INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – CRITICAL WINDOW CLOSING: MDCOA PRECURSORS CONFIRMED
TIME: 012130Z DEC 25
CONFIDENCE LEVEL: HIGH (Kinetic Synchronization/IO Dominance) // MEDIUM (MDCOA Vector)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational environment is characterized by RF kinetic synchronization across multiple domains: immediate penetration (South), tactical victory consolidation (Donetsk), and continued AD dispersion (Deep Rear).
- Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF/Proxy IO assets (TASS, Colonelcassad) have claimed the "liberation" of Pokrovsk (referred to as Krasnoarmeysk) and Vovchansk (Kharkiv Oblast).
- FACT: The western GLOC to Pokrovsk (Phase Line W-1) is severed, and the UAF garrison (SKELIA Regiment) remains isolated in decentralized defense.
- JUDGMENT: RF IO is attempting to establish a fait accompli regarding these two axes to maximize diplomatic leverage during the ongoing Moscow/US talks.
- Zaporizhzhia Axis (Southern Front): The MDCOA risk is escalating rapidly.
- FACT: TASS reported (011922Z) that RF forces have commenced an operation to "liberate" Huliaipole, claiming ongoing street fighting. Huliaipole lies northeast of the primary Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv corridor.
- JUDGMENT: This Huliaipole claim is either the initial kinetic component of the wider Southern MDCOA, or a fixing operation intended to draw UAF reserves and pre-empt counter-preparation fires (5 OShB) away from the critical Stepnohorsk corridor.
- Deep Rear: UAF Air Force confirmed BpLA activity moving into Poltava (011911Z). This sustains the RF strategy of dispersing UAF high-value AD assets away from the Southern front MLD.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring sustained RF UAS, KAB, and combined arms mechanized movement throughout the Stepnohorsk/Huliaipole axes.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
The UAF remains in a critical anticipatory posture in the South. The decisive outcome rests on the timely execution of long-range counter-preparation fires. The RF command is actively synchronizing kinetic action with strategic IO via the Presidential Administration (Peskov).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
RF intentions are focused on accelerating the perceived collapse of the Ukrainian defense and creating internal political friction.
- Kinetic Synchronization: RF has validated the ability to coordinate deep strikes (Poltava/Dnipro) with near-front kinetic action (Huliaipole) and simultaneous strategic information operations (Pokrovsk claims, Putin visit).
- MDCOA Trigger Acceleration: The claimed commencement of operations in Huliaipole (19:22Z) suggests that RF commanders are accelerating the timeline for the broader Southern thrust, likely due to the critical decision point window (NLT 012200Z DEC) closing for UAF counter-preparation fires.
- Logistical Focus: Putin’s directive to ensure winter supplies (011922Z) is a public confirmation of a long-term commitment, counteracting UAF narratives of RF resource depletion.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
The shift to claiming offensive operations in Huliaipole is the key tactical change. This could signify:
- The MLD is positioned further East than anticipated (Huliaipole instead of Stepnohorsk).
- A large-scale deception intended to draw UAF attention and tactical reconnaissance assets to Huliaipole, leaving the original Stepnohorsk staging area exposed for the 55th Guards thrust.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF logistics for the Southern grouping remain sufficient to support the MDCOA. The official emphasis on winter preparation confirms strategic sustainment planning is ongoing.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is highly effective and centrally controlled. The immediate dissemination of kinetic "victories" (Pokrovsk) and current operational claims (Huliaipole) via the Kremlin (Peskov) demonstrates tightly synchronized control between the military (General Staff) and the information domain (Presidential Administration). Confidence: HIGH.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
POSTURE: Defensive resilience in the East (Pokrovsk); Pre-emptive defense in the South.
READINESS: High technical diplomatic readiness demonstrated by the engagement with Dassault Aviation (011929Z), securing potential long-term aviation industrial support.
CRITICAL READINESS GAPS: The operational status of the 5 OShB counter-preparation fires remains the immediate, decisive vulnerability.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Success (Strategic-Technical): President Zelenskyy's meeting with Dassault Aviation confirms French commitment to defense industrial cooperation, potentially related to future fixed-wing or complex materiel acquisition (DS Score suggests interest in Rafale).
- Setback (Operational/IO): Failure to prevent the GLOC severance in Pokrovsk is being amplified by RF IO into a full strategic collapse.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
TIME CONSTRAINT: Less than 60 minutes remain until the previously established critical execution deadline for the 5 OShB counter-preparation mission (NLT 012200Z DEC). This time constraint overrides all other resource limitations.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (RF)
RF IO is currently dominating the narrative by asserting victory in Pokrovsk and projecting unstoppable momentum with the Huliaipole claim. This IO seeks to demoralize the Ukrainian public and solidify the international perception that military stalemate necessitates a diplomatic deal favoring Moscow.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Public morale faces immediate pressure from the synchronized RF claims of victory. UAF leadership must urgently counter the Pokrovsk narrative to prevent widespread confidence erosion. The domestic fundraising appeals (Operational ZSU) underscore the importance of maintaining public trust and support.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
- Negative Friction: White House optimism regarding a potential deal (011916Z) supports the RF diplomatic track by implying US pressure on Kyiv for concessions.
