INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – EXECUTE COUNTER-PREPARATION: STEPNOHORSK MDCOA IMMINENT
TIME: 012100Z DEC 25
CONFIDENCE LEVEL: HIGH (Kinetic Synchronization) // MEDIUM (Financial Stabilization)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational environment remains defined by a kinetic shaping phase focused on fixing UAF AD and reserves, preceding the imminent MDCOA in the South.
- Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): Fighting continues in close quarters (CQC). RF sources claim consolidated gains and continued assault by the 'O' Group towards Pokrovsk and surrounding areas. UAF elements are conducting decentralized defense and tactical friction operations (Confirmed UAF drone strikes on RF logistics on the Kostiantynivka axis, 011849Z).
- Southern/Deep Axis (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv): RF deep strike activity (Shahed drones) is expanding laterally and northward.
- FACT: UAF Air Force tracked multiple Shahed drone groups moving into Dnipropetrovsk (from S Kharkiv, 011847Z) and Chernihiv (from N Sumy, 011848Z).
- JUDGEMENT: This strike vector confirms the intent to maximize UAF AD dispersion and drain high-value interceptors across a broad front (Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv), clearing the air corridor for massed aviation support for the impending Stepnohorsk MDCOA.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear conditions persist, favoring sustained RF UAS and KAB operations throughout the expected MDCOA window (020000Z-020600Z DEC).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF posture is divided: attrition defense in Donetsk and anticipatory concentration in Zaporizhzhia. The deployment status of the 5th Assault Brigade (5 OShB) counter-preparation fires remains the critical unknown element prior to the MDCOA trigger.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
RF intentions are locked onto two simultaneous objectives: achieving operational penetration in the South and forcing diplomatic concessions in the West.
- Kinetic MDCOA (CONFIDENCE: HIGH): The widespread, dispersed Shahed activity is the final kinetic precursor to the ground assault. RF maintains sufficient mechanized forces and fire support (2652th Artillery Base activity, confirmed KAB range expansion per P-DR) to execute a deep penetration of the Stepnohorsk axis.
- Information Operations (IO) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH): RF is leveraging reports of stalled US/UA talks regarding territorial concessions (011900Z) to amplify the narrative that kinetic collapse (Pokrovsk) necessitates diplomatic capitulation.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF is actively utilizing captured materiel for IO gain. The capture of a UAF "Termit" Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) (011958Z) will be leveraged to undermine UAF technological modernization narratives and demonstrate tactical superiority to internal and external audiences.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
UAF drone units continue to inflict friction on RF logistics (Kostiantynivka axis), but this friction has not yet degraded the capacity to stage the MDCOA. RF supply lines supporting the 55th Guards deployment remain viable.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the coordinated kinetic shaping (deep drone strikes) and IO messaging (Moscow/territorial concessions). RF commanders retain the initiative in setting the timing of the next major kinetic phase.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
POSTURE: Defensive concentration in Zaporizhzhia Oblast; active attrition across the eastern front.
READINESS: Tactical readiness is high (Confirmed successful attrition strikes near Oleksiivka, 011852Z). Strategic Financial Readiness has improved significantly.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Success (Strategic Finance/Procurement): President Zelenskyy confirmed the Netherlands' second package of $250 Million USD under the PURL program (011838Z). This commitment, totaling $750M USD from the Netherlands, effectively addresses the previously reported $750M EUR procurement funding gap (P-ISR, Section 3.3), assuming successful conversion/reconciliation of USD/EUR and prioritization of high-demand items (e.g., AD, F-16 components).
- Success (Tech/Diplomatic): Ukraine and the Netherlands signed an agreement for joint drone production (011854Z), securing a long-term strategic supply chain for critical UAS capabilities.
- Setback (Strategic-Diplomatic): UAF sources confirm ABC News reports of a lack of progress in US/UA talks regarding territorial concessions (011900Z). This diplomatic friction risks strengthening RF negotiating positions in the near term.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
The immediate financial constraint is significantly mitigated by the Netherlands funding package. The primary remaining constraints are:
- Time Constraint: Less than 3 hours remain until the MDCOA kinetic window opens.
- Political/IO Constraint: The corruption credibility constraint (Fire Point case) remains active and could jeopardize future non-PURL aid from concerned allies (e.g., Denmark).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (RF)
RF IO is focused on exploiting strategic vulnerabilities:
- Diplomatic Isolation: Promoting the narrative that key allies (Turkey) are prioritizing their own integration (EU) over Ukraine, concurrent with reports of stalled US/UA territorial talks.
