Sitrep 2025-12-01 03:34:26

DTG: 010530Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SITREP 002/01 DEC 25 // POKROVSK GLOC INTERDICTION IMMINENT & STRATEGIC DIVERSION THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) (M-30/H-20). RF forces are confirmed to have infiltrated the Pokrovsk urban periphery, placing the primary GLOC under severe interdiction threat. The preceding 0400Z assessment projected GLOC severance NLT 011000Z DEC 25.

Secondary axes (Siversk/Lyman) are characterized by Information Operations (IO) fixation efforts rather than confirmed high-intensity kinetic breakthrough. RF intent is to force UAF reserve commitment away from the decisive point (Pokrovsk) or the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) (Stepnohorsk).

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Current weather facilitates RF deep strike operations, specifically the deployment of KAB glide bombs and UAS assets across the operational depth (Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk). Visibility is adequate for precision fire and reconnaissance. No current environmental factors restrict RF maneuver capability.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures UAF SKELIA Regiment (425th) is engaged in Close Quarters Combat (CQC) within Pokrovsk. Strategic Reserves remain fixed, pending confirmation of: (1) The successful execution of the R-1 Fire Mission; and (2) The confirmed status of the Pokrovsk GLOC.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Factor	Assessment	Confidence
Primary Intent	Sever the Pokrovsk GLOC and immediately synchronize this tactical success with the ongoing IO campaign to force UAF strategic paralysis and premature concessions during diplomatic talks.	HIGH
Current COA	Consolidation of Hryshyne positions and exploitation of the Pokrovsk infiltration to cut the M-30/H-20. Simultaneous, low-cost Strategic Diversionary IO Efforts (SDIOE) aimed at Siversk/Lyman to fix UAF attention and reserves.	HIGH
Logistics	RF sustainment remains viable via the Kazakh corridor, supporting the main effort in Donetsk. UAF deep strikes (Alabuga) impose long-term constraint but do not prevent immediate operational tempo.	HIGH

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations RF has highly refined its Multi-Domain Synchronization. The IO campaign is no longer generalized; it is now generating highly specific, time-sensitive collapse narratives (Siversk/Lyman) directly following minor kinetic shaping operations, maximizing pressure on the UAF decision cycle.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 is highly effective in cross-domain synchronization, linking kinetic (Pokrovsk), air strike (Kharkiv/Odesa), and information domains (TASS/pro-RF media). This synchronization is the primary mechanism for inducing UAF cognitive paralysis.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness UAF units in Pokrovsk are displaying high tactical resolve (SKELIA CQC defense). However, operational readiness is degraded by the loss of the Sumy depot, constraining high-caliber artillery reserve support for 48-72 hours. The speed of NCA decision-making regarding reserve commitment is the most critical constraint.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Status	Event	Operational Impact
Success	"Sting" Interceptor & 5 OShB UGV TTP validation.	Critical for neutralizing RF BPS/EW dominance, particularly in the mobile Southern sector (Stepnohorsk).
Setback	Loss of Sumy Ammunition Depot.	Immediate constraint on available high-volume fire support for reserve commitment packages.
Setback	Strategic Reserve Fixation.	Reserves are currently committed to preventing the MDCOA (Stepnohorsk) while being targeted by the Pokrovsk crisis and Siversk/Lyman SDIOE.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints The most critical immediate resource requirement is precision fire assets (PGM allocation) to support the SKELIA Regiment until conventional artillery replenishment is possible.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns The enemy IO campaign remains focused on Strategic Diversion and Diplomatic Decapitation. The claims regarding Siversk/Lyman serve as a classic diversion to pull scarce reserves North. Further RF messaging (TASS domestic filler, VDV morale posts) confirms early morning maintenance of the informational front, indicating the next wave of propaganda will likely synchronize with the anticipated Pokrovsk GLOC severance.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors UAF domestic morale is sensitive to the Pokrovsk outcome. Successes (Alabuga strike, UGV deployment) provide resilience, but failure to decisively secure the GLOC or a necessary withdrawal without clear communication will significantly amplify RF "collapse" narratives.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The critical nexus remains the ongoing US/UAF diplomatic talks, which RF IO attempts to frame as imminent surrender (the "Umerov Post Crisis"). Countering this narrative is essential to prevent international partners from delaying or restricting necessary military aid transfers.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) RF forces will achieve operational success in Donetsk by severing the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 011000Z DEC 25. This event will immediately be leveraged by the IO apparatus to confirm the narrative of UAF strategic failure and amplify the SDIOE in Siversk/Lyman. The objective is to force immediate, unfavorable strategic decisions regarding peace negotiations or reserve deployment.

