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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-01 05:04:25Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-01 04:34:27Z)

SITUATION REPORT 005/01 DEC 25

TIME: 010700Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: POKROVSK CRITICAL WATCH PERIOD & RF ADAPTATION TO UAF ADVANCED TTPs


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains defined by the imminent threat to the Pokrovsk GLOC (M-30/H-20). Fighting is confirmed as Close Quarters Combat (CQC) within the urban perimeter, engaging UAF SKELIA Regiment (425th).

New Kinetic Activity:

  • RF forces (36th Army, Vostok Grouping) claim successful UAS strike against a Ukrainian robotized platform in the Dnipropetrovsk region (0501Z). This directly impacts UAF planning for the Stepnohorsk axis defense.
  • Confirmed RF launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) into the Kharkiv region (0456Z), reinforcing the Strategic Diversionary IO Effort (SDIOE) along the Northern Front.
  • Confirmed RF UAS presence tracked over Kherson/Mykolaiv axis, moving west (0434Z, 0448Z), indicating sustained reconnaissance and deep strike capability targeting the Southern Operational Area (SOA) rear.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Favorable conditions persist for kinetic operations, particularly for UAS and tactical aviation activity, which RF continues to leverage across the Eastern and Southern sectors.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The commitment of UAF Strategic Reserves remains hinged upon the 010800Z DEC 25 decision point, pending confirmation of Pokrovsk GLOC status (P-1/P-2 CRs). UAF forces are concurrently prosecuting deep strikes (4x UAVs neutralized over Bryansk Oblast confirms UAF action).


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

FactorAssessmentConfidence
Primary IntentSever Pokrovsk GLOC, paralyze UAF strategic reserve commitment via diplomatic pressure (Moscow mediation), and execute the Stepnohorsk breach (MDCOA).HIGH
Current COA RefinedMaintain CQC in Pokrovsk. Actively counter UAF high-tech assets (UGVs) on the Southern axis. Amplify IO focused on UAF "terrorism" (Crimea FSB claim) to disrupt international support and frame UAF defensive maneuvers as escalation.HIGH
AdaptationRF intelligence and C2 demonstrated rapid adaptation by successfully targeting an advanced UAF robotized platform in Dnipropetrovsk. This indicates high-fidelity SIGINT/reconnaissance focused on UAF advanced TTPs.HIGH
LogisticsContinued RF effort to mask or deflect from UAF deep strikes (Alabuga follow-up) by focusing the narrative on internal security (Crimea FSB operation). Immediate sustainment via the Kazakh corridor is assessed as stable.MEDIUM

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

CRITICAL ADAPTATION: RF forces have successfully identified and countered a UAF robotized platform in the Stepnohorsk general area. This directly challenges the previously established UAF counter-MDCOA TTP (5 OShB UGV). RF is proactively mitigating UAF tactical advantages derived from innovative technology deployment.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF synchronization remains robust. The kinetic pressure (Pokrovsk, Kharkiv KABs, Mykolaiv UAVs) is linked to a political counter-narrative (FSB Crimea claim) designed to erode moral authority and legitimacy for UAF kinetic response during the delicate Moscow mediation window.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are in a high-stress posture. Resilience remains high in CQC (SKELIA) and in the deep battle (sustained UAS strikes). Readiness to commit strategic reserves is high, but the decision cycle is critically compressed by the 010800Z deadline and the complex political environment.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

StatusEventOperational Impact
SuccessRBC-Ukraine Diplomatic Report (0450Z/0453Z).Confirms the primary UAF/US dialogue (Florida) is progressing ("sides made a step forward") and is focused on long-term stability (Zelenskyy-Trump contact). This limits the effectiveness of the RF 'capitulation' IO narrative stemming from the Moscow mediation.
SetbackRF Successful UGV Targeting (0501Z).Confirmed RF capability to target and strike UAF robotized platforms. Reduces the assessed force multiplier effect of UGV TTPs in the Stepnohorsk sector unless counter-counter measures are immediately integrated.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The 48-72 hour deficit in high-caliber fire support remains the dominant kinetic constraint. The effectiveness of unique counter-MDCOA assets (Sting/UGV TTPs) is now subject to confirmed RF counter-TTPs, demanding resource redundancy or tactical dispersion of these assets.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is actively working to suppress the operational success of UAF deep strikes (Alabuga, Bryansk UAVs) by injecting high-profile counter-narratives:

  1. Terrorism Deflection: FSB claims of neutralizing a GUR-led assassination plot against an RF MoD officer in Crimea (0445Z). This aims to portray UAF intelligence efforts as malicious "terrorism" during a purported peace process.
  2. Tactical Progress Amplification: Pro-RF channels (Rybar) reinforce focus on the Southern Axis (Huliaipole/Dnipropetrovsk), preparing the cognitive space for the MDCOA.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment remains precarious. While diplomatic communication offers a measure of stability, the operational realities in Pokrovsk require immediate, transparent communication (Protocol UNITY) to prevent the FSB/Crimea narrative from generating internal doubt about the legitimacy of UAF intelligence actions.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The primary diplomatic channel (RBC-Ukraine/Florida talks) is showing deliberate, measured progress, which provides stability. UAF insistence on high-level contact (Zelenskyy-Trump) indicates a strategy to maintain top-tier US security guarantees, insulating the process from the opportunistic and potentially disruptive Moscow mediation efforts (Kushner/Whitkoff).


