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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-01 23:34:27Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-01 23:04:30Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL/DECISIVE PHASE

TIME: 020100Z DEC 25


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is characterized by the initiation of the synchronized multi-domain assault phase, confirming the pre-identified Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA).

  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): The Main Line of Defense (MLD) remains the decisive point. Kinetic indicators suggest the mechanized assault is underway, or in its immediate pre-fire preparation finale.
  • Northern Shaping Axis (Kharkiv): RF forces are sustaining high-intensity, precision shaping fires. The confirmed Tornado-S MLRS strike on a Temporary Deployment Point (PVD) validates RF intent to suppress UAF reserve movement and degrade rear logistics/C2 in the North.
  • Southern Shaping Axis (Odesa/Danube): The UAV group previously vectoring towards Izmail/Reni has shifted course towards Bolhrad. This movement targets the inland security corridor and logistical routes near the Moldovan border, posing an increased threat to the operational depth of the critical Danube port facilities.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions continue to facilitate high-tempo kinetic operations and effective RF reconnaissance/targeting (e.g., Tornado-S usage requires high-fidelity targeting data). No weather degradation affecting air or ground movement is reported.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are executing the decisive synchronization plan. UAF forces are now fully committed to MLD defense at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously dealing with high-priority deep strikes. Control measures must reflect the immediate threat to the Bolhrad/Reni logistical corridor by allocating dedicated security and AD assets to this new vector, without compromising the MLD defense.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intentions are confirmed as achieving a breach in the Stepnohorsk MLD while simultaneously using synchronized shaping operations (Kharkiv MLRS/KABs and Odesa UAVs) to force UAF AD dispersal and C2 resource drain.

  • Kinetic Synchronization: The confirmation of a Tornado-S strike (MLRS) in Kharkiv Oblast (012304Z DEC) demonstrates effective RF coordination, utilizing high-precision systems to attack rear targets at the exact moment kinetic pressure escalates on the MLD.
  • Tactical Adaptation (Southern Axis): The UAV vector change towards Bolhrad (012317Z DEC) suggests RF may be attempting to bypass the primary coastal AD batteries protecting Izmail/Reni, attacking the facilities or supporting infrastructure from the inland flank.
  • Logistics: No new data contradicts the previous assessment of distant, low-confidence logistics strain (Ushaki). RF short-term kinetic execution remains unconstrained.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of the high-priority UAV threat to the Bolhrad vector is a critical tactical adaptation, requiring an immediate re-evaluation of AD engagement zones and prioritized interdiction lines, moving forces inland from coastal positions.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

  • Confidence: MEDIUM. Unchanged. Sufficient forward stockpiles support the current Stepnohorsk assault phase.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

Confidence: HIGH. RF C2 demonstrates robust multi-domain synchronization, ensuring that kinetic attacks (Stepnohorsk) are perfectly timed with high-value suppression (Tornado-S strike) and diversionary/economic threats (Bolhrad UAV vector).


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF posture is fully defensive and under extreme pressure across multiple domains. READINESS: The political readiness is strengthened by the confirmation of progress on the EU conflict resolution plan (012309Z DEC), providing strategic support during the immediate tactical crisis. Tactical readiness is severely challenged by the sustained requirement to defend both the MLD and critical rear infrastructure simultaneously.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback: Confirmed effectiveness of RF precision fires (Tornado-S) against UAF rear area PVDs (Kharkiv).
  • Success (Strategic/IO): Confirmation of EU diplomatic progress supports the long-term political strategy, mitigating RF attempts to force an immediate ceasefire based on kinetic gains (e.g., Pokrovsk).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Targeted Counter-UAS capability for the Bolhrad corridor. Given the UAV vector change, UAF requires mobile, networked C-UAS/SHORAD assets dedicated to this inland threat. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Lack of AD depth. UAF must decide immediately on the AD allocation ratio between Stepnohorsk (Decisive Engagement) and Bolhrad (Strategic Economic Security).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF information channels are leveraging the EU diplomatic news (progress on settlement plan) to frame the conflict externally, potentially suggesting Western fatigue or pressure for resolution. Internally, RF messaging focuses on domestic issues (LDPR/VTB) and military precision (Tornado-S footage). The goal remains to create cognitive overload and distract from the decisive kinetic event at Stepnohorsk.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is likely strained by the simultaneous kinetic pressure in the North (Kharkiv) and South (Odesa/Stepnohorsk). Counter-IO must immediately amplify the significance of the diplomatic progress (EU commitment) to offset kinetic fears.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confidence: HIGH. Confirmation by Von der Leyen that progress was made on a resolution plan with Zelenskyy (012309Z DEC) solidifies the Western diplomatic track and limits the leverage RF can gain from the "Moscow Mediation" track (mentioned in the previous daily report).


