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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-02 07:34:34Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-02 07:04:37Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020900Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC/COGNITIVE PHASE

SUMMARY: Kinetic operations remain dominated by the high-attrition assault on the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD), validated by increased Vostok Group activity and focused fundraising appeals. Concurrently, the Information Environment has reached a critical inflection point following a leak suggesting potential US willingness to return RF frozen assets, a development RF Information Operations (IO) is actively exploiting to undermine the upcoming Dublin summit. Tactical intelligence confirms the introduction of modernized RF armored vehicles (BMP-3) equipped with enhanced protection and EW capabilities, requiring an immediate adjustment to UAF counter-mobility and C-UAS TTPs. The maritime domain remains volatile following the confirmed USV strike on the commercial tanker Midvolga 2.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

LocationStatusAssessmentConfidence
Stepnohorsk MLD (Zaporizhzhia)Active Assault/CriticalRF forces (Vostok Group) claim capture of a settlement in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. This is assessed as a localized RF attempt to establish a new operational base to support the main assault on Stepnohorsk.MEDIUM
Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka AxisDefensive StabilizationUAF 25th Airborne Brigade confirmed successful employment of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) for CASEVAC, indicating controlled, decentralized urban defense despite GLOC severance. RF continues KAB saturation.HIGH
Donetsk Region (Deep Rear)Active Shaping/Deep StrikeUAF GUR claims successful strike on 2x RF Radars and 1x S-300 PU (Nov 29). This counters RF air superiority claims and mitigates strategic AD risk.HIGH
Black Sea (W. Transit Zone)Active Naval WarConfirmed attack on Midvolga 2 (vegetable oil cargo). RF IO attempting to link the attack to UK influence and the disruption of peace processes.HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains cold and clear across the Eastern front, continuing to favor high-altitude RF UAS reconnaissance and high-precision KAB targeting missions, as confirmed by continuous UAF Air Force alerts regarding KAB launches.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: The 5 OShB remains under C2 bypass conditions at Stepnohorsk. Strategic reserves (82nd/47th Brigades) remain fixed. The 47th Mechanized Brigade reports high enemy attrition rates (114 KIA in Nov), validating UAF defensive lethality in their sector. Emphasis on defensive technological adaptation (UGV CASEVAC, C-UAS TTPs). RF: The Vostok Group of Forces is confirmed escalating offensive tempo in Zaporizhzhia. TASS confirms delivery of new BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) equipped with full multi-component add-on armor and electronic warfare (EW) suites. This upgrade increases the survivability and tactical EW capability of advancing mechanized units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE/OPERATIONAL): RF intends to achieve a breakthrough near Stepnohorsk (NLT 021200Z DEC) using newly fielded, protected mechanized forces (BMP-3 upgrades) to exploit the 5 OShB C2 friction. The overarching intention is to leverage this kinetic success to amplify the political narrative of US diplomatic concession (frozen assets proposal) during the Putin/Whitkoff meeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (TECHNOLOGICAL): The introduction of modernized BMP-3s poses an increased threat due to enhanced armor protection against UAF light Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and the integrated EW capability, which will specifically target UAF FPV/Reconnaissance UAS, complicating target acquisition for UAF counter-mobility teams.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

  1. C-UAS Adaptation: RF units (Colonelcassad source) demonstrate successful FPV ramming attacks against UAF heavy UAS ("Baba Yaga"), confirming advanced tactical adaptation in the counter-UAS domain.
  2. Force Generation: The rapid fielding of modernized BMP-3s indicates a successful operationalization of the Russian defense industrial base to meet the immediate demands of high-intensity conflict sectors (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed deep strike on the Midvolga 2 (carrying commercial oil) validates UAF's continued targeting of Russian economic security, aiming to inflate insurance premiums and disrupt non-military shipping. RF logistics for the Vostok Group appear robust, supported by dedicated public fundraising appeals ("Два майора" for Zaporizhzhia front). (Confidence: MEDIUM - Fundraising suggests local gaps, but official BMP-3 transfers confirm state support.)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is effectively synchronizing tactical unit deployment (BMP-3s to the front) with strategic diplomatic IO (Moscow talks/Frozen Assets leak). RF judicial and administrative personnel changes (TASS reports) project an image of internal stability and centralized state control, contrasting sharply with the kinetic reality on the front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive, focused on mitigating C2 vulnerabilities at Stepnohorsk and maximizing localized technological advantage. The 47th Brigade’s high attrition success rate demonstrates robust defense in sectors where C2 remains intact. The adoption of UGV CASEVAC by the 25th BDE is a vital TTP for reducing losses in high-risk zones (Pokrovsk).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

  1. GUR Suppression: Confirmed successful targeting of 2x Radars and 1x S-300 PU, degrading RF air domain awareness in the Donetsk sector.
  2. Attrition Rate: 47th OMBr confirms high monthly attrition (114 KIA), providing quantifiable metrics of defensive effectiveness.
  3. Technological Mitigation: UGV CASEVAC TTP validated in combat (25th BDE).

Setbacks/Challenges:

  1. C2 CRITICALITY: 5 OShB C2 bypass remains the primary operational risk vector for RF exploitation.
  2. KAB Threat Persistence: Continuous RF KAB launches in Donetsk require resource allocation and pose a constant threat to rear area C2 nodes and concentrations.
  3. Advanced RF Armor/EW: The deployment of modernized BMP-3s requires immediate adjustment of anti-armor and counter-UAS systems at Stepnohorsk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Primary requirement is the immediate dissemination of counter-EW TTPs to forward units (5 OShB) to neutralize the newly fielded BMP-3 EW suites. Constraint remains the allocation of strategic AD/EW assets, which are pulled between deep rear protection (Kyiv/Odesa) and frontline tactical defense (Stepnohorsk).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses on the "Peace for Assets" narrative, leveraging the US Politico leak regarding the return of frozen Russian assets upon a peace deal.

