Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – C2 STABILIZATION AND STEPNOHORSK FORCE MODERNIZATION

TIME: 011600Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by kinetic stabilization through strategic AD dilution in the rear and critical diplomatic consolidation against Russian strategic messaging.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): The situation remains terminal, confirming the GLOC Blockade (Phase Line W-1). However, UAF SSO elements continue localized Close Quarters Combat (CQC) and interdiction, confirming fighting cohesion despite the isolation. (Confirmed: SSO video of RF loss, 15:49Z).
• Northern Axis (Kupyansk): President Zelenskyy publicly claimed UAF forces have "almost completely cleaned up" Kupyansk. This is a critical counter-narrative to RF operational claims and indicates successful kinetic counter-pressure being applied to RF forces in this sector.
• Deep Strike Zone: RF confirmed utilizing an Iskander missile strike on an identified drone production facility in Dnipropetrovsk (11:21Z). This validates the enemy's intent to sustain AD dilution through high-value targeting of defense industrial bases (DIB).
• Cross-Border Operations: UAF specialized units (Aquila, DPNSU) executed successful FPV/drone strikes on RF vehicles and UAV C2 antennas in the Kursk direction (15:45Z), demonstrating continued asymmetric offensive capacity across the international border.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Continued conditions favor high-tempo UAS/FPV operations. Low ceilings complicate manned air support and extraction operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces remain fixed by the dual demands of the Pokrovsk extraction/holding action and the immediate requirement to reinforce the Southern Axis against the MDCOA. The NCA is prioritizing political stabilization, proactively addressing the Office of the President (OP) succession and leveraging the unified diplomatic front (Macron/Security Guarantees) to counter RF political warfare.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intentions are focused on preparing the Southern axis while demonstrating force superiority through reorganization and deep strike capability.

• Kinetic Intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Sustain systematic AD pressure via high-value missile strikes (Dnipro DIB confirmed) to ensure air superiority preparation for the Stepnohorsk MDCOA.
• Force Modernization Intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The formal reorganization of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Guards Naval Infantry Division (15:40Z) signals an attempt to formalize and increase the force generation capacity of a proven, high-readiness assault unit. This directly enhances the lethality and scale of future mechanized breakthrough operations, most likely in the Zaporizhzhia (Stepnohorsk) sector.
• Information Warfare Intent (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF continues to attempt to undermine diplomatic consensus (e.g., using the EU statement against the use of frozen assets, 16:00Z) while downplaying UAF tactical successes (e.g., Kupyansk counter-claims).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting: Shift to precise, high-value Iskander strikes on DIB facilities (Dnipro drone production), maximizing the dual effects of resource degradation and AD drain.
• Organizational: Formal establishment of the 55th Guards Division, confirming long-term commitment to offensive capability using elite assault forces.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

SUSTAINED (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The confirmed use of the Iskander system and high-rate KAB/Shahed attacks show no immediate constraints on high-end munitions or deep strike capability. Civilian/reader aid campaigns (Два майора, 15:52Z) continue to supplement tactical logistics for rear area/Crimean defense.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronized kinetic (Pokrovsk consolidation, Dnipro strike) and organizational (55th Division formation) actions.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

HIGHLY ACTIVE/RESILIENT. UAF retains tactical offensive capability (Kursk strikes) and maintains political stability despite intense RF IO. Proactive messaging regarding OP succession (16:03Z) effectively neutralizes the RF attempt to leverage perceived internal political paralysis. Readiness remains severely taxed by the immediate requirement to reinforce the South.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical/Kinetic): Confirmation of successful counter-battery/interdiction strikes against RF C2/vehicles in the Kursk direction. Continued SSO operational freedom in the Pokrovsk sector.
• Success (Information/Kinetic): Zelenskyy's public claim of "almost complete clean-up" of Kupyansk serves as a crucial strategic counter-weight to the loss of Pokrovsk.
• Success (Strategic/Diplomatic): Confirmation that the "Coalition of the Willing" has completed work on Security Guarantees (Macron, 15:43Z), solidifying the Western commitment framework beyond immediate aid.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the inability to rapidly generate mobile, high-volume AD protection for frontline units, exacerbated by the continuous need to divert assets to DIB protection (Dnipro). Diplomatic constraints include the EU disagreement regarding the use of frozen RF assets for long-term financing (16:00Z).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (RF)

