Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT 014/01 DEC 25

TIME: 010945Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS - NCA C2 STABILITY REMAINS CRITICAL. RF CONSOLIDATES BAKHMUT FLANK (KLINOVE) AND SYNCHRONIZES DIPLOMATIC/KINETIC PRESSURE.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The kinetic operational picture is defined by continued RF synchronization of ground maneuver in Donetsk with persistent long-range fire and deep action operations across Ukraine and into the RF depth.

• Pokrovsk (Donetsk): Reports of captured UAF personnel from Pokrovsk confirm the severity of the urban fighting and indicate RF elements have successfully penetrated or enveloped key defense sectors. The assumption (as per previous guidance) that the M-30/H-20 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) is severed remains valid. The RF Yug Group of Forces is consolidating forward gains.
• Klinove (Bakhmut-Siversk Flank): Confirmed capture of Klinove by RF MoD (09:23Z). This is a FACT. This gain stabilizes the northern operational flank for the Pokrovsk main effort and sets conditions for local exploitation toward Chasiv Yar or Siversk, fixing UAF reserves.
• Deep Strike and ISR:
  • UAV harassment flights are confirmed targeting Sumy, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts (09:08Z – 09:29Z). This effort strains UAF mobile AD assets and provides persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).
  • Confirmed strikes against civilian/infrastructure targets in Kherson (12 wounded) and Ovidopol coastal zone (09:20Z, 09:28Z). This maintains pressure on Southern UAF logistics and civilian morale.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Optimal conditions for RF deep strike assets (missiles/UAVs). RF Information Operations (IO) are leveraging environmental narratives (Dnipro/Black Sea pollution) to exacerbate domestic fears.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense: Continues to track high-speed targets (Sumy, 09:08Z) and UAV groups (Zhytomyr). AD effectiveness is hampered by persistent, multi-axis low-altitude threats.
• NCA Status: The National Command Authority (NCA) remains diplomatically active (Zelenskyy/Finland coordination, briefing on US talks), successfully projecting an image of continued function. However, the critical internal political C2 friction (Yermak/Malyuk) remains unresolved in the public domain, impeding timely commitment of strategic reserves required for the Pokrovsk counter-maneuver.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain capable of sustaining multi-front kinetic operations. Diplomatic signaling (Saudi visa agreement) and positive domestic economic reporting are used to project stability and long-term commitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrating synchronous execution across the kinetic (Klinove/Pokrovsk), deep action (New Moscow counter-response), and cognitive (pre-negotiation IO framing) domains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

D. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements (CR)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are successfully executing high-value, deep-action missions against RF technical targets (New Moscow scientist). However, the primary operational focus (Pokrovsk) is severely strained by the loss of key terrain and the critical delay in committing strategic reserves, a direct result of ongoing NCA political instability.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF campaign is fully operationalized to support the diplomatic offensive:

1. Imminent Negotiations/Ultimatum: The RF MoD and aligned war correspondents are explicitly linking the "liberation" of Klinove and Pokrovsk advances to the need for immediate, outcome-determining "peace negotiations." This is a pre-negotiation framing effort.
2. Internal Decapitation (Unresolved): The Yermak/Malyuk crisis remains a potent RF tool, used to explain any UAF tactical failure as a consequence of self-inflicted strategic paralysis.
3. Defeatism and Isolation: RF media amplifies narratives of European economic weakness (German austerity) and internal Ukrainian collapse (mocking environmental warnings) to promote defeatism among the populace.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under extreme duress, caught between the gravity of the Pokrovsk kinetic crisis, confirmed losses (Klinove, Kherson strikes), and the unresolved political C2 instability. The government's effort to project normalcy (social welfare, health updates) is an essential, but insufficient, countermeasure against the concurrent hybrid attack.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will dedicate the next 12 hours to finalizing the physical severance of the M-30/H-20 GLOC and establishing effective fire control over the Western Pokrovsk approaches (Phase Line W-1). Simultaneously, RF C2 will prepare diplomatic channels, leveraging the Putin/Whitcoff meeting tomorrow as the venue for presenting a non-negotiable proposal demanding ceasefire along the current LOC, validated by the territorial gains (Pokrovsk/Klinove).

