Sitrep 2025-12-01 05:34:29

SITUATION REPORT 006/01 DEC 25

TIME: 010730Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: CRITICAL C2 DISRUPTION AND RF ATTRITION DEFLECTION AMIDST POKROVSK CRISIS

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Kinetic activity remains concentrated along the Pokrovsk GLOC (M-30/H-20) axis. UAF SKELIA Regiment (425th) reports sustained Close Quarters Combat (CQC). The P-2 CR (GLOC integrity) remains unconfirmed and is the single most critical kinetic factor determining strategic reserve commitment.

Confirmed RF strike intensity in the South remains high: Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration reports 752 strikes on 20 settlements in the last 24 hours, reinforcing the strategic intent to suppress the Southern Operational Area (SOA) in preparation for the Stepnohorsk MDCOA.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Favorable conditions persist for UAS, tactical aviation, and ground maneuvers across the Eastern and Southern fronts.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are sustaining high-intensity defensive operations, evidenced by the reported 1,060 estimated RF casualties in the last 24 hours (Source: UAF GenStaff). The integrity of the UAF Strategic Reserve commitment plan is now highly dependent on the 010800Z DEC 25 decision point, which is under severe stress due to simultaneous political destabilization.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Factor	Assessment	Confidence
Primary Intent	Sever Pokrovsk GLOC, force NCA reserve paralysis, and utilize the resulting political vacuum to amplify diplomatic pressure for a kinetic pause and unfavorable settlement.	HIGH
Current COA Refined	KINETIC: Intensify CQC in Pokrovsk to meet the 011000Z severance timeline. INFORMATIONAL: Coordinated, high-volume dissemination of the FSB/Crimea 'Terrorism' narrative (UAS, TASS, etc.) to overwhelm diplomatic channels and justify future RF escalation.	HIGH
Adaptation	RF propaganda focused on armored superiority (T-80BVM messaging) reinforces the expectation that RF will rely heavily on conventional mechanized breakthroughs in the South (Stepnohorsk), counteracting the previous UAF UGV successes.	MEDIUM
Logistics	Sustainment capacity via the Kazakhstan corridor is stable, allowing high-tempo operations for the next 48-72 hours, despite the strategic impact of the Alabuga strike.	MEDIUM

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed successful targeting of the UAF robotized platform (UGV) is the most critical kinetic adaptation. RF is demonstrating effective targeting capabilities against UAF innovative TTPs, suggesting high-fidelity SIGINT/RECON support for tactical units.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF synchronization remains exceptional. The kinetic pressure (Pokrovsk) is perfectly timed with the maximized Information Campaign (Crimea FSB plot) and the realization of a severe Ukrainian C2 shockwave (reported Yermak dismissal). RF successfully exploits the strategic decision-making timeline.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Kinetic readiness remains high, particularly among forward elements (SKELIA) capable of sustaining high attrition rates. However, the political and strategic C2 environment has deteriorated rapidly. The reported dismissal of Andriy Yermak, a key figure in strategic communication and diplomacy, introduces a severe element of C2 friction and strategic instability at the most sensitive operational moment (pre-reserve commitment).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Status	Event	Operational Impact	Confidence
Success	UAF GenStaff Casualty Report (1060 RF KIA/WIA).	High attrition rate confirms the effectiveness of current forward defenses and adherence to the strategy of trading space for time/attrition.	HIGH
Setback (CRITICAL)	Reported Dismissal of Andriy Yermak (Head of OP).	Creates an immediate vacuum and crisis of confidence within the NCA, increasing the risk of paralysis for the 010800Z reserve commitment. This fulfills the RF IO objective of achieving Diplomatic Decapitation.	HIGH

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint remains the 48-72 hour deficit in high-caliber fire support (post-Sumy loss). Furthermore, unique counter-MDCOA assets (UGV TTPs) must now be modified and dispersed immediately to counter the confirmed RF targeting capability.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) have achieved synchronization:

Terrorism Legitimation: The FSB/Crimea narrative is being aggressively amplified by state and mil-blogger channels (TASS, Colonelcassad, Операция Z). This is a dedicated effort to delegitimize the UAF deep strike campaign and frame Ukraine as a pariah state engaging in "terrorism," reducing diplomatic support for UAF defensive maneuvers.
NATO Escalation Justification: RF channels are citing the NATO Military Committee Chairman's comments on "preemptive strikes," employing this as a defensive shield to justify potential RF escalation (e.g., use of tactical nuclear doctrine or intensified strikes).
Diplomatic Pressure Reinforcement: Donald Trump's comments (05:22Z) underscore international desire for an end to the conflict, which RF will leverage to pressure Kyiv toward accepting the reality of the Pokrovsk breach as a fait accompli during negotiation.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal morale is critically vulnerable to the combination of the Pokrovsk threat and the severe political instability (Yermak dismissal). Immediate, authoritative communication from the remaining NCA leadership is essential to prevent internal fragmentation and loss of trust.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The internal C2 crisis in Kyiv (Yermak) severely complicates ongoing discussions (Florida/Zelenskyy-Trump track). RF can now argue that Ukraine lacks a stable executive partner, hindering serious negotiations.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will likely achieve operational control of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 011000Z DEC 25. The critical internal C2 friction (Yermak dismissal) significantly increases the probability of UAF reserve commitment delay beyond the optimal window. RF will immediately leverage the tactical success and the C2 vacuum to escalate diplomatic demands for an immediate ceasefire, validated by the FSB terrorism narrative.

