Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT 016/01 DEC 25

TIME: 011045Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: KINETIC GAINS SYNCHRONIZED WITH DIPLOMATIC CLOCK. UAF MUST DECISIVELY COMMIT RESERVES NLT 1130Z WHILE LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES. BALLISTIC STRIKES ON DNIPRO CONFIRMED.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF Main Effort remains the severance and consolidation of the Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) West of Pokrovsk (Phase Line W-1).

• Pokrovsk Axis: The primary GLOC remains functionally severed or interdicted by effective RF fire control. UAF counter-propaganda is active (10:09:05, 10:10:54), refuting broad territorial gains, which suggests UAF units retain cohesion, but the kinetic pressure on the SKELIA Regiment in the urban periphery is extreme.
• Central/Rear Area Attacks: Confirmed ballistic/missile strikes on Dnipro resulted in 3 KIA and 8 WIA (10:08:25, 10:14:05, 10:21:02). This represents a highly aggressive RF targeting of non-military areas in daylight hours, intended to maximize psychological and political impact.
• Air Activity (South/North): UAF Air Force confirms continued use of Guided Aerial Bombs (КАБи) in Zaporizhzhia (10:07:42), indicating sustained RF tactical air superiority over the Southern axis. Persistent UAV reconnaissance and strike probes are tracked moving towards Chernihiv and Zhytomyr/Korostyshiv (10:08:21, 10:09:45), straining UAF AD assets across multiple domains.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Favorable visibility and moderate ground conditions persist, supporting RF air operations (KABs, UAVs) and ground maneuver in Donetsk.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are maximizing offensive pressure to secure the Pokrovsk area NLT 012000Z DEC 25, directly correlating kinetic actions with the timing of tomorrow's confirmed diplomatic meeting (Putin/Whitcoff). RF forces are confirming complex operations in Donbas involving groups like "RUBICON" (10:20:30), suggesting specialized unit deployment for urban/complex terrain operations.
• UAF: UAF units are executing localized counter-propaganda and showcasing technological successes (Sting interceptor). However, the critical operational challenge remains the commitment of Strategic Reserves to Phase Line W-1.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF appears to be standardizing the use of KABs in the South and increasing kinetic/reconnaissance pressure on the Northern/Central flanks (UAVs) simultaneously. This is a classic multi-domain fixation effort designed to prevent UAF AD or ground assets from reinforcing Donetsk.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly centralized and synchronized, achieving alignment between military operations (Pokrovsk consolidation), internal messaging (mobilization/veteran support), and external diplomatic timing.

D. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements (CR)

The existing CRs remain critical, especially regarding Strategic Reserve Movement and the viability of Pokrovsk Western access.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are demonstrating strategic resilience by actively executing high-level diplomatic engagement (Zelenskyy in Paris, 10:14:33) while simultaneously achieving crucial technological validation (Sting interceptor). However, operational readiness remains strained by the requirement to defend the Pokrovsk axis without confirmed strategic reserve commitment.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign is peaking in synchronicity with the diplomatic timeline:

1. Diplomatic Leverage: The confirmation of the Putin/Whitcoff meeting NLT 02 DEC focuses all RF narratives toward establishing a position of strength and defining the conflict boundary based on current territorial gain (Pokrovsk).
2. Domestic Mobilization Reinforcement: RF channels are balancing domestic economic complaints (10:11:02) with high-intensity patriotic content (veteran profiles, 10:16:31) and confirming aggressive mobilization checks, preparing the population for continued, difficult conflict.
3. Counter-Propaganda Warfare: UAF is successfully employing active counter-propaganda (3rd Army Corps) and tactical victories (Sting interceptor) to refute RF claims of total collapse. This proactive UAF messaging is vital to maintaining domestic and international C2 confidence.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale in the rear (Dnipro) is under intense pressure due to high-casualty strikes. The immediate public display of high-level diplomacy (Paris) and the technical success of the Sting interceptor are crucial psychological countermeasures demonstrating continuous defense and innovation.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maintain maximum kinetic pressure in the Pokrovsk sector until 012000Z DEC 25. Primary MLCOA is continued consolidation, fire control, and clearing operations in the urban periphery, leveraging specialized units (RUBICON). RF information channels will then intensify messaging on the "new line of contact" to prime the international community for the ultimatum phase tied to the 02 DEC diplomatic meeting. Deep strike activity (ballistic/UAV) will continue against Central/Northern population centers to fix UAF AD and C2.

