Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020730Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC/COGNITIVE PHASE

SUMMARY: The operational center of gravity remains focused on the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD), where the kinetic assault continues amidst critical C2 friction. The failure to confirm 5 OShB C2 status by the 0645Z deadline confirms the activation of bypass protocols and shifted fire support to preemptive counter-mobility plans. Concurrently, the Ukrainian Deep Strike Campaign has escalated significantly, now confirmed to include strikes against the Livny/Ilsky/Tuapse energy complex and an attack on a Russian commercial tanker (Midvolga 2) in the Western Black Sea. RF Information Operations (IO) are leveraging diplomatic developments (ECB funding refusal) and tactical gains (Pokrovsk, Borovskaya Andreevka) to project overwhelming advantage at the Dublin summit.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain clear and cold (Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk), sustaining optimal RF UAS reconnaissance and target acquisition. The maritime conditions in the Black Sea permit high-endurance Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: 5 OShB is operating under C2 bypass conditions, relying on decentralized command and pre-planned fire support. Strategic reserves (82nd/47th Brigades) remain fixed, awaiting confirmation of a strategic breakthrough at Stepnohorsk or a definitive operational collapse at Pokrovsk. RF: The Vostok Group of Forces is confirmed operating near Gulyaypole (via PSYOP delivery). The 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (39 OMRB) is heavily invested in FPV/UAS operations (Kaira Detachment), confirming the centrality of drones to their current assault TTPs.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF intends to achieve kinetic exploitation at Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia) while simultaneously sustaining strategic deep pressure on UAF logistics (Odesa/Dnipro strikes) and key energy infrastructure (Ilsky, Tuapse). The core intention remains to force diplomatic concession based on perceived military success, amplified by the perceived fracturing of Western support (ECB reports). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (UAS/FPV): The demonstrated high tempo and specialized training (including UGV integration training for 39 OMRB 'Kaira') confirm RF's increasing dominance in the tactical UAS domain, posing a persistent threat to UAF light armored vehicles and C2 nodes.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. Naval Response: The attack on the Midvolga 2 tanker will likely trigger an immediate RF response, potentially involving increased naval patrols, heightened Black Sea AD posture, or retaliatory strikes against Odesa port infrastructure.
2. C2 Projection: Direct involvement and visibility of RF senior leadership (Putin/Gerasimov meeting at CP) is an intentional counter-IO measure designed to project strategic confidence and centralized command authority.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes targeting the Livny, Ilsky, and Tuapse energy complexes represent significant pressure on RF fuel and energy supply chains. This pressure point is intended to reduce RF operational endurance in key offensive sectors (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia). RF AD remains effective, claiming 39 downed UAVs, confirming UAF persistence in long-range strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is leveraging high-visibility meetings to project strength. UAF analysis judges the RF C2 synchronization between kinetic operations (Stepnohorsk) and strategic IO (Dublin summit) to be highly effective.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

5 OShB: The C2 bypass protocol activation (effective 0645Z) mitigates the immediate risk of C2 collapse but requires immediate forward deployment of liaison officers (LNOs) to restore tactical communication and integrate external fire support effectively. Units remain actively engaged.

Deep Strike Forces: Confirmed successful execution of strikes against three major Russian energy/fuel nodes, validating the long-range targeting capability and the USV program's capacity to target economic interests globally.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Successful execution and expansion of the strategic deep strike campaign (confirmed naval target).
2. High UAF Air Defense effectiveness (63% interception rate) against the massed overnight drone attack.

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. C2 CRITICALITY: The necessity of the 5 OShB C2 bypass indicates significant operational stress, demanding immediate mitigation to prevent tactical fragmentation.
2. SHORAD Constraint: The sustained, high-volume RF drone attacks on Odesa continue to dilute SHORAD coverage from frontline areas.
3. Kupyansk Pressure: RF claim of Borovskaya Andreevka capture indicates increased pressure on the Northern flank, further fixing UAF reserves.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the re-establishment of localized C2 (LCC2) at Stepnohorsk. This requires secure, mobile communication relay equipment (SATCOM/COMINT assets) and LNOs to transition from pre-planned fire support to responsive, observed fire support.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has intensified along two axes:

1. Diplomatic Fracture: Amplifying the ECB’s reported rejection of using frozen assets (€140B) to fund Ukraine, directly aimed at disrupting the Dublin summit and discouraging further EU financial commitments.
2. Tactical Dominance: Heavily promoting the effectiveness of FPV drone units (Kaira 39 OMRB) and claiming local gains (Borovskaya Andreevka) to signal technological superiority and continuous forward momentum.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF messaging is heavily focused on national resilience, remembrance, and the cost of war (Minutes of Silence, commemoration posts). This strategy is necessary to stabilize morale in the wake of continued civilian casualties and the severe kinetic stress in the East. Strategic communication must balance solemnity with proof of continued kinetic capability (Deep Strike validation).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF is actively attempting to co-opt diplomatic narratives and freeze UAF kinetic action by leveraging exaggerated tactical successes (Pokrovsk) and highlighting perceived Western division (ECB funding). The UAF priority is ensuring the Dublin summit yields tangible, public commitments that directly contradict RF IO.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: FOCUSED STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION & MARITIME RETALIATION (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will utilize heavy UAS/FPV concentration (leveraging 39 OMRB TTPs) to maximize attrition and disrupt UAF C2 within the Stepnohorsk MLD NLT 021200Z DEC. Simultaneously, RF will execute a high-visibility, retaliatory deep strike (likely using Jet-Shaheds) against a coastal or port city, aiming to distract from the Black Sea tanker attack and force UAF reserves to redeploy AD assets.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 EXPLOITATION AND RESERVES FIXATION (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF forces successfully penetrate the Stepnohorsk MLD, exploiting the current C2 void and forcing NCA to commit the 82nd/47th Brigades. Concurrently, the Borovskaya Andreevka advance in Kupyansk is revealed to be a supporting effort, preventing the withdrawal of Northern forces, thus fixing strategic reserves on two separated, deteriorating fronts under suboptimal C2 conditions.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. C2 Mitigation (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): Deploy specialized LNO teams and mobile communication relay vehicles to the 5 OShB adjacent sector (e.g., 5-10km rear of MLD) NLT 020900Z DEC. Establish LCC2 (Local Contingency Command and Control) to restore the ability to call responsive fire missions, mitigating the risk of fragmentation under C2 bypass.
2. FPV/UAS Counter-Measures (URGENT): Given the confirmed high density of 39 OMRB FPV attacks, immediately release additional man-portable EW/Anti-UAS systems (backpack jammers, C-UAS rifles) to the forward elements of 5 OShB. Prioritize EW assets that can operate without relying on centralized C2.
3. Black Sea Pre-positioning (URGENT): Anticipate an RF retaliatory strike against coastal infrastructure. Increase the readiness level of AD units protecting the Odesa port complex and strategic energy storage facilities NLT 021000Z DEC. Pre-authorize mobile AD movement to intercept incoming vectors.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. DEEP STRIKE AMPLIFICATION (IMMEDIATE): NCA/GUR must acknowledge the strikes against RF energy infrastructure and the Midvolga 2 tanker NLT 020930Z DEC. Frame these actions as the required strategic cost for RF kinetic aggression, shifting the domestic narrative from defensive failure (Pokrovsk) to offensive capability.
2. DIPLOMATIC COUNTER (CRITICAL): Instruct the Dublin delegation to proactively address and refute the ECB funding reports, framing it as expected RF IO, while emphasizing concrete pledges of military support (e.g., Netherlands €250M) to maintain the narrative of strong Western cohesion.

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