• Timeline Estimate: Kinetic consolidation complete NLT 012000Z DEC 25. Diplomatic Ultimatum initiated NLT 021200Z DEC 25.
• Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF observes the continued failure of UAF Strategic Reserves to deploy to the Western Blocking Position (due to ongoing NCA paralysis). RF exploits this systemic failure by launching an armored exploitation deep into the operational rear area, aiming for the next logical hub (likely Kurakhove or Selydove). Simultaneously, RF may initiate the secondary assault in the South (Stepnohorsk or Prymorske sector) under heavy air cover to maximize UAF C2 distraction and prevent any coherent counter-attack preparation.

• Timeline Estimate: MDCOA Initiation Window: 011000Z DEC 25 – 011800Z DEC 25.
• Confidence: MEDIUM (Increasing hourly until C2 clarity is achieved.)

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

CRITICAL C2 RESOLUTION POINT (IMMEDIATE): 011000Z DEC 25. NCA must publicly confirm the status of the Head of the Presidential Office (Yermak) and issue an unambiguous public or military-channel statement confirming the activation of specific Strategic Reserves (J3 must execute regardless). CRITICAL KINETIC ACTION POINT (URGENT): 011200Z DEC 25. UAF J3 must assume GLOC severance and ensure all designated units are executing reinforcement operations on Phase Line W-1. Failure to stabilize this line by 1200Z allows RF to breach the operational rear. CRITICAL INFORMATION WARFARE POINT (IMMEDIATE): 011400Z DEC 25. President Zelenskyy’s team, while in Europe, must secure and announce a concrete, sizable European military aid package (e.g., specific AD systems or armored vehicles) to definitively counter the "US friction" and "isolation" narratives.

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/J2)

1. PRIORITIZE POKROVSK REAR DEFENSE: EXECUTE HARD LOCKDOWN W-1. Redirect all immediately available engineer assets and indirect fire support to rapidly enhance prepared defensive positions along Phase Line W-1. This is the last line of defense before the operational rear. Units currently fighting in Pokrovsk must be given clear, controlled withdrawal parameters to fall back to W-1.
2. COUNTER-FIXATION AT KLINOVE: Task Tactical Aviation and long-range fires to execute highly disruptive strikes against RF consolidation efforts at Klinove (P-3 CR). The goal is to maximize attrition and prevent the RF from freeing up forces there for redeployment toward Pokrovsk or further exploitation toward Siversk.
3. HIGH-VALUE TARGET PROTECTION: Initiate a Level 2 Force Protection Alert for all UAF/GUR technical and R&D personnel (similar to the targeted scientist in New Moscow). Increase immediate counter-intelligence focus on internal sources that may provide RF targeting data.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND C2 STABILIZATION (NCA/J9)

1. PROTOCOL UNITY PHASE VII (C2 STABILIZATION): NLT 011000Z DEC 25, the NCA must resolve the command crisis. If a decision on Yermak/Malyuk cannot be made publicly, the NCA must use military command channels to immediately issue the Strategic Reserve Deployment Order. The kinetic situation requires action despite the political stalemate.
2. EUROPEAN ANCHORING: Leverage the Finnish and French engagements to announce a significant new European initiative (e.g., a "Strategic Defense Pact" or "Joint AD Task Force") that explicitly fills the perceived gap created by US negotiation difficulties, neutralizing the "isolation" IO campaign.
3. COUNTER-ENVIRONMENTAL IO: Task the Ministry of Environmental Protection and relevant regional authorities (Kherson, Dnipro) to immediately issue scientifically backed assessments regarding alleged pollution incidents, attributing the damage to documented RF military action (mining, shelling), thereby turning the narrative into an RF war crime.

//END OF REPORT//