Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301605Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Critical Fire Support Phase PERIOD: H-301545Z NOV 25 to H-301605Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The operational imperative is now defined by a severe deficit in fire support capacity (R-1 failure/disruption) coinciding with RF consolidation in the Pokrovsk urban area. The strategic IO domain remains favorable due to US commitments and the Senegal strike, but immediate kinetic risk has intensified due to confirmed RF counter-battery effectiveness. URGENT cross-sector resource allocation is required.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces continue to press the Donetsk-Pokrovsk axis. The battle is confirmed as Close Quarters Combat (CQC) within the urban periphery.

• Pokrovsk GLOC (CRITICAL SEVERANCE LIKELY): The assessed RF intention to achieve total severance NLT 301800Z NOV is now highly likely due to the confirmed targeting and probable destruction of key UAF Fire For Effect (FFE) assets (D-20 near Druzhkivka, 1603Z).
• Southern Axis (HIGH ALERT): The threat remains high, but the temporary lifting of the air raid alert in Zaporizhzhia (15:55Z) provides a brief operational window for UAF to deploy Counter-UAS (C-UAS) teams (R-12).
• Northern Axis (FIXATION): Confirmed Russian MoD activity (Mi-28NM strike in Sever Group AOR, 15:50Z) supports the analytical judgment that RF is conducting shaping operations to fix UAF units near Kupyansk/Lyman, preventing reserve transfer to Donetsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions persist. New UAF confirmed success using thermal sighting systems against RU infantry in Sumy Oblast reinforces the localized UAF technological advantage (15:43Z), despite RF attempts to neutralize this via anti-thermal concealment.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): The SKELIA Regiment is critically exposed in Pokrovsk due to degraded FFE support. Reserves must be shifted or prioritized immediately. UAF units in the Southern AOR have a brief window to implement C-UAS TTPs (R-12) following the air alert clear.
• RF (RED): RF ground forces in Pokrovsk are consolidating. RF counter-battery and intelligence capabilities (UAVs/Lancets) are assessed as highly effective in the Donetsk sector (DS Belief 0.349).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is to leverage the tactical breakthrough at Pokrovsk to dictate terms diplomatically, while simultaneously addressing the strategic humiliation of the Senegal deep strike.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The successful RF strike against the UAF D-20 near Druzhkivka (16:03Z) indicates that RF has significantly improved its sensor-to-shooter loop regarding UAF FFE positions in the Pokrovsk operational depth. This is a critical adaptation that prevents UAF from sustaining fire support from prepared positions.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed successful strike against the RF shadow fleet tanker (Senegal) is now publicly acknowledged by key Russian military voices. This places significant internal pressure on the RF military to demonstrate capability to protect its logistics and retaliate.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated highly effective operational synchronization between the kinetic front (Druzhkivka strike) and the IO response (Poddubny’s immediate calls for maritime escalation). C2 remains decisive in critical sectors.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces demonstrated continued technological superiority in specialized areas (thermal/CQC) but suffered a critical operational degradation in FFE capacity needed to stabilize the Pokrovsk line.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Diplomatic/IO): Confirmed positive messaging and commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty from US diplomatic representatives (Rubio), significantly neutralizing the RF "Diplomatic Decapitation" campaign.
• Successes (Tactical): Confirmed UAF tactical success using thermal optics in Sumy Oblast CQC operations.
• Setbacks (Kinetic): Confirmed destruction of a UAF D-20 FFE asset near Druzhkivka, severely limiting UAF capacity to support the SKELIA Regiment in Pokrovsk. This confirms the R-1 fire mission capacity is now jeopardized.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Constraint (Fire Support): The immediate, critical constraint is the lack of FFE capacity in the Pokrovsk sector. Reserve artillery packages must be sourced from potentially less-active sectors (e.g., Kupyansk/Lyman) or immediately re-positioned with enhanced AD/EW protection. Requirement (EW/AD): High-priority requirement for EW/AD packages to protect remaining FFE assets from sophisticated RF counter-battery measures (Lancets/UAVs).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF narrative has pivoted from "UAF capitulation" to "UAF internal military defiance and disunity" (NBC/Alex Parker report, 15:43Z). This is a focused effort to undermine the NCA's authority following the positive Miami talks.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains boosted by the diplomatic clarity (Rubio's commitment to sovereignty) and the strategic kinetic success (Senegal strike). Turkish diplomatic engagement suggests international confidence in the possibility of a negotiated resolution, which may increase internal pressure for UAF to show flexibility while securing its territorial integrity.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Support is HIGH. The key friction point for the US-UA talks is officially confirmed as "territories and security guarantees" (Axios/TASS, 15:57Z). This indicates the talks are serious and have moved past procedural issues.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Pokrovsk Consolidation & Maritime Retaliation Shaping (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will fully consolidate the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301800Z NOV. They will simultaneously initiate maritime shaping operations (e.g., heightened surveillance, increased AD posture, aggressive rhetoric, and potential non-lethal interdiction) targeting shipping approaching Odesa/Black Sea ports as a direct response to the Senegal attack.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Coordinated Breakthrough on Southern Axis & FFE Neutralization (Confidence: HIGH) RF launches the synchronized ground and air assault targeting the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky line NLT 302000Z NOV. This COA is now more dangerous than previously assessed, as the successful RF counter-battery strike near Pokrovsk demonstrates RF ability to neutralize UAF heavy fire support across the theater, leaving the Southern front vulnerable to unmitigated tactical air support.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1B (IMMEDIATE CRITICAL): CROSS-SECTOR FFE RE-ALLOCATION (J3/J2)

ACTION: Due to the confirmed loss of FFE assets (Druzhkivka D-20), the J3 must immediately activate FFE Package Bravo (High Mobility/High Survivability) from the least kinetic sector (likely Kupyansk/Lyman) and task it to provide CQC support to Pokrovsk. This package must include two full mobile EW/C-UAS teams dedicated solely to protecting the artillery battery from Lancet/UAV attack. PRIORITY: Prevent total collapse of Pokrovsk defense (IMMEDIATE).

R-12 (URGENT): SOUTHERN TTP IMPLEMENTATION WINDOW (J3 / Tech)

ACTION: Utilize the current temporary lifting of the air alert in Zaporizhzhia (15:55Z) to accelerate R-12 deployment. The mobile C-UAS/Thermal TTP teams must be fully integrated into the Stepnohorsk operational zone NLT 301700Z NOV. Prioritize SIGINT collection (P2 CR) against anticipated RF CAS frequencies to program "Sting" interceptors. PRIORITY: Mitigate MDCOA (URGENT).

R-15 (STRATEGIC): COUNTER-ESCALATION PREPARATION (NCA / J7 / Naval)

ACTION: Given the visible internal Russian pressure for maritime retaliation (Poddubny), UAF Naval Command (VMS) and GUR must immediately increase surveillance and defensive posture around the Odesa maritime corridors and shipping. Develop counter-strike options targeting Black Sea Fleet assets NLT 302200Z NOV should RF attempt kinetic disruption of commercial shipping lanes. Simultaneously, the NCA must proactively leverage the US/Rubio statements to frame any RF maritime action as a breach of diplomatic good faith. PRIORITY: Deter RF maritime escalation (STRATEGIC).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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