Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – POKROVSK CONSOLIDATION AND SOUTHERN C2 SHAPING

TIME: 011700Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The crisis in Pokrovsk has entered the RF consolidation phase, while the main kinetic risk shifts decisively to the Southern Axis.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): SKELIA Regiment remains isolated but is conducting decentralized, effective Close Quarters Combat (CQC) operations (Confirmed: taking enemy prisoners). FPV drone footage confirms RF soldier presence inside heavily damaged buildings, indicating the final stage of urban clearing is underway.
• Deep Strike Zone: RF continues systematic pressure against UAF rear areas to force AD dilution. Kramatorsk residential areas were struck, confirming the sustainment of the AD drain strategy aimed at protecting the Stepnohorsk MDCOA staging.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Weather continues to favor high-tempo UAS/FPV operations. Low ceilings and visibility remain a complication for extraction and manned CAS operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Strategic Command (NCA) is actively projecting continuity of government and external support, attempting to counter the kinetic setback at Pokrovsk with high-level diplomatic engagement (Zelenskyy/Macron meeting confirmed). Frontline UAF reserves remain fixed by the necessity of managing the Pokrovsk extraction window and responding to sustained deep strikes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intentions are fully synchronized across kinetic, technological, and cognitive domains.

• Kinetic Intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Achieve complete internal control of Pokrovsk NLT 012000Z DEC. The FPV drone footage depicting potential looting or exploitation of dead RF personnel suggests localized RF ground commanders are prioritizing immediate tactical gains and exploitation over disciplined maneuver.
• Information Warfare Intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF is executing a highly targeted Information Operation (IO) aimed at fracturing UAF Strategic C2 stability immediately preceding the Ireland Summit. The synchronized claims regarding Yermak's forced immobility/criminal charges and the mocking of Umerov's progress reports seek to discredit key negotiators and create internal power struggles (DS Belief: Internal Power Struggle in Ukraine 0.000419).
• Technological Escalation: Sustained use of deep strikes (Kramatorsk confirmed) and Jet-Powered Shaheds guarantees UAF AD assets are kept diluted, enabling effective air preparation for the Southern Axis breakthrough.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• CQC Adaptation: RF forces are transitioning rapidly from maneuver to urban consolidation in Pokrovsk. The presence of young POWs (17 y/o) captured by SKELIA suggests RF is utilizing low-quality or mobilized personnel for high-risk urban clearing missions, preserving high-value units for the Stepnohorsk exploitation.
• Information Warfare Shift: The shift from generic defeatism (Colonelcassad missile claims) to targeted political disruption (Yermak/Umerov claims) indicates a higher level of political warfare synchronization with the Moscow diplomatic track.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

SUSTAINED (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). The high rate of air and missile activity (KAB, Shaheds, Kramatorsk strike) shows no immediate constraint.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in synchronization. The ability to coordinate a military crisis (Pokrovsk) with an acute political/IO campaign (Yermak/Umerov narratives) and high-level diplomatic feints (Moscow meeting) is indicative of centralized control.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

CRITICAL BUT RESILIENT. The resilience of the SKELIA Regiment (425th Separate Assault Regiment) is a significant tactical morale factor. Their ability to take prisoners while isolated contradicts RF operational claims of annihilation and validates the ongoing extraction effort. Readiness remains severely constrained by AD requirements in the rear (Kramatorsk/Dnipro).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical/Morale): SKELIA Regiment taking POWs confirms fighting cohesion and prevents the complete narrative collapse desired by RF.
• Success (Strategic/Diplomatic): Zelenskyy/Macron live address reinforces UAF's primary diplomatic track (Ireland Summit) and solidifies European commitment against the Moscow feint. Umerov's confirmed progress in US talks further counters RF narratives of isolation.
• Setback (Kinetic): Confirmed RF strike on Kramatorsk, sustaining casualty rates and necessitating the costly dilution of AD assets.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint remains SHORAD mobility and fire support for the W-1 breach. The technological gap regarding the R-60 TTP remains a critical factor for freeing up conventional AD assets needed in the South.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (RF)

RF IO is focused on creating internal paralysis in Kyiv.

