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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-01 20:04:33Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-01 19:34:34Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MDCOA IMMINENT: KINETIC WINDOW CLOSED, COGNITIVE DOMAIN COLLAPSE

TIME: 012145Z DEC 25 CONFIDENCE LEVEL: HIGH (RF IO Dominance / MDCOA Imminence) // CRITICAL (5 OShB Status)


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is characterized by high-intensity RF information warfare (IO) intended to mask the imminent Main Effort (MLD) in the South.

  • Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Druzhkivka): RF sources (Gerasimov via Peskov) have definitively claimed the "liberation" of Pokrovsk (renamed Krasnoarmeysk). This is synchronized with ground reporting near Druzhkivka, indicating RF consolidation efforts targeting the SKELIA Regiment's isolated defense perimeter.
    • FACT: The GLOC severance (Phase Line W-1) is now treated by RF strategic command as a confirmed operational victory.
    • JUDGMENT: This IO surge is designed to saturate the global information space 6-8 hours prior to the expected Southern MLD initiation, preventing effective UAF crisis management.
  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (Southern Front): The MDCOA risk is maximized. The critical window for proactive counter-preparation fires (5 OShB) NLT 012200Z DEC has lapsed without confirmation of execution. All UAF operational planning must now shift from pre-emption to kinetic response/delay.
  • Deep Rear (Kyiv/Vyshhorod): Confirmed successful strategic strike by RF, liquidating a high-value MIB asset (FP-7/FP-9 designer). This validates RF capability to decapitate UAF domestic technology programs.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, enabling RF aviation support and sustained KAB use against forward positions (Air Force confirmed KAB launches on Donetsk). UAV activity (Northern Kharkiv) suggests continued AD drain tactics.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF posture remains dangerously reactive. While forces are alerted in the South, the potential failure of the pre-emptive fire mission has ceded the initiative to the 55th Guards. RF C2 is confirmed centralized and highly effective (Putin receiving immediate reports from Gerasimov regarding Pokrovsk).


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intentions are focused on collapsing UAF resistance across three domains simultaneously: kinetic (Zaporizhzhia), technological (Vyshhorod MIB), and political (budget crisis exploitation).

  • Kinetic Synchronization: RF command has demonstrated the ability to link claimed battlefield successes (Pokrovsk) with strategic targeting (Vyshhorod designer), reinforcing a narrative of relentless pressure.
  • MDCOA Trigger: The lack of confirmed UAF counter-preparation fire execution provides RF commanders with a green light for the Stepnohorsk assault NLT 020000Z DEC, assuming maximal force projection.
  • Propaganda / Diplomatic Nexus: RF IO is explicitly linking military gains (Pokrovsk/Vovchansk) with the ongoing US/UA deadlock on territorial concessions (ABC News report), pressuring the US to coerce Kyiv into unfavorable terms.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The key tactical development is the shift to confirmed high-value strategic targeting in the deep rear (Vyshhorod). This suggests RF is prioritizing the long-term degradation of UAF technological asymmetry (UAVs) alongside immediate battlefield gains.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain robust. External fundraising appeals (Dva Mayora for Kherson) continue to provide supplemental, decentralized sustainment, freeing up conventional military logistics for the Stepnohorsk MLD.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is currently operating at a high synchronization level. The chain of command (Gerasimov -> Putin -> Peskov -> IO channels) executed a massive, timely information operation regarding Pokrovsk/Vovchansk immediately following the high-level meeting. Confidence: HIGH.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Defensive anticipation in Zaporizhzhia. Internal political vulnerability is now acute. READINESS: Operational readiness is challenged by the critical intelligence gap regarding the 5 OShB status. Assuming failure, the Southern front is dangerously exposed to the MDCOA. CRITICAL VULNERABILITY: The confirmed liquidation of key MIB personnel (Vyshhorod) will cause a 3-6 month slowdown in certain domestic drone programs (FP-7/FP-9), requiring immediate contingency planning for materiel replacement.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (Operational/Kinetic): Probable failure/delay of the critical 5 OShB fire mission.
  • Setback (Technological): Loss of key personnel in the Vyshhorod strike.
  • Setback (Cognitive/Political): Failure of the Ruling Coalition to pass the 2026 State Budget (RBC-Ukraine), creating a political crisis that RF IO will immediately exploit to undermine NCA authority and stability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL TIME CONSTRAINT: The operational clock has moved past the pre-emption window. The immediate resource requirement is rapid execution of secondary deep strike assets (HIMARS/ATACMS) to interdict the 55th Guards concentration before the 020000Z DEC window. Political resources must be focused on immediate budget reconciliation.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (RF)

RF IO is currently executing a maximum effort campaign:

  1. Asserting Military Inevitability: Claims of seizing Pokrovsk/Vovchansk, amplified by Gerasimov's direct report to Putin.
  2. Strategic Symbolism: Renaming a Moscow metro station to "Luganska" to normalize annexation and project long-term control.
  3. Exploiting Internal Weakness: RF IO will immediately amplify the UAF budget crisis as proof of government failure and systemic instability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under extreme pressure due to the synchronized shock of claimed major territorial losses (Pokrovsk) and confirmed domestic political paralysis (Budget). Maintaining public confidence requires immediate, verifiable counter-narratives and swift resolution of the budget deadlock. Public fundraising (STERNENKO, Operational ZSU) continues, indicating grassroots resilience but demanding government stability.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The report of the US/UA deadlock on territorial concessions (TASS via ABC News) significantly amplifies the urgency of the battlefield situation. RF seeks to demonstrate that kinetic victories translate directly into diplomatic advantage, increasing external pressure on Kyiv to negotiate from a position of weakness. (DS Belief: Disagreement on Territorial Concessions 0.027999).