RF IO is dual-track:

1. Diplomatic Fissure Amplification: Highlighting internal EU/Western disagreements (e.g., Kallas opposing asset loans) to portray a lack of unity (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
2. Narrative of Overwhelming Force: Leveraging the formal reorganization of the 55th Guards Division and the Pokrovsk victory to project inevitability and overwhelming conventional strength (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
3. Domestic Diversion: RF state media continues to focus on peripheral domestic issues (Russian crime, consumer problems) to normalize the conflict environment.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (UAF)

Morale benefits significantly from the high-level diplomatic support (Macron condolences for Dnipro, security guarantees finalized) and the direct, immediate response from the NCA regarding internal C2 structure (OP succession). The focus on DIB strikes (Dnipro) reinforces the domestic messaging regarding the need for robust AD protection.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

STRENGTHENING (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The completion of security guarantee work by the Coalition marks a formal transition toward long-term defense planning. Zelenskyy's detailed reporting on the 6.5-hour territorial discussion with US counterparts confirms high-level, serious diplomatic engagement, counteracting RF claims of abandonment. French support remains demonstrably firm (Macron condolences for Dnipro).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: INTENSIFIED SHAPING FIRE AND DIPLOMATIC MAXIMALISM. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will sustain heavy, precise deep strikes targeting DIB and C2 nodes (as seen in Dnipro) to fix UAF AD assets NLT 020600Z DEC. Concurrently, RF will leverage the Moscow diplomatic track and the formalized 55th Guards Division to present maximalist terms for a ceasefire, aiming to freeze the front lines on current advances (Pokrovsk consolidation). Small-scale RF probes in the Sloviansk direction (per RF Telegram reports) are likely diversions to fix UAF attention north.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: DECISIVE MECHANIZED ASSAULT LED BY 55TH GUARDS DIVISION. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF launches the concentrated, combined arms assault on the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv corridor NLT 020200Z DEC. The formation of the new 55th Guards Naval Infantry Division signals the commitment of significant, high-readiness assault force capacity to this axis. This force is optimized for breakthrough and exploitation, aiming for the operational encirclement of UAF forces in Zaporizhzhia. Air preparation fires will be overwhelming (KAB/Jet-Shahed).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)

1. Phase Line W-1 Final Effort (CRITICAL - NLT 011730Z DEC): Execute the coordinated fire mission using deep-strike assets (HIMARS, heavy artillery) to breach the RF proxy blockade on Phase Line W-1. Priority: Extraction of SKELIA Regiment personnel and their captured RF POWs, prioritizing the tactical and IO value of the cohesive unit and POWs over saving materiel.
2. Counter-MDCOA Force Prioritization (IMMEDIATE): Given the confirmation of the 55th Guards Division formation, the Stepnohorsk defense is now the highest kinetic priority. Immediately confirm the full deployment status and readiness posture of the 5th Assault Brigade (5 OShB) in this sector. Directive: Prepare 5 OShB commanders for immediate massed-fire counter-preparation missions targeting identified 55th Guards staging areas, irrespective of Pokrovsk outcomes.
3. DIB Air Defense Layering: Reprioritize remaining Iskander/KAB interception capability to the most critical remaining DIB facilities following the Dnipro strike. Utilize the experimental R-60 TTP (if validated) for point defense of rear C2 nodes to free up conventional assets for the Southern front.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)

1. IO Consolidation (IMMEDIATE): The NCA must leverage the positive diplomatic momentum (Security Guarantees completed, Macron support) to consolidate domestic opinion. Publish a joint statement detailing the progress on US peace talks and security guarantees, explicitly using Zelenskyy's statement that the "territorial question is the most difficult" to manage expectations while demonstrating commitment.
2. Neutralize C2 Disruption (IMMEDIATE): Since the Yermak/Umerov narrative appears to be fading, the NCA should now use the measured statement regarding the OP succession (16:03Z) to reinforce stability and institutional continuity rather than defensiveness. Frame the appointment process as "thorough and consultative" to contrast with RF narratives of chaos.
3. Counter-Force Narrative: Proactively disseminate information regarding the successful UAF operation in the Kursk direction (Aquila strikes) and the Kupyansk counter-claims to demonstrate offensive operational flexibility and deny RF the narrative of overall operational momentum.