Timeline Estimate: Next 4-10 Hours (NLT 011500Z DEC 25)
Confidence: HIGH

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) RF observes UAF strategic reserves diverted North due to the Siversk/Lyman SDIOE, or frozen by the Pokrovsk crisis. RF initiates a rapid, sustained air and ground assault on the Stepnohorsk axis (Southern Front), exploiting the heightened tactical air presence (1488th AA Regiment). A successful breakthrough here achieves operational depth, potentially isolating forces further west and destabilizing the Odesa GLOC.

Timeline Estimate: Next 24 Hours (NLT 020200Z DEC 25)
Confidence: MEDIUM

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points The critical operational decision point is 010500Z DEC 25 (passed) regarding R-1 status, and 010600Z DEC 25 regarding the initiation of Protocol "UNITY." The subsequent critical decision point is 010800Z DEC 25, which is the deadline for the NCA to execute the pre-planned reserve commitment contingent on GLOC status.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Confidence in Gap Assessment	Collection Requirement (CR)
P-1 (KINETIC STATUS)	R-1 Fire Mission Execution Status. URGENT: Was the planned reserve artillery interdiction (R-1) executed against RF concentrations in Hryshyne/Pokrovsk? This determines availability of immediate heavy fire support.	HIGH	IMINT/LIDAR/UAS Reconnaissance of Hryshyne/Pokrovsk ingress routes. NLT 010600Z DEC 25.
P-2 (GLOC Integrity)	Pokrovsk GLOC Status (M-30/H-20). Is the primary supply route severed, interdicted, or merely under fire control?	HIGH	HUMINT/UAS real-time reporting from SKELIA Regiment and forward logistics units. NLT 010700Z DEC 25.
P-3 (RF Intentions/Siversk)	Kinetic Reality in Siversk/Lyman. Confirm RF force commitment level to definitively distinguish propaganda from an emerging secondary main effort.	MEDIUM	SIGINT/ELINT tasking on known RF maneuver units in Siversk/Krasny Lyman sectors.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. IMMEDIATE RESERVE ALLOCATION (J3/J2)

TASK: Utilize P-1 and P-2 collection results (CR 010600Z/010700Z) to make a definitive "GO/NO GO" decision on strategic reserve commitment.
ACTION: If the GLOC (M-30/H-20) is confirmed severed and/or the R-1 mission failed, IMMEDIATELY COMMIT STRATEGIC RESERVES to secure secondary/tertiary routes and establish a hardened defensive line west of Pokrovsk. Prioritize western perimeter defense and withdrawal over urban reclamation.

B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND IO COUNTER (NCA/J9)

URGENT ACTION: Execute Protocol "UNITY" NLT 010630Z DEC 25. The NCA must deliver a high-visibility address that:
- Explicitly dismisses the Siversk/Lyman reports as RF deliberate Strategic Diversionary IO Effort (SDIOE).
- Rejects the "Umerov Crisis" narrative, framing it as an RF attempt to exploit diplomatic communications.
- Highlights the operational significance of the Alabuga strike and the SKELIA Regiment's tactical successes.
WARNING: Any NCA public statement must avoid confirming the RF success in Pokrovsk until operational control of reserves is finalized, to deny RF IO immediate validation.

C. HARDEN MDCOA AXES (J3/Tech)

ACTION: Accelerate deployment and operational integration of validated anti-vehicle UGV TTP teams and "Sting" interceptor units to the Stepnohorsk sector (Southern Axis).
RATIONALE: These emerging assets provide the necessary counter-mobility and low-level air defense capabilities required to mitigate the MDCOA surge against the backdrop of suppressed traditional UAF air defense in the South. Do not divert these assets to the static, IO-driven Siversk front.

D. DEEP STRIKE LOGISTICS DEGRADATION (J2/GUR)

ACTION: Maintain pressure on RF logistics. Execute prepared strike packages against the Caspian/Volga rail hubs supporting the Kazakh corridor NLT 011000Z DEC 25 to further erode RF long-term supply resilience while they are operationally committed in Pokrovsk.

//END OF REPORT//