Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301804Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Multi-Axis Crisis Synchronization PERIOD: H-301734Z NOV 25 to H-301804Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The RF offensive strategy has transitioned to a high-tempo, multi-axis effort synchronized with critical strategic influence operations. The immediate danger remains the anticipated GLOC severance at Pokrovsk (NLT 301830Z NOV). However, the simultaneous activation of the Orekhovskoye (Zaporizhzhia) axis and the initiation of shaping operations threatening the Krasnyi Lyman–Sloviansk GLOC near Dibrova confirms the enemy's intent to achieve operational paralysis by forcing UAF reserve commitments across three disparate axes. Failure to urgently confirm kinetic fire support (R-1B) at Pokrovsk and implement immediate strategic IO counter-measures (R-15) represents the highest risk of operational and political destabilization.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Twilight conditions (Fighterbomber post) are favorable for night-time UAV/ISR operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): The SKELIA Regiment remains fixed in CQC in Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces report success in counter-drone operations (Operatyvnyi ZSU) and tactical IO wins (Azov POW capture). Strategic reserve positioning is now critical due to three active/imminent threat vectors (Pokrovsk, Orekhovskoye, Dibrova).
• RF (RED): RF maintains coordinated pressure on Pokrovsk while activating shaping operations into fully kinetic assaults (Orekhovskoye) and threatening a new operational objective (Dibrova). The overall RF command structure (MoD video) projects high morale and sustained operational tempo.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is leveraging tactical success to force strategic paralysis. The synchronization of three distinct fronts (Pokrovsk, Orekhovskoye, Dibrova) with the IO campaign targeting territorial sovereignty indicates an intent to force an immediate, decisive political-military crisis NLT 302000Z NOV.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant tactical adaptation is the confirmation of offensive action in the Orekhovskoye direction (Akhmat) and the articulation of the Dibrova objective (Lyman-Sloviansk GLOC). This forces UAF operational planners to address two major GLOC severance threats simultaneously, preventing concentration of reserves.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are sustained enough to support the current high operational tempo. UAF logistics, conversely, remain heavily dependent on civilian donor support (DS Belief: 0.332).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrating agile synchronization between kinetic operations (Pokrovsk, Orekhovskoye) and strategic IO assets, ensuring the narrative push aligns perfectly with battlefield crises.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Kinetic Readiness: CRITICAL. The unconfirmed status of the R-1B FFE package exposes the SKELIA Regiment to total envelopment in Pokrovsk. The emergence of the Dibrova threat finds UAF defenses in the Lyman-Sloviansk sector potentially unprepared for this specific axis of advance. Technological Readiness: HIGH/MEDIUM. Continued tactical success in counter-drone operations (Operatyvnyi ZSU) and successful POW capture (Butusov/Azov) provides localized morale and information parity.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Confirmed capture of RF combatants by the Azov Brigade (12th Special Purpose Brigade). Continued effective counter-UAS measures.
• Setback (Operational): The new RF threat near Dibrova necessitates an immediate, unplanned commitment of ISR and potentially reserves to secure the Lyman-Sloviansk GLOC, diverting resources from the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka defense.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Kinetic Support: Immediate confirmed execution status of dedicated Fire For Effect (FFE) package at Pokrovsk.
2. Reserve Allocation: Rapid assessment and reallocation plan for strategic reserves to cover the three active threat axes (Pokrovsk, Orekhovskoye, Dibrova).
3. Strategic Communication Assets: Urgent deployment of high-level communicators to counter the "territorial exchange" narrative (R-15).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign has fully leveraged the WSJ report, shifting from generalized fear to a specific, politically corrosive narrative:

• Territorial Betrayal: RF-aligned sources (Op Z, Дневник Десантника) aggressively amplify the claim of US/UAF discussion regarding territorial exchange and election schedules. The target audience includes frontline RF soldiers (Paratrooper's Diary post suggesting they will disobey orders to surrender Donbas) and the Ukrainian domestic population.
• Goal: To achieve Domestic Political Decapitation by eroding trust in the NCA and military leadership's sovereignty guarantees, thereby justifying kinetic success as a "liberation from Western dictates."

