Sitrep 2025-12-01 10:04:34

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT 015/01 DEC 25

TIME: 011015Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS: GLOC SEVERANCE IMMINENT (Krasnoarmiysk Blockade Claim). RF KINETIC ACTIONS SYNCHRONIZED WITH CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING NLT 021200Z DEC 25. NCA C2 CLARITY REMAINS THE DECISIVE FACTOR.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF operational tempo in Donetsk remains high, focused on maximizing territorial gain ahead of the confirmed high-level diplomatic engagement (Putin/Whitcoff).

Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiysk) Axis: RF-aligned channels (DNR Militia/Sparta) are claiming successful interdiction and blockade of supply routes into the area they term the "encircled Krasnoarmiysk" (10:01Z). This VALIDATES the previous assessment that the M-30/H-20 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) is now functionally severed or under effective fire control. UAF units (SKELIA Regiment) are confirmed to be executing precision FPV strikes within urban/industrial zones (09:42Z), indicating ongoing localized defense efforts.
Klinove Flank: Confirmed RF liberation/capture of Klinove is widely disseminated across Russian military information channels (09:41Z, 09:48Z, 09:57Z), solidifying the RF northern operational flank and fixing UAF reserves previously noted in the Bakhmut-Siversk area.
Deep Strike and Rear Area Pressure: RF forces are maintaining high-volume deep action:
- Confirmed missile strike on Dnipro resulting in 3 KIA and 8 WIA (09:44Z – 09:52Z).
- Confirmed drone attack in Sumy Oblast resulting in 1 KIA (09:40Z).
- UAF Deep Action: GUR strike confirmed against occupation forces in Berdyansk (09:49Z).

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Favorable conditions for RF deep strike platforms (missiles/UAVs) and ground maneuver in Donetsk.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Focus is on kinetic consolidation west of Pokrovsk and maintaining deep fire pressure to disrupt UAF logistics and C2 (Dnipro, Sumy). RF Information Operations (IO) are escalating external threat narratives (NATO preemptive strike claim).
UAF: Units are fighting locally effective CQC defense in Pokrovsk. Strategic C2 and the commitment of reserves remain the critical operational vulnerability due to unresolved NCA political friction.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Factor	Assessment	Confidence
Primary Intent (Urgency)	RF is attempting to lock in territorial gains (Pokrovsk GLOC severance, Klinove capture) NLT 012000Z DEC 25 to establish the maximum possible advantage before the confirmed Putin/Whitcoff meeting tomorrow. Intent is to present the captured territory as a non-negotiable fait accompli.	HIGH
IO/Diplomatic Synchronization	Confirmed meeting between Putin and Steve Whitcoff (US associated envoy) tomorrow (09:53Z). RF is setting pre-negotiation conditions: framing Ukraine as isolated and demanding respect for sovereign rights (Peskov comments on Black Sea tanker strikes, 09:55Z).	HIGH
Cognitive Domain Warfare	RF is utilizing fabricated, highly aggressive external threat narratives (NATO preemptive strike, 09:36Z) to justify current operations to the domestic audience and promote unity/mobilization.	HIGH
Main Effort Status	RF is actively claiming to have completed the operational encirclement/blockade of Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk). This is a narrative aimed at inducing surrender, but militarily confirms the highest risk to UAF forces along Phase Line W-1.	HIGH

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are sustained, supported by continued domestic fundraising (09:35Z). RF domestic IO is attempting to manage localized economic dissatisfaction (rising car prices, 09:36Z) by redirecting criticism away from military spending. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, due to domestic economic vulnerability)

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating highly synchronous multi-domain execution, linking tactical gains directly to diplomatic signaling and domestic IO within a tight 24-hour window. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

D. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements (CR)