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: MLD BREACH AND BOLHRAD INTERDICTION (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF continues the mechanized assault along the Stepnohorsk MLD (020000Z - 020300Z DEC). The synchronized deep strikes will include:

  1. Sustained KAB/MLRS fires on Kharkiv rear areas to prevent reserve movement.
  2. UAV Group Interdiction: The UAV group targets GLOC/infrastructure in the Bolhrad region (ETA 020200Z - 020400Z DEC), forcing UAF AD assets to engage them far inland, leaving the immediate coastal AD thin for future, larger strikes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: STEPNOHORSK BREAKTHROUGH AND C2 DECAPITATION (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE)

The Stepnohorsk assault achieves a tactical breakthrough (3-5 km depth). Simultaneously, RF air assets (Su-34/Su-35) exploit the AD dilution (caused by the UAV/MLRS threats) to conduct a high-speed, low-altitude ingress, delivering precise stand-off munitions (e.g., Iskander or KAB-1500 equivalents) directly onto the forward operating C2 nodes of the 5 OShB and adjacent tactical reserves, causing temporary command paralysis and precipitating a local collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (ETA)ConfidenceDecision Point/Trigger
Stepnohorsk MLD Penetration Assessment020130Z - 020300Z DECHIGHTrigger for commitment of local tactical reserves (platoon/company level).
Bolhrad UAV Group Interception Window020200Z - 020400Z DECHIGHDecision on engagement assets (UAF AF vs. Ground SHORAD). Must be engaged before reaching high-value targets.
RF Air Asset Commitment (Stepnohorsk AD Exploitation)020300Z - 020500Z DECMEDIUMTrigger for mandatory C2 frequency hopping and physical dispersal.
Commitment of UAF Strategic Reserve (Stepnohorsk)NLT 020600Z DECHIGHDecision based on confirmed RF penetration depth (>3km).

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGaps/Unresolved QuestionsCollection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (MLD KINETICS)RF Mechanized Density and Direction. What are the primary RF breakthrough axes in Stepnohorsk, and what is the confirmed armor density (T-90 vs. T-72)?IMINT/RSTA (Zaporizhzhia - Stepnohorsk): Continuous high-frequency SAR/EO coverage focusing on armor columns moving 1-5km from the MLD.
PRIORITY 2 (DEEP THREAT RESPONSE)Bolhrad Threat Assessment. Precise coordinates, velocity, and assumed payload/type of the UAV group now moving toward Bolhrad.EW/SIGINT/ISR (Odesa Region): Urgent redirection of sensors (e.g., UAF AF fighter patrols, mobile EW teams) to the Bolhrad vector to classify the drone type (Shahed-136 vs. Jet-Shahed).
PRIORITY 3 (RF PRECISION STRIKE SOURCE)Tornado-S Launch Origin. Identifying the specific launch location of the Tornado-S MLRS strike in Kharkiv Oblast.SIGINT/ELINT (Kharkiv/Belgorod Axis): Continuous monitoring of RF MLRS fire control signatures to pinpoint launch positions for immediate Counter-Battery Fire (CBF).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)

  1. MLD DEFENSE (Stepnohorsk - CRITICAL): Directive: Maximize CBF. Prioritize immediate, heavy Counter-Battery Fire against known/suspected RF artillery positions supporting the Stepnohorsk assault. All available HIMARS allocation must be focused on reducing RF fire support over the MLD area for the next four hours.
  2. AD ALLOCATION (URGENT - Bolhrad Focus): Re-orient SHORAD/Mobile AD. Immediately pull back non-essential coastal SHORAD assets protecting the open sea approach and redeploy them to the Bolhrad/Reni inland corridor. Prioritize deployment of mobile AD (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, or R-60 adaptation) to establish an inner defensive ring for the port infrastructure against the confirmed inland UAV vector.
  3. KHARKIV CBF: Immediately utilize the intelligence gap closure (CR P3) to conduct Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST) via long-range artillery against the identified Tornado-S launch location. Punishing the use of high-precision fires is essential for deterrence.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)

  1. IO TACTICS (IMMEDIATE): Leverage the Tornado-S precision strike in Kharkiv (targeting PVDs) to generate immediate international condemnation, emphasizing civilian and military casualties just prior to the UN Security Council session (if applicable). This counteracts the RF narrative of "peace solicitation."
  2. DIPLOMATIC FOCUS: Task the Minister of Foreign Affairs to utilize the confirmed EU resolution progress (Von der Leyen statement) as a demonstration of strategic strength, rather than weakness, reinforcing that negotiations will only proceed on UAF terms, regardless of short-term kinetic setbacks at Pokrovsk or Stepnohorsk.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-01 23:04:30Z)

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