Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020515Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC/C2 STRIKE EXECUTION WINDOW (Stepnohorsk MLD)

SUMMARY: The RF has confirmed its deep exploitation objective in the Zaporizhzhia axis by framing the post-breakthrough target as Huliaipole. This IO shaping message, issued at 05:01Z, falls within the established C2 strike window and reinforces the MLCOA/MDCOA. There is no confirmed report of the anticipated C2 Decapitation Strike against the 5 OShB CP, suggesting the kinetic initiation decision point is imminent or slightly delayed. UAF continues robust deep strike operations (RF claims 45 UAVs intercepted), demonstrating strategic attrition commitment despite the tactical crisis. Immediate focus must remain on C2 survival and preemptive targeting of RF launch platforms.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Stepnohorsk MLD (Zaporizhzhia Axis): Remains the main effort focus. RF IO is now explicitly targeting the next operational objective: Huliaipole (NE of Stepnohorsk). Huliaipole serves as a critical UAF logistical and C2 node for the broader Orikhiv-Polohy front. RF psychological shaping suggests intent to achieve an operational depth greater than 3km following a breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): The IO focus has successfully established a narrative of strategic victory and capture, fixing UAF operational reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Favorable for continued high-resolution RF ISR and precision targeting required for the MDCOA C2 strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF posture is defensively critical and strategically active.

• UAF Deep Strike: RF MoD confirms UAF is successfully sustaining high-volume, long-range attrition operations (45 UAVs claimed intercepted overnight, including over Chechnya and Bryansk/Oryol areas). This continues to dilute RF AD coverage.
• 5 OShB C2 Status: Unconfirmed. The critical decision window for C2 dispersal and activation of GHOST protocols is now past the optimal point but remains active. All units must assume the CPs are under active RF targeting.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): Execute a localized tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk, potentially preceded by the C2 strike, and immediately begin operational exploitation towards Huliaipole. The use of the Kotsnews channel to preemptively announce Huliaipole as the next target is designed to destabilize the operational rear area command structure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (Aviation/Strike): While RF possesses the capability for a high-yield C2 strike, independent reporting (ASTRA, 04:49Z) confirms recurring operational failures (131 air-dropped munitions failed in 2025). This introduces a small, measurable risk of RF technical failure impacting the timing or effectiveness of a kinetic attack, but does not negate the threat.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The key adaptation is the refinement of the IO synchronization. RF is now using high-profile military correspondents to directly name the exploitation objective (Huliaipole) simultaneous with the kinetic MLD preparations. This is highly effective operational-level psychological warfare designed to pre-panic rear area security forces.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes are confirmed to be persistent (45 intercepted UAVs), forcing RF AD allocation away from the front. The confirmed failures of air-dropped munitions suggest latent logistical/maintenance issues, potentially decreasing confidence in long-term high-precision weapon inventory management. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in integrating kinetic and cognitive domains. The ability to shift the IO narrative seamlessly from the strategic fixation (Pokrovsk) to the operational exploitation target (Huliaipole) demonstrates centralized, responsive control over key influence assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are managing multi-domain pressure. The sustained deep strike campaign confirms robust strategic commitment. Tactical readiness in the Stepnohorsk MLD is critically dependent on the status of the 5 OShB C2 dispersal protocols. Failure to execute C2 hardening in the next 15 minutes will exponentially increase the MDCOA risk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Sustained deep strike attrition against RF AD and military/industrial targets (confirmed by RF MoD claims). Imminent Setback Risk: The threat to Huliaipole compromises the integrity of the operational rear, forcing UAF command to prioritize the defense of fixed logistics (Huliaipole) over mobile reserve deployment.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: C2 Survivability. Confirmed survival of 5 OShB leadership during the expected strike window. Secondary constraint is the positioning of reserves, which must be immediately optimized for a counter-attack in the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv area, disregarding the Huliaipole IO threat as a primary deployment driver for now.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign is focused on creating a cascading sense of collapse:

1. Strategic Collapse: (Pokrovsk/Vovchansk claims).
2. Operational Threat: The explicit naming of Huliaipole as the next target (Kotsnews, 05:01Z). This is a textbook use of psychological leverage intended to compel UAF to deploy key reserve forces prematurely or misallocate logistical support.
3. Domestic Normalcy: TASS coverage of winter sports attempts to shield the RF population from the kinetic realities of the war.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public morale is under intense stress due to the Pokrovsk claims. Sustained UAF counter-messaging focused on deep strike attrition (confirming damage to Russia) is necessary to mitigate the shock from the Stepnohorsk/Huliaipole operational threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No immediate diplomatic developments in the new reporting. The conflict remains defined by the dual-track diplomacy (Moscow vs. Ireland), with RF attempting to use kinetic success (Pokrovsk) and anticipated success (Stepnohorsk) to dictate terms.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: C2 STRIKE EXECUTION FOLLOWED BY ACCELERATED GROUND ASSAULT (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces will initiate the precision strike on the most probable 5 OShB CP targets NLT 020530Z DEC. This kinetic event will be immediately followed by heavy artillery preparation, drone swarms, and the commitment of lead mechanized elements into the Stepnohorsk defense line. The immediate objective of the initial breach forces will be to secure an axis for exploitation forces targeting Huliaipole.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The Most Dangerous Course of Action remains the successful execution of the C2 Decapitation Strike, resulting in operational paralysis of the 5 OShB and a successful breach that forces the commitment of strategic reserves to prevent the loss of Huliaipole. The naming of Huliaipole at 05:01Z has increased the operational consequence of the MDCOA. Risk Level: IMMINENT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. C2 EVASION (IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL): ASSUME COMPROMISE; FORCE REDUNDANCY NOW. All primary 5 OShB CPs must be vacated and decoy operations executed immediately (smoke, thermal emitters). Command authority should temporarily devolve to the most survivable, lowest echelon CP until the strike window passes.
2. PREEMPTIVE COUNTER-FIRE (URGENT): Authorize high-density counter-battery fire against confirmed RF ISR UAV launch/landing sites and known high-risk mobile launch platforms (SS-26 Iskander TELs or high-value MLRS). This is the last opportunity to degrade the MDCOA targeting solution before strike initiation.
3. RESERVE DEPLOYMENT (CRITICAL): Reserves must remain fixed for counter-attack in the Stepnohorsk operational rear. Ignore the Huliaipole IO threat for reserve allocation. The operational priority is stopping the breach, not defending the anticipated exploitation target.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. IO COUNTER-PUNCH (CRITICAL): The NCA must issue the unified, high-level statement NLT 020600Z DEC as previously advised. The new narrative must explicitly address the Huliaipole threat: Frame the threat to Huliaipole not as a credible military maneuver, but as desperate RF psychological warfare used to mask severe logistical and morale failures confirmed by UAF deep strikes.
2. Deep Strike Amplification: Immediately publicize the RF MoD confirmation of UAF deep strike activity (the 45 intercepted UAVs) and the confirmed technical failures (ASTRA report) to demonstrate UAF operational effectiveness outside the contested MLDs.

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