Priority	Gap Description	Confidence in Gap Assessment	Collection Requirement (CR)
P-1 (CRITICAL KINETIC STATUS)	Pokrovsk GLOC Confirmation (W-1). Precise confirmation of the viability of any remaining Western supply routes. Specifically, the location and disposition of the RF/Sparta unit claiming to block access.	HIGH	IMINT/UAS DA focus on all secondary roads feeding into Pokrovsk from the West. IMMEDIATE/ONGOING.
P-2 (NCA C2 STATUS - CRITICAL)	Strategic Reserve Movement Confirmation. Confirmation of the precise military orders issued (or not issued) regarding the deployment of Strategic Reserves (e.g., 82nd AAB, 47th Mech) to Phase Line W-1.	HIGH	HUMINT/C2 reporting from NCA/J3 sources. NLT 011130Z DEC 25.
P-3 (RF Deep Strike Intent)	Identification of RF staging areas for long-range strike assets targeting Ukrainian population centers (e.g., Dnipro, Sumy). Are strikes solely punitive, or targeting specific strategic infrastructure?	MEDIUM	SIGINT/ELINT focus on missile launch zones and targeting data. ONGOING.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under intense pressure along the Pokrovsk axis, compounded by the psychological impact of deep strikes. Resilience is demonstrated through continued GUR deep action (Berdyansk) and public military solidarity (46th/79th AABs). The Netherlands commitment of €250M for US weapons is a crucial counter-narrative success, offsetting previous diplomatic friction points.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Status	Event	Operational Impact	Confidence
Success (DIPLOMATIC)	Netherlands commitment of €250M for US weapons procurement (09:44Z).	Confirms continued NATO financial backing and mitigates the RF IO narrative of UAF isolation stemming from US negotiation friction.	HIGH
Success (DEEP ACTION)	GUR strike on RF targets in occupied Berdyansk confirmed (09:49Z).	Maintains pressure on RF logistics/C2 in the Southern rear, forcing RF to commit security assets far from the front.	HIGH
Setback (KINETIC)	Confirmed missile strike on Dnipro (3 KIA, 8 WIA) and drone strike on Sumy (1 KIA) (09:40Z-09:52Z).	Strains UAF AD assets and significantly degrades civilian morale and rear-area security, diverting attention from the Pokrovsk crisis.	HIGH
Setback (KINETIC/IO)	RF claim of "blockade/encirclement" of Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) (10:01Z).	Even if partial, this claim reinforces the operational reality that the main GLOC is unusable and increases pressure on the trapped UAF forces.	HIGH

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF campaign is in the critical synchronization phase leading up to tomorrow's diplomatic effort:

Imminent Crisis/Ultimatum: European officials (Kallas, 10:03Z) signal the next week is "decisive," validating the atmosphere of strategic crisis RF seeks to leverage.
External Provocation Framing: RF media is using fabricated (or extremely distorted) quotes from NATO military leadership (09:36Z) calling for preemptive strikes on Russia. This is a classic IO technique to shift the narrative from RF aggression to RF self-defense, domestically and internationally.
Geopolitical Wedge Driving: Peskov attempts to drive a wedge between Ukraine and NATO by claiming Ukrainian deep strikes (Black Sea tankers) violate Turkish sovereignty (09:55Z), seeking to complicate NATO consensus ahead of negotiations.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is being tested by concurrent kinetic attacks on major cities (Dnipro) and critical operational losses (Pokrovsk GLOC). The NCA's perceived lack of decisive action regarding internal political C2 friction creates a vacuum filled by RF narratives of paralysis. UAF solidarity messages (09:39Z) and rapid dissemination of Western aid news (Netherlands, 09:44Z) are key counter-measures.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will dedicate the period 011000Z to 012000Z DEC 25 to finalize fire control over the Western Pokrovsk access routes (Phase Line W-1) and secure the Klinove position against UAF counter-fixation fires. Following consolidation, RF diplomatic channels will prepare the ground for the ultimatum tied to the Putin/Whitcoff meeting, demanding a ceasefire along the current LOC NLT 021200Z DEC 25, framed by the fait accompli territorial gains.

