Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301704Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Integrated Counter-Penetration Phase PERIOD: H-301645Z NOV 25 to H-301704Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The RF multi-domain synchronization of kinetic pressure (Pokrovsk) and strategic Information Operations (IO) has reached its operational apex. The immediate crisis is compounded by the OVERDUE execution of the R-1B FFE/SHORAD deployment, which directly jeopardizes the survivability of the SKELIA Regiment prior to the assessed GLOC severance (NLT 301800Z NOV). The primary threat shift is the drastic escalation of the RF "Diplomatic Decapitation" IO campaign, now pushing a highly specific (and false) narrative of immediate ceasefire and Presidential resignation. The NCA must immediately execute strategic communications (R-15 Revised) while expediting tactical support (R-1B Modified).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Main Effort (ME) remains the Donetsk-Pokrovsk axis. RF forces are consolidating their penetration into the urban periphery. The projected Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) severance timeline (NLT 301800Z NOV) is unchanged.

• Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): Continuous, low-intensity shaping operations confirmed. The latest reporting confirms ongoing FPV drone warfare near Prymorske (301640Z NOV), validating persistent reconnaissance and local combat activity supporting the MDCOA threat vector.
• Rear Area/Infrastructure: Infrastructure stability is degraded. UAF energy operators confirm nationwide electricity consumption limits for tomorrow (301637Z NOV), reflecting successful RF long-range strikes (KABs/UAVs) against the energy grid.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Current operations are defined by sub-freezing conditions in the ME, facilitating persistent drone usage. Long-range strike projections indicate potential for operational impact: UAF monitors assess a high threat of a massive repeat strike on Kyiv/Kyiv Oblast within the next 72 hours (301644Z NOV), requiring preparatory measures for AD assets.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): The SKELIA Regiment is critically dependent on immediate external fire support. The R-1B FFE/SHORAD package deployment, critical for stabilizing the Pokrovsk defense, is OVERDUE (Target time 301645Z NOV). Local resilience initiatives continue, including deployment of modular heating systems and improved protective shelters (Kryvyi Rih, 301646Z NOV).
• RF (RED): RF C2 maintains synchronization, utilizing the kinetic success in Pokrovsk to drive the IO narrative. RF force generation efforts are highly visible, with high-value contract recruitment drives (5.5M Rubles, 301701Z NOV) indicating sustained demand for combat personnel.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is to collapse the Pokrovsk defense NLT 301800Z NOV and use the resulting tactical shockwave to politically paralyze the UAF National Command Authority (NCA) and force concessions in ongoing diplomatic tracks.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation remains the heavy reliance on KABs following the degradation of UAF FFE capacity. In the informational domain, the immediate, coordinated RF amplification of ambiguous UAF diplomatic statements ("much can change") to suggest internal crisis or capitulation represents a critical adaptive tactic to exploit domestic uncertainty.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain capable of sustaining the current high-tempo offensive, supported by centralized force generation efforts. UAF logistics remain constrained by the Sumy depot loss.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing kinetic pressure (Pokrovsk) with strategic influence operations (Diplomatic Decapitation narrative).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Strategic Readiness: High. UAF diplomatic activities are robust, with continuous, coordinated talks with key partners (NATO SG, PM Rutte, US delegation). Positive feedback from these talks (Kyslytsya assessment of US meeting, 301701Z) helps stabilize the strategic picture, although the public messaging is being immediately weaponized by RF IO. Tactical Readiness: CRITICALLY LOW in the ME (Pokrovsk) due to the FFE deficit and the now OVERDUE FFE deployment package.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Operational): Failure to deploy FFE Package Bravo NLT 301645Z NOV critically exposes the SKELIA Regiment and increases the probability of total Pokrovsk collapse.
• Successes (Diplomatic): Confirmed high-level coordination with NATO/EU partners counters the RF objective of isolating the NCA.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most severe constraints are the FFE deficiency and the associated lack of integrated, mobile SHORAD/EW protection required to deploy FFE assets safely near the front. The immediate requirement remains the protected deployment of FFE Package Bravo.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF "Diplomatic Decapitation" campaign is at its zenith:

1. Ceasefire/Resignation Narrative: Pro-RF channels (Alex Parker, 301651Z) are promulgating the immediate, baseless claim that President Zelenskyy will sign a ceasefire by December 15th and resign on New Year's Day. This is a deliberate, highly specific attempt to sow chaos and paralyze decision-making.
2. Ambiguity Weaponization: RF media immediately frames Zelenskyy's statement ("many things can change") as a sign of weakness or impending defeat.
3. External Pressure: Turkish MFA claim that parties are "closer to peace than ever" adds external diplomatic pressure, amplifying the surrender narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is challenged by the visible diplomatic friction (e.g., UAF reports on non-optimistic delegation faces, 301642Z) combined with the physical setback in Pokrovsk. Immediate, forceful repudiation of the "resignation/ceasefire" narrative (R-15 Revised) is required to prevent a cognitive breakdown.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Support remains HIGH. Active coordination with PM Rutte and NATO SG confirms unified strategy. Positive assessment of the US delegation meeting provides stability against RF IO pressure.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Isolation and IO Saturation (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will achieve operational isolation of the SKELIA Regiment and total severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301800Z NOV. This kinetic success will be immediately followed by a sustained, centralized IO campaign across all channels (military and political) aimed at forcing immediate negotiations under the threat of catastrophic collapse, targeting NLT 302000Z NOV.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Coordinated KAB-Supported Assault on Southern Axis (Confidence: HIGH) RF initiates a synchronized ground assault along the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky line (Zaporizhzhia) under cover of sustained tactical air support utilizing KABs. The continued confirmed FPV activity near Prymorske (301640Z NOV) suggests the shaping phase is ongoing. The goal is to force the UAF command to divert critical FFE/AD assets from the Pokrovsk relief effort, enabling a dual breakthrough NLT 302000Z NOV.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1B MODIFIED (IMMEDIATE EXECUTION): FFE PACKAGE PROTECTION AND DEPLOYMENT (J3/J2/J7)

ACTION: The R-1B deployment is overdue. Re-task designated reconnaissance/C-UAS elements immediately to clear a path and provide close security for the FFE package. J3 must override normal safety protocols and accept increased operational risk to achieve firing capability NLT 301730Z NOV. Prioritize direct fire support for the SKELIA Regiment's withdrawal route stabilization over counter-battery fire against RF artillery. Utilize the integrated SHORAD/EW assets as a mobile sanctuary for the artillery package. PRIORITY: Prevent total collapse of Pokrovsk defense and loss of SKELIA Regiment (IMMEDIATE).

R-15 REVISED (CRITICAL IO): COUNTER-CAPITULATION NARRATIVE (NCA / J7)

ACTION: The NCA must immediately address the "resignation/ceasefire" disinformation. Issue a Presidential/Military address NLT 301715Z NOV that explicitly states that: (a) No ceasefire or political capitulation is being discussed; (b) The specific claims of resignation are Russian psychological operations (PSYOP); and (c) All efforts are focused on stabilizing the Pokrovsk front. Use the positive Kyslytsya assessment of US talks to anchor the narrative of strength. PRIORITY: Neutralize RF IO success, maintain troop and public morale, and secure NCA cohesion (IMMEDIATE).

R-16 (NEW): CAPITAL AD RESERVE POSTURE (J3/J7)

ACTION: In response to the 72-hour threat assessment for Kyiv (301644Z NOV) and confirmed energy grid hits, place 50% of the Capital Air Defense Reserves on readiness level 1 (within 30 minutes of fire capability) and dedicate mobile AD assets to protect confirmed high-value energy nodes. J7 must prepare public communications explaining potential rotational blackouts as proactive defense measures, not failure. PRIORITY: Mitigate future massive strike risk and preserve strategic depth infrastructure (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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