1. C2 Disruption: Targeted dissemination of claims regarding Yermak's forced removal or corruption to undermine the NCA's political authority just prior to the Ireland negotiations.
2. Historical Revisionism: Efforts (Colonelcassad) to delegitimize the government's foundation (Maidan) to weaken domestic support for continued warfare.
3. Normalization: Use of domestic media (TASS, Moscow News) to portray stability and focus on non-war related topics.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors (UAF)

Sentiment is resilient but highly stressed. The strike on Kramatorsk reinforces the need for effective AD protection. Morale hinges on the immediate outcome of the SKELIA extraction (NLT 011800Z DEC) and the public projection of diplomatic unity (Zelenskyy/Macron). The Zaporizhzhia OMA’s promotion of national festivals serves as an important regional morale countermeasure in the high-risk Southern area.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

HIGH CONFIDENCE - MULTILATERAL REINFORCEMENT. The NCA has successfully leveraged the US/Miami talks (Umerov progress) and key European partner engagement (Macron) to project a united front, directly undermining the isolation narrative promoted by the Moscow meeting. The open letter from 16 Nobel Laureates introducing the topic of prisoner amnesty into peace talks (DS Belief: 0.063700) adds a complex humanitarian dimension that UAF negotiators must proactively manage.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: POKROVSK EXPLOITATION AND C2 DISRUPTION. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will complete the physical clearing and consolidation of Pokrovsk (NLT 012000Z DEC). Concurrently, RF will flood the Information Environment with IO targeting UAF C2 (Yermak/Umerov), attempting to maximize the psychological impact of the Pokrovsk victory to preemptively damage the outcomes of the Ireland Summit. Continued shaping fires (KAB/Shahed strikes on Dnipro/Kramatorsk) will be sustained to maintain AD dilution.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: MECHANIZED BREAKTHROUGH AT STEPNOHORSK (ZAPORIZHZHIA). (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF launches the concentrated ground assault on the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 020200Z DEC. The attack is anticipated to be preceded by an unusually heavy air preparation fires (KAB and Jet-Shaheds), exploiting the confirmed gaps in SHORAD caused by asset diversion to rear defense (Kramatorsk confirmed vulnerability). Success in this axis risks operational encirclement of UAF forces in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)

1. Phase Line W-1 Coordinated Breach (CRITICAL - NLT 011730Z DEC): Allocate all available deep-strike assets (HIMARS, heavy artillery) to execute a fire mission focused on generating a 30-minute window of suppressive fire on the confirmed RF proxy blocking elements on Phase Line W-1. This mission is paramount for maximizing the chances of extracting the cohesive SKELIA Regiment elements (confirmed taking POWs).
2. MDCOA Counter-Shaping Deployment (URGENT): Confirm the deployment of the 5th Assault Brigade (5 OShB) with UGV counter-mobility teams to the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv corridor immediately. This must be treated as the primary kinetic effort. Authorization required for the 5 OShB to prioritize the use of any available low-cost/high-volume AD assets (ManPADS/Sting) to target RF KAB launch platforms or Jet-Shahed routes in the sector, accepting risk elsewhere.
3. AD Asset Prioritization: Revert mobile SHORAD assets from the Dnipro/Kramatorsk defense rings to the Stepnohorsk frontline defense NLT 020000Z DEC, contingent on the R-60 TTP being approved for experimental deployment in the rear.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)

1. IO Counter-Strike (IMMEDIATE - NLT 011800Z DEC): Issue an authoritative joint statement (Presidential Office and MOD) directly refuting the RF claims regarding Yermak and Umerov. Frame this disinformation as a desperate attempt by RF to sabotage the legitimate, unified negotiation track (Ireland Summit). Simultaneously, publish the positive updates from the SKELIA Regiment (POW captures) to counter the narrative of total defeat in Pokrovsk.
2. Diplomatic Proactivity: Instruct the NCA delegation (Ireland Summit) to proactively address the Nobel Laureates' humanitarian appeal regarding prisoners of war and political detainees. Position the UAF as amenable to humanitarian exchanges, thereby neutralizing the RF attempt to complicate peace parameters with external pressure groups.