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION UNDER IO COVER. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maintain maximum IO saturation regarding Pokrovsk for the next 4-8 hours to fix UAF psychological attention. They will initiate the main mechanized thrust from the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv staging areas NLT 020000Z DEC. This MLCOA is now nearly certain due to the failure of the UAF pre-emptive counter-fire mission, enabling the 55th Guards to deploy at full strength. The Huliaipole action will remain a high-density fixing operation.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: KINETIC-POLITICAL SYNCHRONIZATION. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a significant operational breakthrough (20-30 km) near Stepnohorsk NLT 020400Z DEC. Simultaneously, they leverage the political instability caused by the UAF budget crisis and the Pokrovsk claims to call for an immediate ceasefire based on the current line of contact. This MDCOA aims to achieve both a territorial gain and a forced political concession within the next 12 hours, leveraging US frustration over the territorial deadlock.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (ETA)ConfidenceDecision Point/Trigger
Commitment of Alternate Deep Strike (HIMARS/ATACMS)CRITICAL: NLT 012230Z DECHIGHCRITICAL DECISION POINT: Failure to strike the 55th Guards staging area by this time guarantees maximum enemy force projection for the assault.
RF Mechanized Assault Initiation (Stepnohorsk)020000Z - 020400Z DECHIGHFirst confirmed satellite detection of massed armor movement across the initial line of departure (ILD).
NCA Decision on Budget ReconciliationNLT 020600Z DECHIGHFailure to resolve the budget crisis by morning provides RF with maximum political IO advantage.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGaps/Unresolved QuestionsCollection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC/FORCE POSTURE - CRITICAL)5 OShB Mission Status. Immediate confirmation of the status (executed/delayed/failed) of the 5 OShB counter-preparation mission and the reason for the non-execution by 012200Z DEC.BLUE FORCE TRACKING/COMINT: J-3 must provide an immediate After Action Review (AAR) summary on the fire mission.
PRIORITY 2 (KINETIC/MDCOA VECTOR - URGENT)Stepnohorsk Density and Deployment. Did the 55th Guards shift their staging area in anticipation of UAF fire? Precise coordinates and estimate of the forward armored density.IMINT/SAR (Zaporizhzhia): Task all available ISR platforms (especially SAR) to provide current, high-resolution imagery of the Orikhiv-Stepnohorsk corridor.
PRIORITY 3 (TECHINT/MIB)Impact of Vyshhorod Strike. Assessment of the organizational damage and timeline for replacement of the liquidated MIB leader (Maxym Hayduk) and his project teams (FP-7/FP-9).HUMINT/J-4/Tech Coordination: Immediate contact with Fire Point company leadership and internal security assessment of MIB sites.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)

  1. Immediate Deep Strike Execution (J-3, URGENT ACTION): Proceed immediately with the secondary deep strike plan (HIMARS/ATACMS/MLRS reserve) targeting the confirmed 55th Guards staging areas near Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv (Priority 2 CR focus). Assume the 5 OShB mission failed and the enemy will launch at maximum strength. Execution NLT 012230Z DEC is mandatory to degrade the assault capability.
  2. Air Defense Re-prioritization (J-3/J-4): Given the confirmed strategic targeting of MIB personnel, increase the operational readiness level of AD coverage for all confirmed defense industrial production and C2 nodes in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv oblasts.
  3. Huliaipole Engagement (J-3): Commit only highly mobile, fire-supported holding forces (e.g., mechanised light infantry/dismounts) to counter the Huliaipole action. Prevent the force-on-force engagement from drawing the decisive operational reserves away from the Stepnohorsk axis.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)

  1. Stabilize Political Domain (NCA, CRITICAL ACTION): NCA leadership must immediately convene to resolve the 2026 Budget deadlock and issue a joint, unified statement NLT 020000Z DEC. The statement must emphasize the resolution of the crisis and project national stability to negate RF IO exploitation.
  2. Counter-IO on Pokrovsk (J-7): Issue a precise statement defining the situation in Pokrovsk as a defensive perimeter collapse under overwhelming force, while focusing on the heroic defense of the SKELIA Regiment. Do not confirm the RF "liberation" claims; focus on force preservation and continued fight elsewhere.
  3. Address MIB Strike (J-7/NCA): Issue a public statement honoring the liquidated MIB leader and emphasizing the resilience of UAF technological innovation, including accelerated Western MIB cooperation (Dassault). Frame the RF strike as an act of desperation against UAF technological superiority.
Previous (2025-12-01 19:34:34Z)

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