Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 020100Z DEC 25

OPERATIONAL PHASE: Decisive Engagement (Stepnohorsk/Bolhrad Axis). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The operational situation is entering the kinetic culmination phase as projected. RF Command and Control (C2) remains at a heightened state (UVB-76 confirmed activity). The ground assault against the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD) is judged to be in progress, concurrent with the identified UAV threat targeting the Bolhrad Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). All new intelligence is dominated by RF Information Warfare (IW) activity, aimed at distracting strategic attention and undermining internal cohesion during this critical operational window. The C2 dispersal of the 5 OShB remains the most critical force protection measure against the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The MLD in the Stepnohorsk sector (Zaporizhzhia) is the current decisive point. Control of this sector prevents RF mechanized exploitation toward the northern GLOCs. Bolhrad/Reni corridor is the critical strategic denial area. Failure to intercept the incoming UAV group will severely impact strategic logistics flow, particularly through the Danube corridor.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold conditions persist. Visibility remains high, favoring RF ISR and precision strike capabilities (KAB/Artillery). No ground mobility constraints. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are defensively committed. The primary control measure is the active execution of the Counter-Battery Fire (CBF) plan targeting RF fire support units 4-15 km behind the MLD, coupled with the mandatory reallocation and positioning of mobile Air Defense (AD) assets to protect the Bolhrad GLOC. Confirmation of successful 5 OShB Command Post (CP) dispersal and strict EMCON protocols is pending.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: simultaneous kinetic breach at Stepnohorsk and deep logistical interdiction at Bolhrad. The RF has the capability to sustain high-rate kinetic action (confirmed political/logistical backing).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No new kinetic tactical maneuvers reported in the current window (020030Z - 020100Z DEC). The primary adaptation observed is a high-volume, synchronized effort in the Information Environment (IE) to cover or distract from the kinetic operation (see Section 4).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain adequate for the current decisive phase. The commitment of resources to the Stepnohorsk grouping suggests sustained offensive capability for the next 48-72 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

STATUS: CRITICAL // HIGH ALERT The confirmed activation of the UVB-76 C2 node validates the RF operational synchronization plan. RF C2 is judged to be highly effective and fully engaged in executing the MLD breach/GLOC strike sequence. J-2 assessment: The high C2 effectiveness significantly increases the risk profile for the MDCOA (air exploitation targeting CPs). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains defensively stressed due to the requirement to defend the MLD while simultaneously committing AD assets to the rear. Readiness is functionally reliant on the successful execution of pre-emptive force protection measures (CBF, AD relocation, C2 dispersal).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

No new kinetic tactical successes or setbacks reported within this specific reporting window. The critical decision to prioritize the stabilization of the southern front (Stepnohorsk) over the lost Pokrovsk GLOC remains strategically sound, provided the MLD holds.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: Limited strategic AD depth remains the key constraint. The allocation decision (Bolhrad vs. MLD protection) must be continuously re-evaluated based on immediate threat status.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF information operations are highly active and focused on two objectives:

1. Undermining UAF Leadership/Cohesion (PSYOPS): The video disseminated by RVvoenkor (Operatsia Z) featuring Dmytro Korchynsky (framed as a Ukrainian nationalist) expressing "hope only in Putin" is a deliberate, high-impact Psychological Operation. J-2 Assessment: This aims to sow internal distrust, suggest UAF defeatism, and undermine the legitimacy of current UAF National Command Authority (NCA) decisions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
2. Strategic Distraction: TASS messages focusing on unrelated international disputes (Trump/Venezuela) or geopolitical expansion (Thailand/BRICS) are judged as attempts to dilute global media attention and political focus away from the active kinetic operations at Stepnohorsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal morale is under direct threat from the RF PSYOPS campaign (Korchynsky video). The NCA must execute a rapid, robust counter-narrative to prevent internal fracturing and loss of confidence during the MLD assault.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

International diplomatic support holds (Ireland Summit track). The RF emphasis on non-Ukraine geopolitics should be utilized in the Information Operations (IO) domain to frame RF as attempting to divert attention from war crimes or active kinetic escalations.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: MLD BREACH EXECUTION AND BOLHRAD INTERDICTION (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF mechanized forces will attempt to penetrate the Stepnohorsk MLD between 020130Z and 020300Z DEC. This is tightly coordinated with the UAV group attempting to strike the Bolhrad GLOC NLT 020400Z DEC. The current window represents the tactical peak of the synchronized attack.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 DECAPITATION VIA AIR ASSETS (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE)

If RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) confirms delays or failures in the mandatory C2 dispersal of the 5 OShB and adjacent maneuver units, RF air assets (Su-34/35/Su-57 supported by EW/SEAD) will execute a low-altitude strike targeting forward CPs between 020300Z - 020500Z DEC. Success in this action would create localized command paralysis and operational collapse, forcing a premature commitment of the Strategic Reserve.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)

1. MLD Defense Fire Adjustment (IMMEDIATE): Directive: Refine CBF based on P1 CR results. Do not cease CBF, but if P1 CR confirms armor breakthrough axes, shift a portion of long-range fire assets (HIMARS, etc.) from static artillery targets to confirmed, concentrated RF reserve and armor staging areas (1-5 km behind the penetration point).
2. C2 Force Protection Confirmation (CRITICAL): MANDATE STATUS REPORT. Requires immediate verification (NLT 020130Z DEC) from the 5 OShB that CP dispersal and strict EMCON are 100% enforced. If compliance is not confirmed, initiate secondary communication links (satellite/redundant fiber) and prepare an AD asset to cover the primary CP location as a contingency against the MDCOA.
3. AD/C-UAS TTP Utilization: Given the high pressure on AD assets, ensure the validated R-60 TTP (identified in the previous daily summary) is utilized for the Bolhrad threat if feasible, reserving high-end SAMs for confirmed high-performance RF air assets (Su-34/35).

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. PSYOPS Counter-Narrative (URGENT): Develop and immediately disseminate a counter-narrative addressing the Dmytro Korchynsky video (RVvoenkor). TTP: Highlight the RF hypocrisy by citing Korchynsky's listing as an extremist/terrorist entity within the RF itself, framing the propaganda as RF desperation and explicit manipulation by using "enemies" to deceive the Russian populace and demoralize Ukrainians.
2. Strategic Focus Reinforcement: Instruct diplomatic channels to dismiss the RF-promoted TASS distractions (Venezuela/BRICS) as irrelevant to the core security situation. Focus all public messaging back on the kinetic realities of the RF MLD assault and the resulting civilian casualties.