Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301645Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Integrated Counter-Penetration Phase PERIOD: H-301605Z NOV 25 to H-301645Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The RF has successfully exploited the confirmed UAF Fire For Effect (FFE) deficit in the Donetsk sector by initiating heavy use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) to accelerate the Pokrovsk urban collapse. This kinetic pressure is synchronized with a highly effective Information Warfare (IO) campaign aimed at fracturing the National Command Authority (NCA) during diplomatic negotiations. The operational imperative is immediate, protected FFE deployment (R-1B) while leveraging confirmed diplomatic support to counter the RF narrative.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The focus of main effort (ME) remains the Donetsk-Pokrovsk axis.

• Pokrovsk Urban Penetration: RF forces are leveraging precision fires and stand-off munitions to facilitate penetration. Confirmed heavy use of KABs targeting the Donetsk region (301625Z NOV) suggests RF intent to minimize exposure of ground units to close defense while compensating for anticipated UAF FFE interdiction.
• Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): Confirmed FPV drone activity near Primorske (301624Z NOV) supports the assessment that RF reconnaissance and light infantry preparations are ongoing, validating the MDCOA threat vector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions persist. Continuous, high-density FPV drone usage is confirmed, evidenced by the observed environmental impact of fiber optic cable accumulation (301628Z NOV), indicating FPV drone warfare remains the dominant tactical characteristic for both sides in CQC.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): UAF Air Force is tracking inbound KABs (Donetsk/South Kharkiv) and UAVs (Chernihiv). The SKELIA Regiment is critically exposed to KAB strikes due to the current operational depth and the severe degradation of UAF FFE support capacity.
• RF (RED): RF units in Donetsk are supported by persistent air assets delivering KABs. RF is conducting multi-axis shaping operations (KABs on Kharkiv, UAV reconnaissance in Chernihiv) to fix UAF reserves.
• NATO Flank: Poland has elevated air defense posture (301631Z NOV) in response to Russian strategic aviation carrying Kinzhal missiles, demonstrating persistent strategic probing by RF forces.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is to achieve kinetic success in Pokrovsk and immediately weaponize that success in the information domain to force UAF political capitulation or fracture NCA cohesion.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate, heavy application of KABs in the Donetsk sector (301625Z NOV) is the most critical adaptation since the D-20 loss. This adaptation confirms RF intent to maintain maximum pressure on the urban defense lines despite degraded ground assault capacity due to FPV/UGV defense.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

No change. The requirement to monitor the Kazakhstan corridor (Previous INTSUM) remains valid. RF internal IO is promoting unit cohesion and morale via targeted messages (255th regiment video), suggesting latent pressure points requiring morale reinforcement.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing kinetic action (KAB strikes) with IO strategy (focusing on UAF disunity). The rapid pivot to KABs demonstrates adaptive operational control.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF diplomatic and strategic readiness is improving, with the Presidential administration confirming alignment with the European Commission (301625Z NOV) on key diplomatic and resilience issues. Tactical readiness is critically degraded in the Pokrovsk sector due to the FFE deficit, which is now being exploited by RF air power.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks (Kinetic): Confirmed KAB strikes on Donetsk region intensify the pressure on the SKELIA Regiment and increase the lethality of the urban battle.
• Successes (Strategic/IO): High-level coordination between President Zelenskyy and EC President Von der Leyen effectively counters the RF "Diplomatic Decapitation" narrative by confirming unified strategy and support for infrastructure resilience.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT (Air Defense Integration): The FFE shortage (R-1B) must now be resolved in parallel with an urgent requirement for mobile short-range Air Defense (SHORAD) integration to protect any repositioned FFE package from both Lancet/UAV attack and stand-off KAB delivery.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF is intensifying the "Disunity/Capitulation" campaign. The assertion that UAF units may refuse withdrawal orders, even if issued (Colonelcassad, 301620Z NOV), directly attempts to pit field commanders against the NCA and create a narrative of political instability or civil discord within the military structure.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is supported by the confirmed unified diplomatic front with the EU. However, the aggressive RF IO suggesting imminent defeat ("the war is over," 301623Z NOV) combined with the physical breakthrough in Pokrovsk presents a risk of rapid demoralization if UAF Command does not quickly stabilize the line and publicly counter the narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Support remains HIGH. Beyond the EU alignment, the public discussion regarding NATO preparing for warfare with limited US support (301607Z NOV) suggests Europe is hardening its strategic resolve, a net positive for UAF long-term resilience and defense industrial base development.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Pokrovsk Isolation and FFE Hunting (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will achieve operational isolation of the SKELIA Regiment and total severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301800Z NOV. Concurrently, RF air assets will prioritize reconnaissance and strike missions (UAV/KAB) against known and suspected UAF FFE staging areas in the operational depth, ensuring R-1B deployment is immediately contested.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Coordinated KAB-Supported Assault on Southern Axis (Confidence: HIGH) RF initiates a synchronized ground assault along the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky line (Zaporizhzhia) under cover of sustained tactical air support utilizing KABs. The timing will leverage the political window (NCA focus on Pokrovsk and diplomatic messaging) and the confirmed UAF FFE constraint, aiming for a breach NLT 302000Z NOV.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1B MODIFIED (IMMEDIATE CRITICAL): FFE PACKAGE PROTECTION AND DEPLOYMENT (J3/J2/J7)

ACTION: Execution of R-1B must be treated as a combined arms mission, not solely an artillery move. FFE Package Bravo must be escorted by dedicated mobile SHORAD/EW platforms (minimum 2x systems) capable of countering Lancet and inhibiting KAB targeting. The package commander must be granted autonomy to prioritize survivability over position, utilizing shoot-and-scoot TTPs immediately after engaging RF concentrations in Pokrovsk. Failure to protect FFE will result in further loss and subsequent total RF air dominance in the sector. PRIORITY: Prevent total collapse of Pokrovsk defense (IMMEDIATE).

R-15 REVISED (STRATEGIC): COUNTER-PROPAGANDA & UNITY OF EFFORT (NCA / J7)

ACTION: The NCA must utilize the confirmed diplomatic success (Zelenskyy/Von der Leyen talks) to immediately counter the RF "Disunity/Capitulation" narrative. Issue a high-visibility, joint statement with senior military leadership (Zaluzhny/Umerov) NLT 301700Z NOV affirming absolute unity of purpose and commitment to SKELIA’s defense, framing the Pokrovsk fight as an operational hold, not a strategic retreat. PRIORITY: Neutralize RF IO success and maintain troop morale (IMMEDIATE).

R-12 (URGENT): SOUTHERN C-UAS/UGV FORCE MULTIPLIER (J3 / Tech)

ACTION: The confirmed FPV activity near Primorske (301624Z NOV) validates R-12 urgency. Accelerate the transfer and operational integration of the "Sting" interceptor units and the 5 OShB's anti-vehicle UGV TTPs into the Stepnohorsk operational zone NLT 301700Z NOV. This technology is vital for mitigating the MDCOA threat, where limited AD coverage necessitates sophisticated ground-based counter-mobility and counter-UAS capabilities. PRIORITY: Mitigate MDCOA (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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