Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 020345Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: Critical Transition (Stepnohorsk Axis). RF ground assault is entering the kinetic peak closure window (020330Z DEC). The primary operational risk remains IMPENDING RF C2 DECIPITATION STRIKE (MDCOA), amplified by new intelligence confirming RF counter-UGV capabilities.
The Stepnohorsk MLD (Main Line of Defense, Zaporizhzhia Axis) remains the focus of decisive engagement. RF forces are attempting to maintain momentum towards a decisive penetration, NLT 020330Z DEC. The operational focus has shifted from the Pokrovsk containment to the survival of the 5 OShB command structure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Clear, cold conditions persist. Favorable for high-resolution UAV reconnaissance and PGMs/Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs), supporting RF targeting efforts against fixed and mobile assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UAF posture is defensive. The new deep operational environment is bifurcated:
INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): Achieve operational depth (>1.5 km) at Stepnohorsk and/or degrade the 5 OShB's capacity to organize a counter-attack. CAPABILITY (NEW CONFIRMATION): RF forces are demonstrating highly effective counter-mobility TTPs. The 36th Army (Vostok Group) publicly claimed successful UAV strikes against a "robotized platform" in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (03:06Z). This is a direct indication that RF has adapted to or successfully targeted UAF Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).
J-2 JUDGMENT (Adaptation): RF is successfully utilizing their multi-domain superiority (UAV ISR/Strike) to neutralize UAF asymmetric advantages (UGV counter-mobility). This severely degrades the defensive utility of the 5 OShB's recommended UGV TTPs against the mechanized assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The confirmed RF counter-UGV success suggests RF is prioritizing ISR/strike assets for C2 and mobility denial, complementing KAB strikes against fixed positions.
The presence of an active deep UAF threat in Leningrad Oblast requires RF to divert AD and C2 resources, potentially delaying rapid resupply to the Stepnohorsk breach force, though frontline sustainment remains adequate for the next 6 hours.
RF C2 remains robust, managing both a decisive engagement and a major deep-strike response (Leningrad/Lipetsk). The rapid, localized C2 response demonstrated during the counter-UGV operation is concerning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Readiness of the 5 OShB is highly compromised. Not only is the C2 status unknown, but the effectiveness of their signature defensive maneuver (UGV counter-mobility) is now questionable following the RF strike claim. SHORAD is critically needed to cover presumed CPs and to protect remaining UGVs/EW assets.
Immediate Tactical Setback: High probability that the 5 OShB's UGV assets were compromised or successfully interdicted by RF UAVs near the operational area. This reduces the friction anticipated by the RF mechanized push. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) Deep Operational Success: Initiation of a new deep strike (Leningrad Oblast) maintains pressure on RF strategic AD assets, preventing their redeployment to the front line to support the MDCOA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
CRITICAL RESOURCE SHIFT: Due to the diminished confidence in UGV effectiveness, the 5 OShB must immediately shift kinetic resource reliance to crew-served ATGMs and reinforced anti-mobility barriers (mines/demolitions). Confirmation of the type of UGV struck is a Priority 1 collection requirement.
RF Information Operations (IO) are currently focusing on:
UAF intelligence confirms a significant breakdown of civil administration in occupied territories, evidenced by reports of public safety degradation (feral dog attacks, 03:20Z). This presents a strong narrative for UAF IO to undermine RF claims of effective governance and security.
No immediate change. The ongoing diplomatic contest (Ireland vs. Moscow tracks) remains subject to the kinetic results at Stepnohorsk. A successful RF breakthrough would strengthen the Moscow position.
MLCOA: MLD ATTACK/RECONSOLIDATION FOLLOWED BY MDCOA PREPARATION (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF ground forces will continue kinetic pressure until the MLD assessment deadline (020330Z DEC). Given the observed RF success against UGV assets, the probability of the ground assault being decisively stalled is now lower. If limited gains are achieved, RF will immediately transition operational focus to preparing the MDCOA (Precision C2 Strike) NLT 020400Z DEC.
MDCOA: EXECUTION OF PRECISION C2 STRIKE (HIGH YIELD) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The failure to confirm C2 dispersal, coupled with the imminent closure of the ground assessment window, dictates a high probability of RF aviation executing precision strikes targeting the assumed (non-compliant) 5 OShB C2 nodes. This strike will likely leverage the same high-resolution UAV ISR that targeted the UGV assets.
| Event | Estimated Timeline (ETA) | Confidence | Decision Point/Trigger |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stepnohorsk MLD Penetration Assessment | 020304Z - 020330Z DEC (CRITICAL) | HIGH | Confirmed RF penetration depth >1.5 km (Execution of pre-planned counter-attack reserves). |
| RF Shift to MDCOA (C2 Strike) | 020330Z DEC - 020430Z DEC | HIGH | Confirmation that RF ground assault failed decisive breakthrough or ground assault achieved marginal gains sufficient to justify decapitation strike. |
| 5 OShB UGV Status Confirmation | NLT 020400Z DEC | CRITICAL | Confirmation of the nature of the "robotized platform" struck (Logistics UGV, Combat UGV, or Target Decoy). |
| Priority | Gaps/Unresolved Questions | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (COUNTER-TTP VALIDATION) | 5 OShB UGV Asset Status. Was the "robotized platform" confirmed destroyed by RF an asset belonging to the 5 OShB, and was it a Combat UGV (critical defense loss) or a Decoy? | TECHINT/HUMINT (Dnipropetrovsk Border/Stepnohorsk): Assess local RF UAV TTPs and BDA on the claimed strike target. (Timeline: NLT 020400Z DEC). |
| PRIORITY 2 (FRIENDLY C2 STATUS) | 5 OShB C2 Posture Verification. Are alternate CPs operational and maintaining silence? Has the GHOST advisory been implemented? | SIGINT/EW (Stepnohorsk Sector): Monitor for anomalous high-volume RF EW activity (MDCOA precursor) and compliance with UAF radio silence. (Timeline: IMMEDIATE). |
| PRIORITY 3 (DEEP STRIKE ASSESSMENT) | Leningrad Strike Target Identification. What infrastructure or military asset was targeted in Leningrad Oblast? (Necessary to assess strategic resource drain impact). | OSINT/HUMINT (Leningrad Oblast): Initial damage assessment and target confirmation. (Timeline: NLT 020600Z DEC). |
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