Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301545Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Integrated Crisis Response Phase PERIOD: H-301515Z NOV 25 to H-301545Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The operational environment has stabilized in the Cognitive Domain but remains CRITICAL in the Kinetic Domain. The confirmed commencement and positive framing of the US-UA Miami negotiations have effectively neutralized the RF "Diplomatic Decapitation" IO campaign, providing the necessary strategic clarity (R-10 success). The immediate kinetic imperative remains the confirmation of the R-1 Fire Mission execution (301530Z NOV deadline passed) and the subsequent stabilization of the Pokrovsk GLOC. A secondary, but highly significant, development is the confirmed deep strike against RF global maritime logistics (Senegal tanker), which offers a new avenue for strategic pressure.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF primary axis of effort remains the Donetsk-Pokrovsk sector. The operational front is defined by Close Quarters Combat (CQC) within the Pokrovsk urban periphery.

• Pokrovsk GLOC (CRITICAL): RF intent to achieve total severance NLT 301800Z NOV remains the primary threat. The status of the immediate counter-fire (R-1) is unknown but critical for mitigating this.
• Southern Axis (HIGH ALERT): The threat of the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) targeting Stepnohorsk remains high, reinforced by sporadic air raid warnings in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. UAF successful deployment of advanced C-UAS TTPs (Sting/Thermal countermeasures) in the immediate periphery suggests improved readiness for counter-MDCOA operations.
• Maritime Logistics Domain (ESCALATED): The confirmed successful strike against an RF shadow fleet tanker off the coast of Senegal expands the battlefield geometry to the Atlantic/West African coast, signaling an escalation of UAF strategic effects against RF logistical resilience.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing temperatures persist. The new confirmation of UAF success in neutralizing RF infantry concealed by anti-thermal blankets (67th OMBR in Dnipropetrovsk) suggests UAF forces maintain a local technological advantage in thermal/IR detection over certain RF infantry TTPs, despite prevailing winter conditions.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): SKELIA Regiment maintains CQC defense in Pokrovsk. Strategic attention is split between confirming R-1 BDA and rapidly implementing MDCOA mitigation (R-12 Southern hardening). The 67th OMBR and 118th OMBr confirm the successful integration of advanced C-UAS/drone TTPs.
• RF (RED): RF units in Pokrovsk are presumed consolidating their tactical hold. The RF reaction to the major maritime logistical strike remains to be assessed, but is likely to draw immediate resources for investigation and media counter-narrative (IO).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is shifting from strategic coercion via NCA paralysis (now mitigated by Miami talks) to establishing irrevocable military facts on the ground via the Pokrovsk breakthrough.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The failure of RF forces to effectively use anti-thermal concealment blankets, confirmed by UAF drone footage (Dnipropetrovsk), suggests a vulnerability in RF specialized infantry equipment and training against UAF advanced thermal/FPV surveillance.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed successful strategic maritime strike (Senegal) represents a significant disruption to RF global energy logistics (shadow fleet). This is a severe setback, potentially increasing domestic fuel prices and forcing an immediate reassessment of naval escort/AD priorities outside the existing theater.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated fast synchronization in the IO space (immediate Voloshin comment post-Miami news). However, the failure to secure high-value long-range maritime assets suggests a persistent C2 deficiency in global, non-combat-zone asset protection against GUR/UAF strategic strike capabilities.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF tactical readiness remains high, marked by successful counter-drone and anti-thermal TTP validation (67th, 118th OMBrs). Strategic posture is robust, stabilized by the positive outcome and messaging from the bilateral talks in Florida (R-10 achieved).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Strategic): Confirmed successful commencement of high-level US-UA negotiations, featuring strong public messaging from US representatives (Rubio). Confirmation of deep strike success against RF global maritime logistics (Senegal).
• Successes (Tactical): Confirmed operational effectiveness of UAF C-UAS/thermal detection TTPs in the Dnipropetrovsk/Southern sectors.
• Setbacks (Unconfirmed): Lack of confirmation regarding the R-1 fire mission execution, indicating a potential C2 delay or BDA failure during the critical 301530Z NOV window.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Constraint (Kinetic Status): The status of the R-1 mission is the single highest immediate constraint. If execution failed, immediate reserve artillery deployment is required for Pokrovsk CQC support. Requirement (Southern Defense): The deployment of the successful anti-thermal/C-UAS TTPs validated by the 67th and 118th OMBrs to the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky area is an URGENT technical requirement for MDCOA mitigation (R-12).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF core "Diplomatic Decapitation" narrative is weakened. The TASS/Voloshin narrative attempting to frame President Zelensky as being "driven into a dead end" is directly contradicted by the visual evidence and optimistic statements emerging from the Miami talks ("significant progress," "halfway to independence").

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is receiving a crucial injection of confidence from two domains simultaneously:

1. Diplomatic Victory: Visible, high-level, and positive US support negates the fear of abandonment/capitulation created by the Umerov incident.
2. Strategic Kinetic Success: The Senegal strike provides a major narrative boost demonstrating UAF's capability to punish RF globally.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

International focus is now positive and engaged due to the US-UA meeting in Florida. UAF IO must immediately pivot to emphasizing the longevity and scope of US commitment (per Rubio's statements) to solidify this advantage and deny RF any future IO space regarding peace talks.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Pokrovsk Consolidation and Diplomatic Hardening (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will assume tactical control of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301800Z NOV (if R-1 failed). RF IO will immediately leverage this tactical win—not to coerce UAF capitulation (since the NCA is now stabilized)—but to harden their territorial demands in diplomatic channels, arguing UAF is incapable of halting their kinetic advance.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Coordinated Breakthrough on Southern Axis (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF remains poised to launch a synchronized ground and air assault targeting the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky line NLT 302000Z NOV. If UAF reserves are committed to the Pokrovsk crisis, and if the deployment of the new C-UAS/thermal TTPs (R-12) is delayed, the RF tactical air superiority combined with ground pressure poses a high risk of deep penetration.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1 (IMMEDIATE CRITICAL): POST-FFE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (J2/J3)

ACTION: The R-1 deadline has passed. URGENTLY confirm execution status and initiate immediate Post-Strike BDA (Battle Damage Assessment), leveraging high-resolution IMINT/GEOINT (P1 CR) or dedicated UAS assets. If R-1 failed or BDA shows insufficient disruption, allocate reserve artillery package (Package Alpha) for CQC support NLT 301615Z NOV. PRIORITY: Prevent total GLOC severance (IMMEDIATE).

R-12 (URGENT): SOUTHERN TTP INTEGRATION AND HARDENING (J3 / Tech)

ACTION: Accelerate implementation of the R-12 protocol. Immediately disseminate the proven 67th OMBR anti-thermal detection TTPs and the "Sting" interceptor protocols to all operational units in the Stepnohorsk/Zaporizhzhia sector. Deploy at least two full mobile C-UAS/EW teams to the MDCOA vector NLT 301700Z NOV to maximize counter-air and anti-infantry capabilities before the expected ground surge. PRIORITY: Mitigate Most Dangerous COA (URGENT).

R-15 (STRATEGIC): MARITIME STRIKE EXPLOITATION (NCA / GUR / J7)

ACTION: Immediately launch an integrated IO campaign focused on the Senegal strike, framing it as evidence of RF logistical insecurity and global vulnerability. Diplomatically, leverage the strike in ongoing negotiations to highlight RF dependence on shadow fleet activity and demand global enforcement of maritime sanctions. GUR should prioritize P2 SIGINT collection against RF commercial/naval assets operating outside standard AORs. PRIORITY: Increase strategic cost to the enemy (STRATEGIC).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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