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces achieve effective control of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 011000Z DEC 25. This success is immediately leveraged by RF state media and diplomatic envoys to demand a kinetic pause across all fronts, utilizing the FSB Crimea narrative to pressure international partners into supporting the demand. UAF reserves are committed but delayed past the optimal window.

  • Timeline Estimate: Next 2-4 Hours (NLT 011000Z DEC 25)
  • Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The threat profile for the Stepnohorsk axis breakthrough remains CRITICAL. MDCOA is the synchronized RF armored/mechanized assault NLT 020200Z DEC 25. RF tactical aviation will provide suppression, and ground units will be prepared to counter UAF advanced platforms (UGV/Sting). A successful RF breakthrough in the South would force a strategic withdrawal to protect Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

  • Timeline Estimate: Next 12-24 Hours (NLT 020200Z DEC 25)
  • Confidence: HIGH (Increased confidence due to confirmed RF targeting of UAF advanced tech, reducing UAF mitigation leverage).

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

CRITICAL KINETIC DECISION POINT: 010800Z DEC 25. NCA/J3 must commit reserves based on the incoming P-1 and P-2 CR results. CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC DECISION POINT: 011200Z DEC 25. NCA/J9 must finalize and deliver the cohesive public strategy regarding Moscow mediation and the Crimea IO counter-narrative (Protocol UNITY).


6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionConfidence in Gap AssessmentCollection Requirement (CR)
P-1 (CRITICAL KINETIC STATUS)R-1 Fire Mission Execution Status. Confirmation of whether the pre-planned artillery interdiction was executed.HIGHIMINT/LIDAR/UAS Reconnaissance of Hryshyne/Pokrovsk ingress routes. NLT 010700Z DEC 25 (URGENT - Decision Critical).
P-2 (GLOC INTEGRITY)Pokrovsk GLOC Status (M-30/H-20). Is the route severed, interdicted, or merely under observation?HIGHHUMINT/UAS real-time reporting from SKELIA Regiment and forward logistics elements. NLT 010700Z DEC 25 (URGENT - Decision Critical).
P-4 (RF UGV COUNTER-TTPs)Specificity of RF strike on UGV. What method was used (FPV, Lancet, Artillery) to neutralize the UGV platform in Dnipropetrovsk?HIGHSIGINT analysis of 36th Army/Vostok Group communications; IMINT review of strike zone. NLT 011400Z DEC 25.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE RESERVE ALLOCATION AND DISPERSION (J3/NCA)

  1. DEADLINE ACTION: Execute the "GO/NO GO" decision on the Pokrovsk relief package at 010800Z DEC 25.
  2. ACTION: RESERVE DEPLOYMENT TTP: If committed, the reserve must execute the bypass operation (E-50/T-0515 corridor) and establish a hardened perimeter west of Pokrovsk. Crucially, the reserve element must immediately implement A2/AD (Area Access/Area Denial) protocols to mitigate confirmed RF tactical aviation surge and deep surveillance capability.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE (NCA/J9)

  1. URGENT ACTION: ACTIVATE PROTOCOL "UNITY" (PHASE II). The NCA must deliver the pre-planned public address NLT 010730Z DEC 25.
  2. IO COUNTER-MEASURE: The address must specifically address the FSB Crimea claim by framing UAF deep operations (Alabuga, GUR action) as legitimate, sovereign, and essential military operations targeting Russian military infrastructure and C2, explicitly rejecting the RF "terrorism" narrative. Highlight the international support confirmed by the RBC-Ukraine diplomatic update.

C. MDCOA MITIGATION ADJUSTMENT (J3/Tech)

  1. ACTION: UGV TTP MODIFICATION: Immediate dissemination of a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to the 5 OShB and supporting units mandating UGV Electronic Protection (EP) measures and increased tactical dispersion. UGV assets must be deployed in smaller, non-networked packs to counter the confirmed RF targeting capability.
  2. PRIORITY ASSET TRANSFER: Re-confirm that the accelerated transfer of "Sting" interceptor units to the Stepnohorsk sector is on track for deployment NLT 011400Z DEC 25. These remain the primary rapid counter to the 1488th AA Regiment's supporting air surge.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-01 04:34:27Z)

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