- Military Inevitability: Propagandizing the Pokrovsk assault and the capture of UAF UGVs to suggest overwhelming military superiority.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF morale is supported by the confirmation of high-value international financial and technological support (Netherlands agreements). This positive news should be leveraged quickly to counterbalance the negative political friction arising from the territorial concession debate.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The Netherlands commitment to funding ($250M PURL) and joint production is the most significant strategic counter-move against RF influence operations. This demonstrates Western willingness to commit to long-term military modernization and support, directly refuting RF claims of abandonment.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: INFRASTRUCTURE ATTRITION AND DIPLOMATIC FREEZE. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will sustain drone/KAB saturation of deep rear targets (Dnipro/Chernihiv) to maintain AD dispersion. Simultaneously, RF will utilize the next 12 hours to leverage the "no progress on concessions" narrative to create an internal political crisis within the UAF National Command Authority (NCA) regarding potential ceasefires or withdrawal from exposed positions.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: 55TH GUARDS FULL-SCALE MECHANIZED ASSAULT. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
The combined arms assault on the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv axis launches within the 020000Z - 020600Z DEC window. Failure to execute the planned UAF counter-preparation fires NLT 012200Z DEC will allow the RF 55th Guards to initiate the assault from secure staging areas, significantly increasing the probability of a MLD penetration.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline (ETA) | Confidence | Decision Point/Trigger |
|---|
| Commitment of 5 OShB counter-preparation fires | CRITICAL: NLT 012200Z DEC (1 hour remaining) | HIGH | CRITICAL DECISION POINT: Execution of deep fires against 55th Guards staging to degrade/delay the MDCOA. No margin for further delay. |
| MDCOA Initiation (Stepnohorsk Assault) | 020000Z - 020600Z DEC | HIGH | Detection of intensive electronic warfare (EW) activity, massed aviation, and forward movement of RF mechanized spearheads. |
| NCA Counter-Corruption Report to Denmark/EU | NLT 020600Z DEC | HIGH | Necessary to maintain credibility following the financial commitment success and preempt future aid freeze (P-ISR CRITICAL). |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gaps/Unresolved Questions | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC/FORCE POSTURE - URGENT) | 5 OShB Counter-Preparation Status. Did 5 OShB receive/execute the fire mission NLT 012100Z DEC? If not, are alternative deep strike assets immediately available (HIMARS/ATACMS) to target 55th Guards staging before 020000Z DEC? | BLUE FORCE TRACKING/COMINT: Immediate confirmation of fire mission execution status and impact assessment. If not executed, initiate immediate asset re-tasking. |
| PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/EW - CRITICAL) | MDCOA EW Profile. Increase SIGINT focus on the Stepnohorsk corridor. Is RF launching jamming/deception efforts (e.g., GPS spoofing, radio silence) to mask the final staging movements between 012200Z and 020000Z DEC? | SIGINT/IMINT: Dedicate full-spectrum EW monitoring in the Zaporizhzhia axis (Orikhiv-Stepnohorsk). |
| PRIORITY 3 (STRATEGIC FINANCE) | Reconciliation of Funding Gap. What specific items are allocated from the $250M USD PURL package, and does this funding fully compensate for the previous $750M EUR gap in critical procurement? | HUMINT/OSINT (MoD/J4): Task finance liaisons to obtain detailed procurement manifest and delivery timelines from the US/Netherlands PURL administrators. |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)
- Southern Counter-Preparation (IMMEDIATE ACTION): CONFIRM and EXECUTE the deep fire mission against 55th Guards staging by the 5th Assault Brigade (5 OShB) NLT 012200Z DEC. If 5 OShB is operationally constrained, re-task high-value long-range fires (HIMARS, heavy artillery batteries) to strike confirmed RF staging nodes immediately. Delaying this mission risks MDCOA initiation with minimal disruption.
- Integrated Air Defense (AD) (DYNAMIC REDEPLOYMENT): Given the confirmed dispersed drone attack vectors (Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv), utilize UAF Air Force tracking data to dynamically redirect mobile SHORAD assets (e.g., Gepard/Avengers) to counter incoming BpLA groups, protecting rear infrastructure while retaining core AD coverage for the Stepnohorsk MLD (Aviation threat).
- Pokrovsk (FORCE EXTRACTION): Continue to use drone and indirect fire attrition (Kostiantynivka axis) to keep RF forces consolidating the blockade confused and under friction. Prioritize small-unit evasion and exfiltration over large-scale, costly breakout attempts.
7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)
- Amplify Strategic Support (IMMEDIATE): The NCA must immediately and widely disseminate the Netherlands PURL funding and joint drone production agreement. MESSAGING: Frame this as a permanent commitment to Ukraine's long-term military industrial base, directly counteracting the "stalled peace talks" narrative and RF claims of Western fatigue.
- Manage Corruption Crisis (CONTINUED PRIORITY): Deliver the detailed response or commitment to audit regarding the Fire Point case to Denmark NLT 020600Z DEC as previously directed. Ensure that the positive news (Netherlands funding) does not lead to complacency regarding the critical need to maintain institutional integrity with all partners.
