Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 302034Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Multi-Axis Crisis Synchronization (MAC-S) PERIOD: H-302004Z NOV 25 to H-302034Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The National Command Authority (NCA) has begun to effectively counter the immediate strategic coercion resulting from the Miami talks fallout, leveraging supportive US statements (Rubio) to reframe the diplomatic status from "crisis of capitulation" to "path to secure peace." However, this diplomatic success has not translated into kinetic stability. The immediate priority remains executing overdue fire support missions to prevent the operational collapse of the Kostiantynivka GLOC.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions (visibility restricted) continue to favor RF deep reconnaissance, UAS operations, and specialized infiltration tactics in the urban periphery (Pokrovsk).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): SKELIA Regiment remains critically engaged in urban combat in Pokrovsk. Strategic reserves (R-18 designated) must be committed to the Krasny Lyman/Borova axis NLT 302200Z to prevent fixing. The NCA is actively engaging in strategic communication to stabilize the cognitive domain.
• RF (RED): RF C2 is sustaining the high-tempo kinetic push in Donetsk while shifting IO focus to highlighting the diplomatic lack of progress on territorial and non-bloc status issues.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Intent: Force immediate, unfavorable negotiations by achieving physical isolation of Kostiantynivka NLT 48 hours, while exploiting friction points (territorial status, NATO membership) to divide the US-UA political alignment.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant adaptation is the rapid change in the RF information operation (IO) targeting. Instead of focusing solely on the "Russia must be included" leverage, RF is now actively disseminating the narrative that the US-UA talks failed to resolve the core issues of sovereignty/territory and bloc status.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain capable. The potential UAF Taganrog strike (if confirmed) targets a key logistical/staging node for the Southern theater, which would disrupt movement NLT 48 hours if damage is assessed as substantial.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains responsive and effective in synchronizing kinetic pressure with information domain exploitation.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Operational Readiness: SKELIA Regiment's urban defense is absorbing significant attrition. Readiness depends entirely on immediate resupply of heavy fire assets (R-1A). Strategic C2: The NCA is executing a strategic stabilization effort, utilizing Umerov's positive spin ("tangible progress toward a just peace") and leveraging positive US statements (Rubio's commitment to "eternal security") to inoculate the domestic audience against RF IO. This mitigates the immediate risk of strategic paralysis identified in the previous report.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Infrastructure Resilience): Successful rapid restoration of critical power infrastructure in Kyiv demonstrates robust civil-military coordination and reduces strategic vulnerability to deep strikes.
• Success (Strategic IO): Effective counter-framing by Umerov and utilization of Rubio's strong pro-UA commitment statements have begun to neutralize the "capitulation" narrative.
• Setback (Kinetic): The delay in executing critical fire support (R-1A, overdue as of 302030Z) increases the immediate risk of operational failure in Donetsk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Kinetic Execution: CRITICAL. Immediate confirmation and execution of R-1A fire missions.
2. Strategic Communication Coherence: While improving, the NCA must address the territorial/bloc status friction points raised by RF IO to fully stabilize the narrative.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Primary Narrative: The negotiations are a sham; the US and Ukraine failed to reach agreement on core issues (territory, non-bloc status). Kyiv's refusal to compromise proves it is the obstacle to peace. UAF Counter-Narrative: The negotiations were "complex but productive," achieving "tangible progress" toward a just peace backed by US security guarantees ("eternal security," "prosperity"). Details are forthcoming (Umerov).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is supported by the visible success in restoring Kyiv's power and the positive messaging from Umerov and Rubio. However, continued heavy fighting without confirmed tactical stabilization in Donetsk poses a high risk to long-term endurance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The US-UA talks are being spun positively by both sides (Umerov, Rubio) regarding long-term security commitments, despite RF efforts to highlight internal friction.
• The overall strategic alignment remains strongly in support of UAF, but the previous report's vulnerability regarding Russian inclusion (Rubio quote, 301958Z) requires continued focused counter-IO.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: GLOC Severance and Political Siege (Confidence: HIGH) RF mechanized and dismounted infantry elements will successfully interdict the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka GLOC NLT 310400Z, achieving operational envelopment of Kostiantynivka. Simultaneously, RF IO will globally amplify the kinetic success and the lack of progress on territory/non-bloc status, pressuring international partners (specifically Germany/France) to advocate for an immediate ceasefire based on current lines.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Kinetic Breakthrough and Deep Exploitation (Confidence: HIGH) Should UAF fail to execute R-1A, the collapse of the Donetsk defensive line enables RF forces to exploit the operational gap toward the Dnipro River. Simultaneously, the Spetsnaz presence near Krasny Lyman transitions from fixation to an offensive thrust, leveraging the strategic distraction in Donetsk to achieve deep penetration in the Northeast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1A (CRITICAL): IMMEDIATE KINETIC INTERVENTION (J3)

ACTION: J3 must provide an immediate SITREP on the status of the previously planned fire mission (R-1A). If execution window was missed, re-prioritize and execute Fire Plan Delta against RF concentrations west of Pokrovsk with utmost urgency, accepting collateral risk to prevent GLOC severance. Confirmation of delivery is required NLT 302100Z. PRIORITY: Prevent tactical collapse and operational envelopment in Donetsk (IMMEDIATE).

R-22 (MODIFIED): STRATEGIC NARRATIVE COHERENCE (NCA / J7)

ACTION: Following the initial stabilization message, the NCA must launch a second phase of strategic communication NLT 310400Z. This message must focus on reaffirming core red lines (territory, sovereignty), explicitly integrating Rubio’s strong commitment language ("eternal security") to contrast RF claims of diplomatic failure. PRIORITY: Counter RF adaptive IO and maintain international/domestic confidence (CRITICAL).

R-18 (CONFIRMED): ACCELERATE RESERVE MOVEMENT (J3)

ACTION: J3 must confirm the physical location and current movement timeline of the stabilization reserve moving toward the Borova axis. This is required for J2 verification NLT 302200Z to ensure they can intercept potential high-speed Spetsnaz exploitation. PRIORITY: Preposition forces against the MDCOA threat in the Northeast (URGENT).

R-25 (NEW): DEEP STRIKE EXPLOITATION ASSESSMENT (J2/ISR)

ACTION: Immediately task all available Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets (SIGINT, IMINT) to confirm the Taganrog strike (302028Z). Determine the target type (e.g., military airbase, rail hub) and estimated damage level to inform follow-up deep strikes against RF Southern supply lines. PRIORITY: Capitalize on long-range capabilities to destabilize RF logistics (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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