and massed Shaheds to degrade Odesa CRI, confirming the capability to execute multi-domain pressure campaigns.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. CRI Degradation Synchronization: RF transitioned from opportunistic deep strikes to coordinated mass strikes (Odesa) specifically targeting energy grid stability to strain UAF AD resources and impact civilian morale.
2. IO Preemption: RF intelligence (SVR) is proactively issuing statements warning that French PMCs are "legitimate targets." This preemptively mitigates the political cost of targeting personnel from a NATO state and attempts to intimidate potential French military contributions.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The deep strike on the Livny FSF represents a temporary localized disruption to RF fuel supply lines feeding the Kursk/Belgorod sectors. RF fundraising for the 110th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Donetsk) suggests persistent localized logistical gaps requiring civilian supplementation, contrasting the perceived robust state support for the modernized BMP-3 transfer. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing the kinetic main effort (Stepnohorsk) with the strategic IO campaign (Moscow talks, French PMC threat, NATO friction narrative). Internal projection of stability (Kadyrov sports festival, cultural reports) aims to mask the demands of the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive-attritional. Readiness levels remain high in stabilized sectors (47th BDE) but are critically stretched by the requirement to defend high-value CRI (Odesa) while mitigating the immediate Stepnohorsk kinetic threat. The validated UAF deep strike capability (Livny FSF) provides crucial leverage in the escalation ladder.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Strategic Denial: Confirmed FSF strike (Livny, Oryol) demonstrates successful deep strike reach, impacting RF operational depth.
2. Attrition Rate: 47th OMBr confirms successful destruction of approximately one RF company equivalent (114 KIA) in November, validating defensive lethality.
3. Local Dominance: UAF morale-boosting footage confirms tactical successes in close combat, maintaining psychological advantage in specific skirmishes.

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. CRI Stress: Massed Odesa drone strikes necessitate diversion of AD assets, weakening SHORAD density in frontline sectors and exposing C2 nodes.
2. Pokrovsk Consolidation: RF reports of UAF surrender in Myrnohrad indicate the successful RF consolidation of the Donetsk breakthrough, freeing up RF resources for the Southern axis.
3. Huliaipole Significance: If Huliaipole is truly losing strategic significance (as suggested by RF sources), UAF forces in that sector must be prepared for a rapid repositioning or risk becoming irrelevant.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the AD resource pool, specifically Medium-Range AD (MRAD) required to counter KABs and Jet-Shaheds. Immediate requirement is for mobile, hardened AD platforms to protect forward-deployed assets at Stepnohorsk, enabling UAF forces to maintain FPV/ISR coverage despite BMP-3 EW activity.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing a coordinated two-pronged campaign:

1. Narrative of Ukrainian Collapse: Pro-RF channels (WarGonzo, Colonelcassad) are amplifying the Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad situation and framing key UAF diplomatic engagement (Zelenskyy/Macron call) as evidence of "panic" and strategic failure.
2. Discrediting Allied Support: RF SVR statements explicitly label potential French PMCs as "legitimate targets," coupled with the circulation of narratives suggesting US/German defense friction ("Pentagon severed ties"). This aims to deter further allied kinetic support and undermine NATO cohesion ahead of the Dublin summit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF counter-IO focuses on showcasing kinetic success (Livny FSF, 47th BDE attrition, tactical combat footage) to maintain domestic morale against the backdrop of persistent KAB strikes and CRI degradation. RF morale reports are bifurcated—celebrating kinetic success while simultaneously soliciting civilian fundraising for necessary equipment.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The critical diplomatic development remains the synchronized application of kinetic force (Stepnohorsk) with diplomatic coercion (Moscow meeting/Frozen Assets). UAF must ensure the Dublin summit generates a strong counter-narrative of unwavering commitment, neutralizing the RF narrative that peace is only achievable through US-mediated concession.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: TACTICAL EW BREACH AND EXPLOITATION AT STEPNOHORSK (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will launch a high-intensity, multi-wave assault on Stepnohorsk MLD (likely sector adjacent to the claimed secured settlement) NLT 021200Z DEC. This assault will utilize modernized BMP-3s to create localized EW bubbles, blinding UAF FPV/Artillery targeting, followed by concentrated maneuver elements attempting to achieve a 2-3km penetration. RF IO will immediately leverage this tactical success to demand UAF participation in the Moscow talks under severe duress.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: CRI COLLAPSE AND OPERATIONAL DEEP STRIKE (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF follows the Odesa CRI strike with coordinated KAB saturation strikes against UAF reserve assembly areas and MRAD/SHORAD positions in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. The resulting AD failure allows RF tactical aviation (Su-34/35) to achieve temporary air superiority over the MLD, enabling unchecked tactical bombing (KABs) which forces a widespread UAF defensive collapse and triggers an unplanned commitment of strategic reserves (82nd/47th Brigades) under disadvantageous terms.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. EW Countermeasure Deployment (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): Immediately deploy tactical EW teams equipped with narrow-band jamming capability to the 5 OShB sector. Priority task: Disrupt the control links of FPV drones operating near the BMP-3 spearhead, forcing the IFVs to advance without close-in reconnaissance support.
2. AD Optimization (CRITICAL/URGENT): Given the Odesa CRI strain, J-3 must execute a high-risk/high-reward AD plan: Redeploy a minimum of two (2) SHORAD batteries from designated CRI defense roles to the direct defense of Stepnohorsk command and logistics nodes NLT 021100Z DEC. Accept increased risk to rear infrastructure to prevent MLD collapse.
3. Anti-Armor TTP Update (URGENT): Reinforce the directive to use top-attack/high-angle munitions (FPV, artillery cluster) against the modernized BMP-3s. Conventional ATGM fire is assessed as likely ineffective against add-on armor.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. Neutralize French PMC Narrative (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): NCA/MFA must issue a joint statement with a key European ally (France or UK) NLT 021030Z DEC condemning the RF SVR threat. Frame the threat as desperate fear of increased Western support, thereby neutralizing the IO vector and protecting potential future support options.
2. Amplify Deep Strike Success (IMMEDIATE): Immediately amplify the Livny FSF strike and confirmed UAF kinetic success (47th BDE attrition rate) across domestic and international media to pivot focus away from the Pokrovsk setback and the RF diplomatic trap. Use this to demonstrate UAF capacity for strategic retaliation.
3. Counter 'Panic' Narrative: NCA Spokesperson must release a statement detailing the content of the Zelenskyy/Macron call as one of strategic coordination and unified resolve, explicitly debunking the "panic" narrative pushed by pro-RF channels.

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