Sitrep 2025-12-01 09:04:30

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT 013/01 DEC 25

TIME: 010904Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: POKROVSK AXIS - GLOC SEVERANCE IMMINENT (HIGH PROBABILITY). NCA C2 COHESION CRITICALLY DEGRADED BY TARGETED IO CAMPAIGN.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by RF synchronization of decisive kinetic action in Donetsk with a high-intensity cognitive domain attack against the Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA).

Pokrovsk (Main Effort): While direct kinetic reporting from the immediate GLOC is pending (CR P-1 remains critical), the sustained, high-intensity Information Operations (IO) targeting the NCA implies that RF ground maneuver units (e.g., 78th MRR) are executing the plan to sever the M-30/H-20 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).
Deep Strike Operations: The RF ballistic missile threat has been resolved (08:52Z), confirming a successful Iskander-M strike on infrastructure in Dnipro (08:41Z/08:53Z). This is a fact.
Peripheral Pressure: RF forces are confirmed active on secondary axes:
- RF Ministry of Defense claims the liberation of Klinove (Bakhmut-Siversk) (09:03Z).
- RF channels claim advances south of Vovchansk (Kharkiv) and in the Krasnolymanskyi direction (09:01Z). This activity confirms continued operational shaping to fix UAF reserves.
Air Activity: UAV reconnaissance and harassment flights reported across northern Ukraine (Donetsk ➡️ Kharkiv; Kyiv ➡️ Zhytomyr), continuing to strain mobile Air Defense assets.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant operational restrictions. RF continues to utilize optimal targeting conditions for high-precision missile strikes (Iskander-M).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense: Remains adaptive, issuing timely ballistic alerts, but resource allocation is under stress due to the multi-axis UAV threat.
NCA Status: Critically unstable. The sustained IO attack targeting the relationship between President Zelenskyy and Head of Presidential Office Yermak, combined with US negotiation friction, threatens to stall the commitment of strategic reserves needed to counter the Pokrovsk breach.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Factor	Assessment	Confidence
Primary Intent (Current Focus)	Leverage the tactical success at Pokrovsk (GLOC severance) and the engineered strategic political crisis (Yermak/US friction) to compel the UAF NCA into making a panicked, non-optimal strategic defensive consolidation NLT 011800Z DEC 25.	HIGH
Adaptive Capabilities	RF forces demonstrate high proficiency in synchronized long-range kinetic strikes (Iskander-M on Dnipro) and adaptive Counter-UAS (CUAS) measures (claiming 18 drones neutralized).	HIGH
Strategic IO Amplification	RF actively leverages leaks from Ukrainian domestic media (e.g., regarding Yermak's resignation request and conflict with SBU Head Malyuk) to lend legitimacy to the narrative of internal collapse and strategic paralysis.	HIGH
Deep Strike Counter-Action	Confirmed assassination attempt/sabotage in New Moscow targeting a defense sector scientist (08:58Z). While RF channels attempt to control the narrative, this confirms successful GUR/UAF action targeting RF depth, which RF must now counter or tolerate.	MEDIUM

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic sustainment projection remains strong, bolstered by high-level diplomatic signaling (Saudi Arabia visa agreement, positive domestic economic reporting), projecting long-term commitment capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly integrated across domains. The political/IO operation (targeting Yermak) is perfectly timed to coincide with the Pokrovsk kinetic climax, demonstrating effective multi-domain C2 integration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

D. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements (CR)

Priority	Gap Description	Confidence in Gap Assessment	Collection Requirement (CR)
P-1 (CRITICAL KINETIC STATUS)	Pokrovsk GLOC Status. Confirmation of severance status (physical control by RF elements of the M-30/H-20 junction) and the current location of the 78th MRR primary exploitation force.	HIGH	IMINT/LIDAR/UAS DA focused 5km west of Pokrovsk NLT 010930Z DEC 25.
P-2 (NCA C2 STATUS - CRITICAL)	NCA Status of Command. Confirmation of Yermak's employment status and operational orders issued by the NCA regarding strategic reserves post-0800Z decision point.	HIGH	HUMINT/C2 reporting from NCA/J3 sources. IMMEDIATE/ONGOING.
P-3 (RF SECONDARY AXIS INTENT)	Combat readiness and immediate objective of RF forces securing Klinove (Bakhmut flank). Is this intended for localized defense or follow-on exploitation toward Chasiv Yar/Siversk?	MEDIUM	SIGINT/ELINT focus on Klinove C2 nets and logistical buildup. ONGOING.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under maximum strain. While tactical units in the South report successful attrition operations (300+ enemy losses, 1 tank destroyed) and air defense remains responsive, the internal political crisis (Yermak/Malyuk conflict) risks institutional instability at the moment of kinetic crisis.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Status	Event	Operational Impact	Confidence
Success (DIPLOMATIC)	President Zelenskyy arrives in France (08:47Z).	Direct counter-move against the narrative of abandonment by the US/West. Opens an immediate line for securing political and military reassurance from key European allies.	HIGH
Success (DEEP ACTION)	Sabotage operation targeting RF defense scientist confirmed in New Moscow (08:58Z).	Confirms UAF/GUR retention of deep strike/sabotage capability against high-value technical targets, diverting RF internal security resources.	HIGH
Setback (KINETIC)	Confirmed Iskander-M strike on Dnipro (08:41Z).	High-precision attack successfully prosecuted against infrastructure, contributing to logistical stress and undermining public confidence in deep AD coverage.	HIGH
Setback (C2/IO)	Confirmed amplification of internal NCA conflicts (Yermak/Malyuk/Zelenskyy) by RF channels.	Severely degrades UAF image of unity and risks paralyzing institutional decision-making required for the Pokrovsk counter-maneuver.	HIGH

