Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020215Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: Decisive Engagement (Stepnohorsk Axis). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The operational situation is reaching its peak kinetic intensity in the Southern Axis (Stepnohorsk MLD). New intelligence confirms RF employment of Guided Aerial Bombs (FAB) in the immediate operational rear (Huliaipole), validating the previous assessment that RF aviation assets are actively committed to shaping the Southern sector. This activity occurs squarely within the critical kinetic window (020130Z - 020300Z DEC). The synchronized Information Warfare (IW) aims to exploit this localized kinetic success while maintaining the strategic distraction of the Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk narrative. The confirmation of FAB usage demands an immediate reassessment and likely preemptive activation of deep AD assets.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Stepnohorsk MLD remains the center of gravity (CoG). The area of operations (AO) has expanded to include Huliaipole (approx. 20-30 km east of the main Stepnohorsk MLD) as an active shaping target, confirming RF intent to strike UAF concentration and reserve areas proximal to the frontline. The Bolhrad GLOC integrity is increasingly threatened by the confirmed presence and proximity of RF aerial strike platforms.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Favorable for RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), fixed-wing aviation, and PGM delivery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces remain defensively committed to holding the MLD. The critical control measure is the required C2 dispersal of the 5 OShB and adjacent formations. The confirmed FAB strike environment mandates stricter enforcement of deception plans (DEC) and dispersal for all logistics and C2 elements within 40 km of the MLD.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CONFIRMED): Achieve a kinetic breach of the Stepnohorsk MLD (MLCOA). CAPABILITY (ESCALATED): Confirmed use of FAB (likely KAB-500/1500 series) on near-rear targets (Huliaipole). This confirms RF tactical aviation possesses the capability to deliver high-yield PGMs to degrade UAF defensive preparation and troop concentrations, overcoming localized SHORAD assets.

J-2 JUDGMENT: The TASS claim regarding a FAB strike near the MLD serves two purposes:

1. Tactical Synchronization: It is the kinetic preparation for the impending ground assault.
2. Cognitive Dominance: It attempts to degrade morale immediately prior to the assault by claiming substantial UAF losses.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is exhibiting synchronized air-ground operations on the Southern Axis. The use of FABs in the Huliaipole area indicates that RF ISR has successfully identified tactical UAF staging or consolidation points. This is a crucial adaptation designed to suppress UAF maneuver elements before they can counter-attack a breach attempt. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Adequate for the decisive phase. No new changes noted.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The immediate release of TASS propaganda detailing the FAB strike coincides perfectly with the critical kinetic window, demonstrating multi-domain synergy.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is under high duress due to the confirmed FAB threat in the immediate rear area. Readiness hinges on rapid C2 hardening and the execution of effective fire control against the predicted ground assault. AD readiness is critically strained.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The loss of the Pokrovsk GLOC remains the strategic setback, which RF continues to exploit. The alleged strike near Huliaipole represents a potential tactical setback if UAF concentrations were successfully hit. (Fact: TASS claim; Judgment: If verified, this is a significant tactical degradation.)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: AD assets are highly constrained. The proven RF ability to employ FAB/KAB near the MLD necessitates diverting or repositioning medium/long-range AD assets (e.g., PATRIOT, NASAMS) further forward to cover the Stepnohorsk-Huliaipole sector, potentially exposing the Bolhrad GLOC further.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IW is currently executing a twin-strike psychological operation:

1. Kinetic Justification (Huliaipole): Amplification of high-casualty strikes via TASS (claiming 50 killed) intended to demoralize frontline units and support the narrative of successful deep-strike suppression.
2. Dehumanization (Vovchansk): Dissemination of staged or hyperbolic video testimonials alleging UAF war crimes (grenading civilians). This is a standard tactic aimed at degrading Western political support and reducing UAF legitimacy.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal focus must remain on the success of the Stepnohorsk defense to counteract the dual RF narrative of Eastern collapse and Southern superiority. Sustained discipline against the kinetic assault is paramount. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The IW push serves to maximize RF leverage during the ongoing diplomatic bifurcation (Moscow vs. Ireland tracks). The war crimes narrative (Vovchansk) is intended to dampen positive momentum from recent aid pledges (€250M).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: MLD BREACH EXECUTION (STEPNOHORSK) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The FAB strike confirms the immediate kinetic preparation phase is complete. The ground assault is expected to peak within the current window: 020200Z - 020330Z DEC. RF armored/mechanized units (supported by confirmed tactical aviation) will attempt to penetrate the Stepnohorsk MLD, exploiting gaps created by preparatory fires.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 DECAPITATION & DEEP FIRE SUPPRESSION (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The identified RF air presence and proven PGM delivery capability (FABs) heighten the MDCOA. If the initial breach fails or is stalled, RF air assets will shift to precision strikes targeting verified, high-value UAF nodes, including:

1. Undispersed 5 OShB CPs.
2. Key forward logistics/resupply nodes.
3. Counter-Battery Radar sites.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. Immediate AD Posture Shift (CRITICAL): Given the confirmed FAB usage near the MLD, immediately activate Air Defense Overlay 3 (Deep Asset Protection) and push forward available medium-range AD systems (if feasible without compromising the Bolhrad GLOC entirely) to establish a denial corridor covering the Stepnohorsk-Huliaipole area against PGM delivery platforms (Su-34/Su-35).
2. C2 Force Protection Confirmation (CRITICAL, 5 OShB): MANDATE IMMEDIATE 5 OShB C2 Dispersal Verification. If confirmation is not received by 020230Z DEC, assume a high probability of C2 targeting (MDCOA execution). Immediately initiate high-volume, false-signature communications (GHOST advisory) from the last known primary CP to saturate RF SIGINT and protect the actual dispersed CPs.
3. Fire Support Re-Tasking: Allocate a minimum of two HIMARS/O-FAS strike missions to cover confirmed RF artillery/logistics nodes supporting the ground assault (CR P3 - MLD Kinetics from previous report). Execute strike NLT 020300Z DEC.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. Counter-Propaganda (Huliaipole): Immediately prepare a counter-statement to the TASS claim. TTP: Acknowledge intense fighting and RF use of heavy aviation ordnance, but refute specific casualty figures (e.g., "enemy propaganda exaggerates losses by 500%") while emphasizing successful attrition of RF armored columns at the MLD.
2. War Crimes Narrative Mitigation: Issue a rapid, professional denial regarding the Vovchansk allegations, framing the video as part of the continuous, synchronized RF disinformation campaign used to distract from operational failure. Cite the established operational rules of engagement (ROE) for urban areas.