Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020135Z DEC 25

OPERATIONAL PHASE: Decisive Engagement (Stepnohorsk/Bolhrad Axis). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The operational situation remains in the critical kinetic window identified in the previous report (020100Z DEC). The synchronized RF strategy is confirmed: Active ground assault preparation (Stepnohorsk) paired with high-volume Information Warfare (IW) leveraging the recent operational success in the Eastern Direction (Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk). The critical new input is the confirmed activity of enemy tactical aviation in the Eastern Direction. This significantly raises the probability of the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) targeting C2 nodes or high-value logistics immediately behind the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Stepnohorsk MLD remains the center of gravity (CoG). The loss of the Pokrovsk GLOC (now referred to as Krasnoarmiisk in RF propaganda) is currently functioning as a successful operational distraction/fixing mechanism. The Eastern Direction (Donetsk Oblast) is kinetic (tactical aviation confirmed) but is not judged to be the current decisive effort.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Clear, cold conditions providing favorable conditions for RF ISR, fixed-wing aviation, and precision-guided munitions (PGM) delivery.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces remain defensively committed. The critical control measure is the rapid and mandatory dispersal of the 5 OShB Command and Control (C2) architecture and strict EMCON enforcement, which must be verified immediately given the current aerial threat. Air Defense (AD) assets remain split between MLD support and strategic denial (Bolhrad GLOC).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is fixed: Breach Stepnohorsk MLD while simultaneously using IW (Krasnoarmiisk) to demoralize and fix UAF strategic reserves. The confirmed presence of RF tactical aviation in the Eastern Direction confirms the capability for kinetic support, likely either:

1. Targeting UAF reserves fixed in the East.
2. Executing SEAD/EW/Strike preparation for the Stepnohorsk assault.
3. Acting as the platform for the MDCOA (C2 Decapitation).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF has dramatically increased the synchronization between kinetic action and the cognitive domain. The immediate TASS reports amplifying the Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) situation and claiming destruction of UAF "elite units" serve to maximize the internal and external perception of RF momentum precisely during the Stepnohorsk assault.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

No change. Adequate for the decisive phase.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The coordinated release of TASS propaganda immediately following the UAF tactical aviation alert demonstrates cohesive, multi-domain synchronization between kinetic operations and the Information Environment (IE). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is defensively optimized but highly constrained by AD limitations. The readiness state is defined by successful C2 force protection measures (MDCOA mitigation) and the ability to hold the MLD against the MLCOA.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The loss of the Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) GLOC is amplified by RF IW (TASS claims). UAF tactical success hinges entirely on preventing operational-level kinetic defeat (holding the Stepnohorsk MLD and protecting the Bolhrad GLOC).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: The reported tactical aviation activity places renewed strain on AD allocation. Immediate priority must be assigned to identifying the target set of this aviation grouping to prevent further asset dilution. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

Current Focus: RF propaganda (TASS) is focused on maximizing the psychological impact of the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiisk) event, claiming strategic irreversibility ("irreversible liberation of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk") and destruction of "elite connections." J-2 Assessment: This is a classic cognitive framing operation intended to achieve three goals:

1. Divert Attention: Keep NCA focus on the Eastern front while the Southern front (Stepnohorsk) is actively engaged.
2. Force Decision Delay: Encourage UAF hesitation in committing strategic reserves to Stepnohorsk.
3. Domestic Credibility: Validate RF operational goals for their internal audience.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is currently supported by the counter-narrative indicated by RBC-Ukraine, suggesting UAF leadership recognizes the RF information trap. Sustained defense at Stepnohorsk is required to maintain domestic confidence against the TASS claims. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No change. The RF focus on Krasnoarmiisk success is an explicit attempt to influence the upcoming diplomatic tracks (Ireland Summit).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: MLD BREACH EXECUTION AND BOLHRAD INTERDICTION (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The current kinetic and cognitive synchronization supports the projected breakthrough attempt at Stepnohorsk between 020130Z and 020300Z DEC. RF tactical aviation is highly likely acting as a forward element providing ISR or Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) to facilitate the ground breach or the follow-on MDCOA.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 DECAPITATION VIA AIR ASSETS (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE UPGRADE)

The confirmed activity of RF tactical aviation in the Eastern Direction validates the MDCOA trajectory. If the RF identifies a failure or delay in the mandatory C2 dispersal of the 5 OShB or adjacent high-value operational command nodes (e.g., Forward Logistics Bases), RF air assets will execute a rapid, low-altitude precision strike within the next 60 minutes (NLT 020230Z DEC).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. C2 Force Protection Confirmation (CRITICAL, 5 OShB): MANDATE IMMEDIATE 5 OShB C2 Dispersal Verification. If confirmation is not received by 020145Z DEC, assume non-compliance and immediately issue a "GHOST" advisory (simulated movement/false signal generation) and divert the nearest available mobile AD asset (if possible without compromising Bolhrad or MLD defense) to cover the identified primary C2 node against the now-heightened MDCOA air threat.
2. Tactical Aviation Threat Assessment (IMMEDIATE): Based on the P1 CR fulfillment (sensor focus), if RF aviation trajectory suggests movement toward the Stepnohorsk rear area, immediately activate Air Defense Overlays 3 & 4 (deep asset protection) and prioritize the launch of available long-range interceptors (e.g., PATRIOT, NASAMS) against potential SEAD/EW platforms accompanying the strike package.
3. MLD Defense: Maintain the current Counter-Battery Fire (CBF) plan. The RF propaganda regarding Krasnoarmiisk confirms their intent is to force tactical errors at Stepnohorsk. Units must maintain discipline and adhere strictly to the established MLD defense plan.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. PSYOPS Counter-Narrative (EXECUTE): Proceed immediately with the pre-planned counter-narrative against the Dmytro Korchynsky video.
2. Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) Narrative Containment: NCA must issue a rapid response to the TASS claims regarding the destruction of "elite units." TTP: Acknowledge the high intensity of fighting and the tactical withdrawal while emphasizing that the main strategic effort is currently being repelled in the South (Stepnohorsk), framing the Eastern situation as a successful defense that fixed large RF forces.