  • Goal: Undermine the unity and resolve of the Dublin summit, forcing UAF to address diplomatic concessions while under kinetic pressure.
  • Tactical Focus: Amplifying technological superiority (BMP-3 delivery) and localized gains (Zaporizhzhia settlement claim) to project inevitability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF focus remains on documenting successful defensive actions (47th Brigade attrition, GUR strikes) to stabilize domestic morale against the backdrop of the Pokrovsk loss and KAB strikes. The RF use of fundraising (Dva Mayora) suggests that despite official state resources, local logistical shortfalls persist in key sectors (Zaporizhzhia).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The upcoming Putin/Whitkoff meeting and the US frozen assets proposal represent the most critical cognitive threat. RF aims to frame the Dublin summit as irrelevant and the UAF position as politically unsustainable. UAF must rapidly deploy a counter-narrative, stressing that only unconditional territorial sovereignty is acceptable, regardless of asset status.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: MECHANIZED STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION & DIPLOMATIC COERCION (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will launch a high-density, integrated mechanized assault NLT 021200Z DEC, utilizing the modernized BMP-3 IFVs to suppress UAF FPV/ISR and breach the Stepnohorsk MLD (Likely using the claimed secured settlement as a forward operating base). This kinetic action will be synchronized with the Putin/Whitkoff meeting to apply maximum pressure for a ceasefire based on current lines, with the "frozen assets" proposal serving as the diplomatic incentive/trap.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: TACTICAL EW DOMINANCE AND RESERVES DISRUPTION (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF successfully exploits the 5 OShB C2 bypass through localized EW superiority (utilizing BMP-3 EW suites and integrated C-UAS TTPs) to jam UAF responsive fire support and deny critical target acquisition. This creates a 3-5 km operational breach, forcing the commitment of UAF strategic reserves (82nd/47th Brigades) into a high-EW environment, resulting in unacceptable attrition and collapse of the MLD.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (ETA)ConfidenceDecision Point/Trigger
LCC2 Restoration (Stepnohorsk)NLT 021000Z DECHIGHConfirmation of mobile SATCOM connectivity with 5 OShB LNOs and deployment of at least 50% requested C-UAS/EW jammers.
RF Mechanized Assault Peak021200Z - 021600Z DECHIGHConfirmed visual identification (IMINT/ISR) of BMP-3 IFVs or IFV variants leading the RF spearhead.
UAF Strategic Reserve (82nd/47th) Commitment Trigger021800Z DECMEDIUMRF forces penetrate the MLD and secure continuous, undefended passage of follow-on forces beyond the primary anti-tank ditches (penetration depth exceeding 2km).

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGaps/Unresolved QuestionsCollection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (TECHNOLOGY/EW)Capability of Modernized BMP-3 EW Suites. Specific frequencies targeted, effective range, and vulnerability to existing UAF tactical EW.TECHINT/SIGINT (Stepnohorsk Salient): Focus collection on localized RF radio traffic/jamming signatures surrounding observed BMP-3 movements. Attempt to reverse-engineer EW parameters. (Timeline: IMMEDIATE/CONTINUOUS).
PRIORITY 2 (FRIENDLY C2/LCC2)LNO Integration Effectiveness. Are the LNO teams successfully transitioning the 5 OShB fire plan from pre-planned to responsive observation?COMINT/HUMINT (5 OShB Sector): Confirm LNO communication status and volume of responsive fire requests (as opposed to automated fire). (Timeline: NLT 021000Z DEC).
PRIORITY 3 (RF DEEP INTENT)Verification of RF Zaporizhzhia Settlement Claim. What is the specific name and tactical value of the claimed "liberated" settlement? Is it a diversion or a genuine operational staging ground?IMINT/ISR (Zaporizhzhia N-Front): High-resolution satellite and persistent drone observation to geolocate the RF claim and confirm the density/type of RF forces present. (Timeline: NLT 021100Z DEC).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

  1. C2 and EW Mitigation (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): Confirm LCC2 (Local Contingency C2) activation at Stepnohorsk NLT 021000Z DEC. Prioritize deployment of multiple, decentralized, low-power EW/Anti-UAS systems to the 5 OShB lines to neutralize incoming FPVs and disrupt BMP-3 EW range.
  2. Anti-Armor Reassessment (URGENT): Given modernized BMP-3 armor, shift tactical priority from high-angle ATGM engagements (likely ineffective against add-on armor) to top-attack FPV/UAS strikes and artillery cluster munition saturation against mechanized assembly areas.
  3. UGV CASEVAC Mass Deployment (URGENT): Standardize and immediately disseminate the UGV CASEVAC TTP (25th BDE) across all brigades in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia high-attrition zones. This must be prioritized to maintain combat effectiveness under heavy fire.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

  1. COUNTER DIPLOMATIC TRAP (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): NCA must issue an official, high-level statement NLT 021030Z DEC explicitly rejecting the premise of returning RF frozen assets as a precondition for peace. Frame the Politico leak and the Moscow meeting as desperate RF manipulation attempts, underscoring that sovereignty is non-negotiable and decoupled from financial incentives.
  2. AMPLIFY SUCCESS (IMMEDIATE): Immediately amplify GUR success (Radar/S-300 strikes) and 47th Brigade attrition statistics (114 KIA) to pivot the strategic narrative away from the Pokrovsk setback and toward UAF asymmetric success and kinetic dominance.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-02 07:04:37Z)

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