Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301834Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Multi-Axis Crisis Synchronization PERIOD: H-301804Z NOV 25 to H-301834Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The operational picture remains CRITICAL. The predicted timeline for the severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC (NLT $301830Z$ NOV) has elapsed. We assume, pending P1 confirmation, that the GLOC is currently interdicted or compromised to the extent that it is non-viable for rapid maneuver. This tactical success is being immediately and aggressively weaponized by the enemy across the information domain, supported by alleged third-party diplomatic statements (Turkey). Immediate execution of the IO counter-measure (R-15) and confirmation of the SKELIA Regiment's status are the highest priorities. The simultaneous maintenance of kinetic pressure (Drone activity in Chernihiv/Kharkiv, VKS strikes in Dnipropetrovsk, and active drone raid on Crimea) confirms RF intent to maintain multi-domain saturation.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night operations are underway. Low light conditions favor RF deep strike UAVs (reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): Forces remain heavily committed along the three major axes. UAF is demonstrating technical resilience with reports of successful counter-KAB weapons testing ($301805Z$) and active deep strike missions (Crimea). The most critical constraint is the operational status of the SKELIA Regiment in Pokrovsk.
• RF (RED): RF is leveraging tactical success at Pokrovsk to amplify the strategic IO campaign. RF sources are actively claiming drone superiority (citing WSJ) and attempting to globally frame Ukraine as a maritime aggressor (tanker incidents $301815Z$). This indicates effective synchronization between military success and strategic influence.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

Intent: Force a strategic political decision by the NCA under conditions of simultaneous kinetic and informational collapse.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the immediate, aggressive use of the Pokrovsk crisis to reinforce the negotiation narrative ($301809Z$), coupled with attempts to counter UAF technological successes (e.g., denying UAF drone parity via WSJ quoting $301825Z$). RF is attempting to control the narrative surrounding key warfighting domains (drones, diplomacy, and maritime security).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting the current operational tempo across multiple oblasts (Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk). The IO emphasis on maritime threats suggests a concern, or a preemptive narrative, regarding RF naval logistics or exports.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, maintaining synchronization across tactical objectives (VKS strikes), operational priorities (Pokrovsk assumed severance), and strategic influence ($301809Z$).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Kinetic Readiness: CRITICAL/ADAPTING. Forces in Pokrovsk are in the most immediate danger. However, the confirmed testing of new counter-KAB systems (RBK-Ukraine $301805Z$) indicates adaptation to the RF glide bomb threat, which is crucial for deep defense. Technological Readiness: HIGH/MEDIUM. Continued focus on deep strike (Crimea raid) and counter-drone innovation is necessary to retain parity in niche domains.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Active long-range drone raid on Crimea ($301832Z$) and confirmed testing/deployment of counter-KAB weapons. Reduction in Kyiv evening power cuts suggests localized resilience improvement ($301826Z$).
• Setback (Operational): Assumed severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC.
• Setback (Informational): The IO crisis (R-15) is now being endorsed by quotes attributed to allied third parties (Turkey), giving the RF narrative significant external weight.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Pokrovsk Status: Immediate confirmation of SKELIA Regiment operational status and ability to execute withdrawal/defense maneuvers.
2. Air Defense: Continued prioritization of SHORAD/EW systems to cover UAV vectors (Chernihiv/Dnipropetrovsk).
3. Strategic Communication Assets: Need for the NCA to address the narrative incorporating the Turkish FM quote, without undermining crucial diplomatic relationships.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF campaign has entered the validation phase, leveraging tactical success (Pokrovsk) and alleged diplomatic consensus (Turkey FM Hakan Fidan, $301828Z$).