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO focus is entirely on domestic political decapitation (Operation "Yermak Fissure") and diplomatic isolation:

NCA Disarray: RF channels are treating Yermak's forced resignation and internal conflict (specifically his reported attempt to fire SBU Head Malyuk) as confirmed fact, portraying Kyiv's leadership as paralyzed and self-destructing.
Transatlantic Rift: Continued amplification of Estonian PM Kallas' comments regarding exclusion from US/Ukraine negotiations to sow distrust between Kyiv and European capitals.
Turkish Friction: RF attempts to leverage the maritime incident involving the tanker KAIROS in the Turkish EEZ, framing it as a Ukrainian environmental disaster/attack, aimed at drawing Turkish diplomatic condemnation.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is critically threatened by the concurrent stress points: kinetic threat (Dnipro strikes), physical losses (Pokrovsk GLOC likely severed), and the unprecedented level of internal political scandal being amplified by RF IO. Stabilizing the NCA C2 structure is the priority for retaining both military and public morale.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces, having utilized synchronized deep fires and IO to achieve C2 paralysis, will confirm GLOC severance at Pokrovsk NLT 011000Z DEC 25. They will solidify gains by exploiting the Klinove position (Bakhmut flank) to fix reserves in the north, while using the political crisis as grounds for immediately issuing a public demand for unconditional "ceasefire and negotiations" based on the current line of contact. This will be an IO effort to lock in the territorial gains.

Timeline Estimate: Political Ultimatum NLT 011200Z DEC 25.
Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The MDCOA is the delayed or non-committal response of UAF Strategic Reserves due to NCA paralysis. RF exploits this vacuum by rapidly extending the Pokrovsk salient westwards, aiming to secure the secondary GLOCs (T0515) toward Kurakhove or launching the secondary Southern mechanized assault (Stepnohorsk), despite recent attrition. The failure to commit reserves by 1000Z risks operational envelopment west of Pokrovsk.

Timeline Estimate: MDCOA Initiation Window: 011000Z DEC 25 – 011600Z DEC 25.
Confidence: MEDIUM (Increasing if NCA silence on reserves continues past 0930Z).

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

CRITICAL C2 RESOLUTION POINT (IMMEDIATE): 010930Z DEC 25. The NCA must break the internal political silence and publicly confirm/deny Yermak's status and the command structure regarding strategic reserve commitment. CRITICAL KINETIC ACTION POINT (URGENT): 011000Z DEC 25. UAF J3 must assume GLOC severance and finalize positioning and activation of the Western Blocking Position (Phase Line W-1/W-2). CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC ACTION POINT (IMMEDIATE): 011030Z DEC 25. President Zelenskyy’s team must issue a joint statement with French leadership affirming maximum unified support and rejecting all narratives of diplomatic abandonment.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/J2)

EXECUTE PHASE LINE W-1: Assume the M-30/H-20 GLOC is compromised. Direct all remaining maneuver units and combat engineers to reinforce and establish blocking positions along Phase Line W-1 (west of Pokrovsk). Prioritize establishing integrated fire support for these positions immediately, regardless of the NCA's political status.
Klinove Counter-Concentration: Use localized indirect fires and UAS assets to disrupt RF consolidation at Klinove. This prevents the RF from deepening the salient on the Bakhmut flank, which would further draw attention away from the critical Western Blocking Position.
Deep Strike Force Protection: Review security protocols for high-value technical personnel (similar to the victim in Vyshhorod) and strategic deep action assets, given RF demonstrated ability to target these individuals based on intelligence.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND C2 STABILIZATION (NCA/J9)

PROTOCOL UNITY PHASE VI (C2 STABILIZATION): NLT 010930Z DEC 25, the NCA must issue a direct, brief statement resolving the Yermak/Malyuk political crisis. If Yermak is removed, this must be framed as a strategic reorganization necessary for total war effectiveness, not a sign of internal weakness or RF success. If he remains, a unified photo/video address must be issued. The political narrative must be closed immediately.
DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE (FRANCE): Leverage the immediate arrival in France (011030Z DEC 25) to secure a high-profile commitment from President Macron concerning military aid or financial support. Frame this as the successful strategic pivot that counters US ambiguity.
COUNTER-MARITIME NARRATIVE: Immediately task the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to issue a formal rebuttal regarding the Turkish EEZ tanker incident, providing evidence that attributes the incident to RF mines or naval action, countering the RF narrative designed to alienate Ankara.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report