Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020645Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC PHASE (RF Assault & IO Climax)

SUMMARY: The Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD) remains engaged in intense anti-armor combat (Stepnohorsk MLD). The primary operational risk is the current C2 Status Unknown (CSU) of the 5th Separate Assault Brigade (5 OShB), which is now overdue for confirmation (NLT 0615Z decision window passed). New Intelligence confirms that the RF claim of securing Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) is false, based on video evidence of limited, propaganda-focused penetration. RF Information Operations (IO) remain highly effective, leveraging POW interviews and staged photo opportunities to generate an overwhelming narrative of UAF defeat in the East, timed to coincide with the Dublin diplomatic summit.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain clear and cold across the front (Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk), maintaining optimal visibility for RF reconnaissance and target acquisition systems (UAS and tactical air).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces, primarily the 5 OShB, are fixed at Stepnohorsk. Strategic reserves (e.g., 82nd/47th Brigades) must maintain their current disposition, as the critical intelligence gap regarding Pokrovsk has been partially resolved (city is not lost, but surrounded). NCA control measures must prioritize C2 restoration/bypass over reserve deployment in the immediate term.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF intends to achieve a localized tactical victory at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously solidifying the operational encirclement of the SKELIA Regiment at Pokrovsk. The primary strategic intention is to achieve maximum cognitive disruption by forcing the UAF diplomatic delegation in Dublin to respond to reports of catastrophic defeat in the East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (C2 Synchronization): RF continues to demonstrate highly effective synchronization of kinetic efforts (Stepnohorsk) with IO (Pokrovsk claims, POW videos, internal security messaging).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has immediately leveraged the successful encirclement of Pokrovsk by deploying small teams for rapid propaganda staging (flag planting) and quickly disseminating interviews with captured UAF personnel, demonstrating a high tempo in turning tactical gains into strategic IO leverage. TASS reports on the destruction of foreign mercenaries in Sumy Oblast are assessed as strategic messaging aimed at deterring international volunteer support.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Air Defense claims to have neutralized 45 UAF UAVs overnight. This suggests UAF deep strike operations (CRITLOG attrition) are continuing following the Livny oil depot strike, though RF AD remains effective in defense of domestic assets. Logistics in the forward Stepnohorsk area remain highly kinetic due to the active ground assault.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF state media continues to generate content aimed at destabilizing UAF NCA credibility, including claims that President Zelenskyy and former Chief of Staff Yermak benefited from large-scale defense contract fraud (RT sources). This suggests a sustained RF effort to target the strategic leadership of Ukraine.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

5 OShB C2 Integrity: The status of 5 OShB C2 is assessed as CRITICAL UNKNOWN. The failure to confirm C2 by the 0615Z deadline requires the immediate implementation of pre-planned bypass protocols. Units are engaged and readiness is currently high, but sustainability is contingent on C2 continuity.

SKELIA Regiment (Pokrovsk): The garrison is confirmed surrounded and engaged in Close Quarters Combat (CQC). While facing envelopment, the refutation of the "complete occupation" claim validates their continued resistance and confirms the need to maintain extraction/resupply corridors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Successful refutation of the RF "complete occupation" narrative in Pokrovsk via timely counter-IO.
2. Continued execution of UAF deep strike strategy (implied by the RF claim of 45 downed UAVs).

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. Failure to confirm 5 OShB C2 status (Overdue).
2. Increased civilian casualties in Dnipro (4 KIA, 45+ WIA/Injured), increasing strain on domestic resources and morale.
3. High volume of combat engagements at Pokrovsk (72/226), indicating a high rate of attrition for the forward defense elements.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the synchronization of Fire Support with engaged units at Stepnohorsk in the absence of C2 confirmation. A secondary constraint is the need for rapid allocation of additional SHORAD assets to defend Southern Odesa critical infrastructure against sustained drone saturation attacks.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels are pursuing:

1. Total Victory Narrative: Disseminating the video of a brief flag-planting in Pokrovsk (ЦАПЛІЄНКО source) and using POW testimony (Colonelcassad source) to signal the terminal phase of the Donetsk defense.
2. NCA Corrosion: Amplifying claims of high-level corruption (Zelenskyy/Yermak) to erode international and domestic trust during the critical Dublin summit.
3. Western Weakness: Highlighting internal Western security issues (German ammunition theft) to support the narrative of NATO fracture and unreliability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed casualty count in Dnipro (45+) necessitates proactive messaging. UAF channels are leveraging the high volume of combat in Pokrovsk (72 engagements) to frame resistance as heroic. The immediate counter-IO regarding Pokrovsk is critical to maintain military and civilian morale by preventing the acceptance of the RF victory narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Dublin summit is the current primary counter-IO measure. Continued high-level diplomatic visibility is essential to counteract RF efforts to frame the war as a fait accompli based on exaggerated kinetic success.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK FOCUSED KINETIC PRESSURE & POKROVSK DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF assault forces will maintain maximum kinetic pressure at Stepnohorsk NLT 020800Z DEC, seeking to exploit perceived tactical friction (C2 gaps). Simultaneously, RF state media will formalize the "victory" in Pokrovsk through staged media events and public statements, using the operational status of the encircled garrison to demand a ceasefire or negotiation on RF terms, targeting the US/Western delegations at the Dublin summit.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 COLLAPSE AND OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION (Risk Level: CRITICAL/IMMINENT) Successful RF penetration of the Stepnohorsk MLD, synchronized with confirmed C2 failure of the 5 OShB. The subsequent operational retreat would require NCA to commit strategic reserves (currently fixed due to the perceived threat in Donetsk) under unfavorable conditions, risking a major operational collapse in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. C2 FAILURE PROTOCOL (IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL): Effective 0645Z, execute C2 bypass. All fire support (Artillery/HIMARS) allocated to 5 OShB sector will shift to pre-planned, time-fused counter-mobility fire plans (Phase Line Alpha/Beta) based on expected RF advance rate, regardless of positive C2 status checks. Command responsibility for local counter-attack coordination defaults to the highest-ranking officer confirmed active in the sector.
2. POKROVSK RESERVE DECISION (URGENT): The denial of the "complete occupation" claim stabilizes the strategic picture. Maintain the current NO STRATEGIC RESERVE REDEPLOYMENT order. Reserves must remain poised to reinforce Stepnohorsk or address a verified critical operational gap, not to attempt resupply/reinforcement of an encircled position.
3. AD ALLOCATION (CRITICAL): Prioritize deployment of mobile C-UAS teams (e.g., FrankenSAM variants, if feasible) to Southern Odesa critical infrastructure NLT 021200Z DEC to free up conventional, high-value SHORAD assets for the Stepnohorsk and Pokrovsk operational areas.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. POKROVSK COUNTER-NARRATIVE (IMMEDIATE): NCA must issue a statement NLT 020730Z DEC, explicitly stating that "Pokrovsk is contested, the garrison is fighting bravely, and RF claims of total occupation are propaganda designed to distract the Dublin summit." Disseminate the visual evidence of RF flag-planting as proof of their desperation and limited tactical scope.
2. MORALE TACTICS (URGENT): Immediately amplify domestic and international coverage of the confirmed high volume of fighting (72 engagements) at Pokrovsk to reframe the operation as a high-cost RF attack, not a collapse. Pair this with confirmed data on rescue efforts and casualty support in Dnipro.

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