• Core Message: The war is ending via US/Ukrainian agreement on territorial exchange and elections, proven by RF military success.
• New Vector: Maritime Aggression: The narrative linking Ukraine to the Turkish EEZ tanker incident ($301815Z$) attempts to paint UAF deep strike capabilities (e.g., naval drones) as reckless, terrorist acts that endanger global commerce, complicating future Western support for maritime denial operations.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic risk remains extreme. The rapid succession of military crises (Pokrovsk) and high-level political rumors (territory exchange, Fidan quote) risks triggering the predicted paralysis in the crucial domestic volunteer/logistics network (DS Belief: 0.332, previous report).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF use of Turkey's FM statements—even if taken out of context—complicates the UAF relationship with NATO member Turkey and potentially suggests a lack of Western unity regarding the conflict's outcome. NATO member states are reportedly preparing for "limited" US support (Bloomberg, $301832Z$), reinforcing the narrative that Ukraine must accept unfavorable terms.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Isolation and IO Saturation (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces have severed the main Pokrovsk GLOC and are establishing deep interdiction/fire control over withdrawal routes. Simultaneously, RF will utilize the next 60 minutes to globally saturate media channels with the "peace talks/surrender" narrative, demanding immediate Western pressure on the NCA to finalize the agreement.

• Timeline: Peak IO saturation NLT 301930Z NOV.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Triple Axis Exploitation (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH) RF forces rapidly exploit the Pokrovsk tactical success by committing high-value reserves toward Kostiantynivka, synchronized with a decisive breakthrough in the Orekhovskoye sector (Akhmat forces), preventing UAF from concentrating AD assets or ground reserves. The emerging threat in Dibrova concurrently forces a resource commitment that leaves Kostiantynivka thinly defended.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1A (MODIFIED): CONFIRM SKELIA C2 AND EXECUTE CONTINGENCY FIRE PLAN DELTA (J3/J2)

ACTION: Due to the elapsed Pokrovsk GLOC severance timeline, J3 must confirm the communication status (C2) of the SKELIA Regiment immediately. If C2 is lost or heavily degraded, execute Contingency Fire Plan Delta immediately to deny RF consolidation within the Pokrovsk periphery, regardless of collateral risk, to allow any isolated elements to break contact and withdraw west. PRIORITY: Prevent total loss of CQC unit and stabilize the Kostiantynivka defense line (IMMEDIATE).

R-15 (REVISED 2.0): NCA EMERGENCY SOVEREIGNTY ASSERTION (NCA / J7)

ACTION: The National Command Authority (NCA) must execute the high-level statement NLT 301845Z NOV. The statement must be forceful, explicitly address the WSJ leak as disinformation, and, crucially, address the Turkish Foreign Minister's quote by emphasizing Ukraine's commitment to Turkey's long-term peace goals but confirming that sovereignty is non-negotiable. Failure to execute will validate the RF narrative during the peak IO window. PRIORITY: Neutralize political and morale crisis (IMMEDIATE).

R-20 (NEW): COUNTER MARITIME AGGRESSION NARRATIVE (J7/MID)

ACTION: Launch a dedicated counter-narrative addressing the RF claims of Ukrainian maritime terrorism. The counter-narrative should: 1) Condemn all environmental disasters (e.g., Shari Lanka/tanker incidents) 2) Re-assert the sovereign right to defense of the Black Sea maritime corridor 3) Explicitly deny targeting civilian infrastructure or international shipping beyond the EEZ defined for maritime denial operations. PRIORITY: Protect international legitimacy for naval strike capabilities (URGENT).

R-18 (RE-PRIORITIZED): INTERDICT DIBROVA APPROACHES (J3/J5)

ACTION: Commit available medium-range fire assets to pre-planned interdiction fire missions targeting the confirmed RF VKS strike areas (Malynivka, Dnipropetrovsk) and identified UAV concentration points (Chernihiv vector) to disrupt and delay any forces intended for the Dibrova or Orekhovskoye axes. Simultaneously, execute the R-18 deployment of a stabilization reserve unit to the Krasnyi Lyman–Sloviansk GLOC approach routes. PRIORITY: Prevent RF from fixing UAF reserves using the new axes (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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