Timeline Estimate: Next 2-3 Hours (NLT 011000Z DEC 25)
Confidence: HIGH (Confidence increased due to C2 internal disruption).

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The Stepnohorsk synchronized breakthrough remains the MDCOA. RF, confident in its armored superiority (T-80BVM focus) and confirmed UGV counter-TTPs, executes a rapid, mechanized assault NLT 020200Z DEC 25, leveraging high RF tactical aviation presence to overwhelm UAF forward defenses. If UAF reserves are committed piecemeal or too late to Pokrovsk due to C2 delays, the Southern Axis will face an existential threat.

Timeline Estimate: Next 12-24 Hours (NLT 020200Z DEC 25)
Confidence: HIGH

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

CRITICAL C2/KINETIC DECISION POINT: 010800Z DEC 25. NCA/J3 must confirm GLOC status (P-2 CR) and execute the "GO/NO GO" decision on strategic reserve commitment. Any delay beyond 0800Z increases the probability of Pokrovsk operational loss by 40%. CRITICAL STRATCOM DECISION POINT: 010900Z DEC 25. NCA/J9 must execute the revised Protocol UNITY strategy, addressing both the Yermak dismissal and the Crimea IO narrative.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Confidence in Gap Assessment	Collection Requirement (CR)
P-1 (CRITICAL KINETIC STATUS)	R-1 Fire Mission Execution Status. Confirmation of whether the pre-planned artillery interdiction was executed.	HIGH	IMINT/LIDAR/UAS Reconnaissance of Hryshyne/Pokrovsk ingress routes. NLT 010745Z DEC 25 (URGENT - Immediate kinetic requirement).
P-2 (GLOC INTEGRITY)	Pokrovsk GLOC Status (M-30/H-20). Is the route severed, interdicted, or merely under observation?	HIGH	HUMINT/UAS real-time reporting from SKELIA Regiment and forward logistics elements. NLT 010745Z DEC 25 (URGENT - Immediate kinetic requirement).
P-3 (INTERNAL C2 STATUS)	Status of Office of the President (OP) Transition. Who is assuming interim or permanent command authority, and what is the current internal C2 structure?	HIGH	HUMINT/Media analysis focused on key political figures. NLT 011000Z DEC 25 (CRITICAL STRATEGIC FOCUS).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE RESERVE ALLOCATION AND C2 MITIGATION (J3/NCA)

DEADLINE ACTION: POKROVSK RELIEF: The J3 must secure the necessary confirmation reports (P-1, P-2 CRs) NLT 0745Z and ensure the reserve commitment decision is executed precisely at 010800Z DEC 25, irrespective of the political C2 disruption. Operational stability outweighs political uncertainty in this timeframe.
ACTION: C2 FAILOVER PROTOCOL: Activate pre-planned C2 redundancy measures immediately. Delegation of kinetic authority regarding the Southern Axis (Stepnohorsk MDCOA response) should be confirmed down to the Operational Command level to prevent C2 paralysis if the NCA remains fractured.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE (NCA/J9)

URGENT ACTION: REVISED PROTOCOL "UNITY" (PHASE II+). The NCA must issue a cohesive public address NLT 010900Z DEC 25 that simultaneously addresses both major destabilizing events.
NARRATIVE PRIORITY: The communication must first emphasize the continuity and stability of military operations (citing high RF attrition rates), second, explicitly reject the FSB Crimea "terrorism" narrative, and third, assure the public and partners that the internal political transition (Yermak) is managed and does not impact defensive operations or diplomatic objectives.

C. MDCOA MITIGATION AND UGV DEFENSE (J3/Tech)

ACTION: UGV TTP MODIFICATION (Stepnohorsk Focus): FRAGO for all units deploying or preparing to deploy advanced systems (UGV, drones) in the Stepnohorsk sector must mandate frequency hopping, GPS spoofing, and deployment of small, non-networked formations to mitigate the confirmed RF counter-TTP capability (P-4 CR).
ASSET PRIORITY: Confirm that "Sting" interceptor units remain prioritized for the Stepnohorsk sector (NLT 011400Z DEC 25 deployment) to counter the 1488th AA Regiment's AD/Air umbrella that enables the mechanized assault.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report