Timeline Estimate: Kinetic consolidation complete NLT 012000Z DEC 25. Diplomatic Ultimatum initiated NLT 021200Z DEC 25.
Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Given the confirmed severity of the situation (GLOC severed/blockaded) and the confirmed strategic delay in UAF reserve commitment, the MDCOA is rapidly increasing in probability. RF observes the systemic failure to reinforce W-1 and launches an exploitation force (Likely Motorized/Armor) from the Pokrovsk axis directly toward the operational rear (Kurakhove/Selydove). This would be synchronized with an increased aerial suppression campaign over the Zaporizhzhia/Southern Axis (Stepnohorsk) to completely freeze UAF C2 response capabilities.

Timeline Estimate: MDCOA Initiation Window: 011015Z DEC 25 – 011800Z DEC 25.
Confidence: MEDIUM (Increasing rapidly due to confirmed GLOC block and missed C2 resolution deadline.)

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

CRITICAL C2 RESOLUTION POINT (IMMEDIATE/MISSED): The critical 1000Z deadline for NCA C2 resolution (internal political crisis) is passed. The failure to issue strategic reserve movement orders maximizes the kinetic risk (MDCOA). The revised critical point is the immediate issuance of the deployment order regardless of political status, NLT 011130Z DEC 25. CRITICAL KINETIC ACTION POINT (URGENT): 011200Z DEC 25. UAF J3 must execute maximum destructive fire missions on the units claiming the Krasnoarmiysk/Pokrovsk blockade (P-1 CR). Phase Line W-1 must be actively reinforced by designated reserve units NLT 1200Z. CRITICAL INFORMATION WARFARE POINT (IMMEDIATE): 011600Z DEC 25. NCA must initiate a major IO counter-offensive using the Netherlands aid and the Berdyansk GUR strike to demonstrate strategic continuity and operational capability before the RF narrative locks in the "UAF collapse" frame for the diplomatic meeting.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/J2)

COUNTER-BLOCKADE OPERATIONS (POKROVSK): PRIORITIZE DESTRUCTION OF RF BLOCKING FORCE. Immediately dedicate all available long-range artillery and HIMARS packages to suppress and destroy the specific RF/DNR units (Sparta/DNR Militsia) claiming control over the Pokrovsk-West supply lines (011001Z data). This action must aim to reopen a controlled evacuation/resupply corridor NLT 011500Z DEC 25.
AIR DEFENSE REDEPLOYMENT: Immediate, covert redeployment of one AD battery (mobile short-range/MANPADS) from a low-risk sector (e.g., secondary Northern flank) to the Dnipro region to mitigate future high-casualty strikes and restore civilian confidence.
MDCOA COUNTER-PREPARATION: All maneuver units operating on Phase Line W-2 (rearward of W-1) must assume MDCOA initiation (armored exploitation) and immediately begin preparing pre-planned fire missions, laying mines, and establishing anti-armor ambushes.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND C2 STABILIZATION (NCA/J9)

PROTOCOL UNITY PHASE VIII (C2 EXECUTION): The NCA must issue Strategic Reserve deployment orders immediately (NLT 011130Z DEC 25) via secure military channels. Public acknowledgment of the political situation is secondary to the kinetic requirement.
DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-FRAMING (TURKEY/BLACK SEA): Prepare and disseminate a statement (via MFA/GUR) explicitly detailing how RF aggression, not UAF action, is the source of Black Sea instability, citing documentation of RF mining and war crimes, directly refuting Peskov's attempt to use Turkey as a shield.
CIVILIAN MORALE (DNIPRO RESPONSE): President Zelenskyy or a senior official must provide an immediate, televised address from Dnipro/Sumy, condemning the strikes, confirming the Netherlands aid package, and explicitly stating that the C2 is functioning effectively to reinforce the front.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report