• Timeline Estimate: Kinetic consolidation complete NLT 012000Z DEC 25. Political/Diplomatic ultimatum NLT 021200Z DEC 25.
• Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF observes the continued strategic delay in UAF reserve commitment and initiates a rapid, mechanized exploitation deep into the operational rear (Kurakhove/Selydove) from the Pokrovsk breach (W-1). This exploitation will be preceded by maximum use of KABs and kinetic strikes on regional C2 and mobilization hubs. The MDCOA initiation window is tight, dependent on the assessment of UAF C2 paralysis today.

• Timeline Estimate: MDCOA Initiation Window: 011045Z DEC 25 – 011800Z DEC 25.
• Confidence: MEDIUM (Increasing rapidly. Every hour of delay in strategic reserve deployment significantly increases this risk.)

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

CRITICAL C2 RESOLUTION POINT (IMMEDIATE): 011130Z DEC 25. J3 must receive and execute strategic reserve deployment orders to secure Phase Line W-1 against MDCOA. Political resolution of internal friction must follow kinetic requirements. CRITICAL KINETIC ACTION POINT (URGENT): 011200Z DEC 25. UAF J3 must sustain maximum destructive fire missions on the units blocking Pokrovsk (P-1 CR target) to maintain the viability of even partial Western GLOC access. CRITICAL INFORMATION WARFARE POINT (IMMEDIATE): 011400Z DEC 25. NCA must formally leverage the Zelenskyy/Macron meeting outcome and the Sting interceptor success to publicly reaffirm strategic unity and technological superiority, directly countering the RF narrative of collapse.

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/J2)

1. STRATEGIC RESERVE DEPLOYMENT (P-1 CRITICAL): Execute the deployment of designated Strategic Reserves (e.g., 82nd AAB, 47th Mech, as planned) to pre-planned blocking positions on Phase Line W-2 (Kurakhove/Selydove region) NLT 011130Z DEC 25. This cannot be delayed. Simultaneously, task forward elements to immediately engage RF blocking forces on W-1 with maximum fire.
2. AD ASSET SHIFT (DNIPRO/BALLISTIC THREAT): Immediately conduct vulnerability assessment based on the Dnipro ballistic strike. Redeploy one high-mobility, short-to-medium range AD system (e.g., NASAMS, Patriot assets if available) to provide temporary coverage for Dnipro or high-value C2/logistics nodes in Central Ukraine against further ballistic attack (P-3 CR).
3. COUNTER-KAB TTP DEVELOPMENT (ZAPORIZHZHIA): J3/Air Staff must immediately begin developing and implementing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to counter the confirmed KAB threat in Zaporizhzhia, prioritizing the use of long-range fighters or EW systems to disrupt KAB guidance or targeting aircraft.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND C2 STABILIZATION (NCA/J9)

1. TECHNOLOGICAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE: Maximize dissemination of the Sting interceptor success (Geran-3 kill) through all international and domestic channels. Frame this as a demonstration of UAF innovation countering Russian mass production, directly undermining the "RF dominance" narrative.
2. DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE AMPLIFICATION: Ensure immediate, synchronized messaging from Paris regarding renewed French/European support, financial aid, and military commitment. This messaging must be delivered before the RF diplomatic meeting tomorrow.
3. INTERNAL UNITY STATEMENT: The President or Commander-in-Chief must deliver a public statement NLT 011400Z DEC 25 confirming C2 stability, condemning the Dnipro strikes, and clearly confirming that reinforcements are moving to the critical Donetsk front, addressing the prevailing uncertainty.

//END OF REPORT//