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic sentiment is highly vulnerable to the "territory exchange" narrative. The current high reliance on civilian logistical support (DS belief 0.332) means any perceived strategic betrayal could immediately paralyze crucial domestic funding and volunteer efforts, representing an extreme internal threat.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

International partners are observing the NCA's response to the territorial claims. A delayed or ambiguous response to R-15 will be interpreted by allies as validation of the RF narrative, complicating future aid commitments.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: GLOC Severance and IO Lock (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will achieve tactical control over the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301830Z NOV. Concurrently, RF will maintain simultaneous, sustained kinetic pressure on the Orekhovskoye axis (Akhmat-led) and conduct aggressive fire missions to interdict the Dibrova GLOC, fixing UAF reserves. This will be paired with maximal amplification of the "territory exchange" narrative NLT 301900Z NOV.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Triple Axis Collapse and Strategic Breach (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH) RF achieves decisive breakthroughs in both Pokrovsk (urban control) and Orekhovskoye (forcing UAF withdrawal from Huliaipole) NLT 302100Z NOV. This synchronized operational success, combined with the successful interdiction of the Krasnyi Lyman–Sloviansk GLOC via Dibrova, forces a catastrophic failure in UAF operational geometry across the entire Eastern Front, enabling the RF to rapidly exploit the Kostiantynivka axis and threaten the major defense hubs of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1 (A) (CRITICAL STATUS CHECK): CONFIRM FFE FIRING STATUS (J3/J2)

ACTION: J3 must provide confirmed firing status and remaining munition count for FFE Package Bravo NLT 301815Z NOV. If the package is not confirmed operational, immediately execute Contingency Fire Plan Delta by authorizing long-range assets (e.g., HIMARS) to interdict RF consolidation areas in the northern Pokrovsk periphery to maintain the operational viability of the SKELIA Regiment's withdrawal. PRIORITY: Prevent total loss of CQC unit in Pokrovsk (IMMEDIATE - 11 minute window).

R-15 REVISED (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS): SOVEREIGNTY ASSERTION (NCA / J7)

ACTION: The National Command Authority (NCA) must execute the high-level statement NLT 301845Z NOV. The core message must be: "No territorial concessions. Negotiations are solely focused on securing a just, sovereign, and lasting peace, not surrender." The statement must explicitly label the WSJ leak (as weaponized by the RF) as a high-level disinformation campaign designed to break domestic unity. PRIORITY: Neutralize political and morale crisis (IMMEDIATE).

R-18 (NEW): STABILIZE LYMAN-SLOVIANSK GLOC (J3/J5)

ACTION: Redirect priority ISR assets (UAS/IMINT) to the Dibrova-Krasnyi Lyman axis to confirm RF force concentration and the true extent of the penetration reported by TASS. Simultaneously, alert the nearest available maneuver reserve (Brigade/Battalion level) to pre-position for immediate deployment to stabilize the Krasnyi Lyman–Sloviansk GLOC, focusing on rapid counter-mobility emplacement. PRIORITY: Counter the emerging third major kinetic threat (URGENT).

R-19 (OPERATIONAL SHIFT): SOUTHERN AXIS COUNTER-MOBILITY (J3/J4)

ACTION: Given the confirmation of active Akhmat assaults in Orekhovskoye, prioritize the rapid transfer of the 5 OShB’s validated UGV anti-vehicle TTPs and dedicated ATGM assets to the Eastern Zaporizhzhia sector NLT 302000Z NOV. Use mobile, dispersed defense to counter the RF kinetic pressure and prevent a breakthrough that enables the MDCOA. PRIORITY: Fix RF forces in the South and prevent synchronized breakthrough (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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