Sitrep 2025-12-01 04:04:28

DTG: 010600Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SITREP 003/01 DEC 25 // POKROVSK GLOC SEVERANCE IMMINENT & MDCOA CONFIRMATION CRITICAL

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The decisive operational point remains the Pokrovsk Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) (M-30/H-20). The preceding assessment predicting GLOC severance NLT 011000Z DEC 25 remains valid. RF kinetic action is confirmed within the urban perimeter, forcing UAF SKELIA Regiment (425th) into protracted Close Quarters Combat (CQC). The secondary axis (Lyman/Siversk) is confirmed as an active shaping and Strategic Diversionary IO Effort (SDIOE), supported by limited, high-visibility kinetic operations (SpN clearances).

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Current environmental conditions across the Eastern and Southern fronts remain stable, favoring RF deep strike, ISR, and UAS deployment. Visibility is adequate for precision targeting. No immediate weather-related constraints impede RF maneuver or UAF reserve deployment, should the decision be made.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures UAF SKELIA Regiment (425th) is attriting RF advance within Pokrovsk but is critically reliant on external fire support or immediate reserve commitment. Strategic Reserves remain fixed. The critical operational clock is focused on the 010800Z DEC 25 decision point for reserve release, which requires conclusive intelligence on GLOC status and the results of the P-1 collection requirement (R-1 Fire Mission).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Factor	Assessment	Confidence
Primary Intent	Achieve tactical/operational success by severing the Pokrovsk GLOC, forcing UAF commitment of strategic reserves into a disadvantageous fight, and synchronizing this success with IO to undermine diplomatic talks.	HIGH
Current COA	Maintain CQC pressure in Pokrovsk. Amplify the SDIOE in the Lyman sector (using verified SpN operations) to fix UAF northern reserves. Prepare follow-on exploitation attack in the Stepnohorsk axis (MDCOA).	HIGH
Logistics	RF sustainment via the Kazakh corridor remains viable for operational tempo, despite UAF deep strike efforts (Alabuga). RF has demonstrated sufficient munitions to sustain CQC and simultaneous shaping operations.	HIGH

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations RF tactical forces are successfully leveraging their high-level operational intelligence synchronization. The immediate dissemination of combat footage (Lyman SpN clearance) confirms RF intent to use minor tactical successes to validate large-scale informational operations aimed at fixing UAF decision-makers. RF air defense is confirmed active and effective near Leningrad (four UAS interceptions), indicating resource allocation to deep rear defense continues.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 remains robust, particularly in cross-domain synchronization (kinetic/informational). The rapid synchronization between the Pokrovsk breach and the political/informational crises demonstrates a highly effective, centrally controlled C2 structure prioritizing cognitive defeat.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness UAF frontline units are tactically engaged and demonstrating high resolve. However, the operational readiness of reserve packages is constrained by the loss of the Sumy depot, impacting available high-volume fire support capacity for the next 48-72 hours. The speed of the National Command Authority (NCA) decision cycle is the single greatest vulnerability.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Status	Event	Operational Impact
Success	RBC-Ukraine Diplomatic Report.	Partially neutralized the RF "Umerov Post Crisis" narrative by confirming ongoing, substantive US/UAF negotiations. (Cognitive Domain Resilience).
Setback	Loss of Border Commandant (Kharkiv).	Minor C2 loss, leveraged heavily by RF IO to depict successful assassination of UAF leadership figures.
Ongoing Constraint	Strategic Reserve Fixation.	Reserves remain committed to managing three simultaneous threats, pending confirmation of R-1 execution and GLOC status.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints The critical resource requirement remains precision artillery or PGM assets to support CQC in Pokrovsk and interdict RF concentrations in Hryshyne, offsetting the 48-72 hour artillery deficit caused by the Sumy depot loss. Accelerated deployment of counter-UAS (Sting) and UGV capabilities to the Stepnohorsk axis remains essential to mitigate the MDCOA threat.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO focus remains the SDIOE (Siversk/Lyman) and the Diplomatic Decapitation narrative.

The Lyman SpN video validates the existence of limited kinetic shaping operations, giving credence to broader, exaggerated claims of UAF collapse in the North.
TASS reporting on the Leningrad drone defense success is used domestically to reinforce resilience narratives.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors UAF morale is currently supported by the Alabuga strike success and the partial neutralization of the "surrender" narrative via the RBC-Ukraine report. This stability is fragile and highly dependent on the outcome of the Pokrovsk defense. A withdrawal from Pokrovsk without clear NCA communication will immediately validate RF collapse narratives.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The negotiations in Florida are confirmed as ongoing, counteracting RF claims of imminent UAF capitulation. Maintaining transparency with partners regarding the Pokrovsk crisis is vital to prevent any delay in committed military aid transfers.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) RF forces will finalize the interdiction and effective severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC (M-30/H-20) NLT 011000Z DEC 25 by establishing hardened fire control along the route. This tactical success will be immediately synchronized with an amplified global IO campaign, specifically exploiting the 010800Z decision deadline for UAF reserve commitment to maximize strategic pressure.