- Non-State Actor Pressure: Nobel laureates advocating for political prisoner release adds a complex humanitarian demand to any future peace settlement, increasing the complexity of NCA decision-making.
- Geopolitical Alignment: EU sanctions preparation against Belarus (011911Z) reinforces Western political unity against Russia's proxies.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: FIXATION AND PENETRATION (SOUTHERN AXIS). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will maintain the IO offensive regarding Pokrovsk/Vovchansk while deploying mechanized forces to validate the Huliaipole operation claim. This Huliaipole action is likely designed to fix UAF reserves and reconnaissance efforts along the eastern edge of the Zaporizhzhia front, allowing the main 55th Guards force to execute the decisive breakthrough on the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 020000Z DEC, under cover of massed KAB and aviation support.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: CONCURRENT, DUAL-AXIS THRUST (STEPNOHORSK AND HULIAIPOLE). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF executes both the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv mechanized assault (55th Guards) and a strong operational penetration at Huliaipole simultaneously. This dual thrust will exhaust UAF reserves and prevent effective local counter-mobility/counter-fire coordination, leading to a deep penetration along the MLD (Stepnohorsk) within the first 6-12 hours. This MDCOA is significantly more likely if the 5 OShB counter-preparation fires fail to execute.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline (ETA) | Confidence | Decision Point/Trigger |
|---|
| Commitment of 5 OShB counter-preparation fires | CRITICAL: NLT 012200Z DEC (Less than 60 minutes remaining) | HIGH | CRITICAL DECISION POINT: Execution/non-execution determines the viability of the MDCOA. Confirmed delay necessitates immediate HIMARS/ATACMS re-tasking to the 55th Guards staging area. |
| MDCOA Initiation (Stepnohorsk Assault) | 020000Z - 020400Z DEC (Accelerated window) | HIGH | Detection of intensive EW activity (GPS spoofing/jamming) and mass forward movement of the 55th Guards mechanized spearheads between Orikhiv and Stepnohorsk. |
| NCA Counter-Corruption Report to Denmark/EU | NLT 020600Z DEC | HIGH | Maintaining integrity is critical against the backdrop of RF IO seeking to erode Western trust. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gaps/Unresolved Questions | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC/FORCE POSTURE - URGENT) | STATUS OF 5 OShB FIRE MISSION. Did the 5 OShB fire mission against the 55th Guards staging area (Stepnohorsk corridor) execute NLT 012130Z DEC? If not, why? | BLUE FORCE TRACKING/COMINT: Immediate confirmation of mission status, asset availability, and impact assessment. |
| PRIORITY 2 (KINETIC/MDCOA VECTOR - CRITICAL) | Huliaipole Verification. Is the claimed street fighting in Huliaipole genuine MLD, or a battalion-sized fixing effort/deception? What is the force density difference between Huliaipole and Stepnohorsk staging areas? | IMINT/SAR (Zaporizhzhia): Task ISR assets to conduct immediate, concurrent sweeps of both the Huliaipole and Stepnohorsk corridors (Orikhiv front) to confirm troop/armor concentrations. |
| PRIORITY 3 (TECHINT/AD) | Poltava AD Requirement. What specific AD assets were diverted to counter the Poltava drone wave (011911Z), and does this create a strategic gap in MLD coverage for the 020000Z window? | SIGINT/J-3 Coordination: Monitor AD consumption rates and re-deployment orders associated with the current drone wave. |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)
- Immediate Counter-Preparation (J-3, URGENT ACTION): The execution window for 5 OShB is closing (NLT 012200Z DEC). If confirmation of successful 5 OShB mission execution is not received by 012145Z DEC, immediately divert all available deep strike assets (HIMARS, ATACMS) to target the confirmed Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv staging areas of the 55th Guards. Do not delay for the Huliaipole assessment; the Stepnohorsk threat is verified and imminent.
- Resource Allocation (J-3/J-4): Maintain a decisive firepower reserve dedicated to the Stepnohorsk axis. Only commit limited, mobile forces to Huliaipole until the kinetic nature (feint vs. MLD) is confirmed by Priority 2 CR. Avoid the critical mistake of over-committing reserves to a potential RF deception.
- Pokrovsk (Force Preservation): Continue supporting the SKELIA Regiment's decentralized defense with indirect fire attrition along the Kostiantynivka axis. Prioritize small-unit extraction and high-value equipment preservation over attempting to punch a major breakout corridor against the established RF blockade.
7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)
- Immediate IO Counter-Action (NCA/J-7): Issue a high-profile, verifiable update NLT 012230Z DEC directly contradicting the RF claims of "liberation" in Pokrovsk and Vovchansk. MESSAGING: Emphasize the commitment to fight and expose the RF IO strategy of claiming victory while diplomatic talks are underway.
- Highlight Future Strength: Widely disseminate the success of the Dassault Aviation meeting (Rafale industrial base cooperation) as proof of long-term, high-technology Western commitment, directly refuting RF claims of military inevitability.
- Address Diplomatic Friction: Proactively address the White House's "optimistic" peace deal rhetoric by reiterating that any negotiation must be based on the principles of Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, not desperation caused by battlefield pressure.