Timeline Estimate: Next 2-4 Hours (NLT 011000Z DEC 25)
Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) The critical intelligence regarding the RF tactical air surge in the South (1488th AA Regiment score 13.88) suggests the Stepnohorsk axis is fully prepared for exploitation. MDCOA remains an RF armored/mechanized breakthrough on the Stepnohorsk axis (Southern Front), exploiting the temporary constraint on UAF high-caliber fire support (Sumy loss) and leveraging the existing air superiority umbrella to achieve operational depth NLT 020200Z DEC 25.

Timeline Estimate: Next 12-24 Hours (NLT 020200Z DEC 25)
Confidence: MEDIUM (Reinforced by current intelligence on RF air preparation)

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points The immediate critical decision point is 010800Z DEC 25. The UAF NCA/J3 must determine the necessity and composition of the Strategic Reserve commitment based on kinetic status, specifically:

Confirmed GLOC integrity (P-2 CR).
Confirmed status of the R-1 Fire Mission (P-1 CR).

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Confidence in Gap Assessment	Collection Requirement (CR)
P-1 (CRITICAL KINETIC STATUS)	R-1 Fire Mission Execution Status. Confirmation of whether the pre-planned artillery interdiction against RF concentrations in Hryshyne/Pokrovsk was executed. This determines immediate heavy fire support availability.	HIGH	IMINT/LIDAR/UAS Reconnaissance of Hryshyne/Pokrovsk ingress routes. NLT 010630Z DEC 25 (URGENT).
P-2 (GLOC INTEGRITY)	Pokrovsk GLOC Status (M-30/H-20). Is the primary route severed (physical barrier/destruction), interdicted (under hardened fire control), or merely under observation?	HIGH	HUMINT/UAS real-time reporting from SKELIA Regiment and forward logistics elements. NLT 010700Z DEC 25.
P-3 (MDCOA AIR THREAT)	RF Tactical Aviation C2 Frequencies (Stepnohorsk). Identification of C2/data-link frequencies for the surging RF tactical air assets in the South to enable effective EW/Sting counter-measures.	MEDIUM	SIGINT/ELINT tasking on known RF 1488th AA Regiment adjacent operational areas.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE RESERVE ALLOCATION DECISION (J3/NCA)

DEADLINE ACTION: The 010800Z DEC 25 deadline is immutable. Utilize the P-1 and P-2 CR results (available NLT 010700Z) to make a definitive "GO/NO GO" decision on the Pokrovsk relief/defensive package.
ACTION: If the GLOC (M-30/H-20) is confirmed severed (P-2: Interdicted/Severed), COMMIT STRATEGIC RESERVES to establish a new, hardened defensive perimeter west of Pokrovsk, focusing on secondary/tertiary route security (E-50/T-0515 corridor). Do not prioritize urban reclamation; prioritize force preservation and GLOC integrity via bypass.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND IO COUNTER (NCA/J9)

URGENT ACTION: Execute Protocol "UNITY" NLT 010730Z DEC 25. The NCA must address the nation before the 010800Z reserve decision point to preemptively neutralize RF narrative control. The address must:
- Explicitly confirm the ongoing nature of the US/UAF diplomatic discussions, referencing the RBC-Ukraine report (Fact).
- Identify the Siversk/Lyman activity (including the SpN video) as confirmed RF Strategic Diversionary IO Effort (SDIOE) to confuse UAF reserve commitment (Analytical Judgment).
GUIDANCE: Any communication must emphasize SKELIA's tactical resilience and the ongoing success of deep strike operations (Alabuga).

C. HARDEN MDCOA AXES (J3/Tech)

ACTION: Immediately accelerate the transfer and operational integration of the "Sting" interceptor units and 5 OShB UGV TTP teams to the Stepnohorsk sector (Southern Axis).
RATIONALE: These unique assets provide the only immediate counter to the surging RF A2A and BPS threat in the South, mitigating the MDCOA threat profile during the critical 48-72 hour window when UAF heavy artillery fire support capacity is constrained by the Sumy loss.

D. DEEP STRIKE LOGISTICS DEGRADATION (J2/GUR)

ACTION: Reconfirm strike packages against the Caspian/Volga rail hubs supporting the Kazakh corridor. Execute NLT 011000Z DEC 25. Exploiting RF operational commitment in Pokrovsk is the optimal timing window to further destabilize their strategic sustainment lines.

//END OF REPORT//