Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301500Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Critical Hybrid Coercion Phase PERIOD: H-301445Z NOV 25 to H-301500Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The RF has successfully transitioned the conflict into a Multi-Domain Crisis Synchronization Event. Kinetic penetration of the Pokrovsk periphery has been achieved and is being executed in real-time correlation with the peak of the NCA diplomatic crisis. The critical R-1 fire mission deadline is 30 minutes away, but its objective has shifted from GLOC protection to urban counter-infiltration. The immediate priority is stabilizing UAF strategic communications (R-10) while delivering localized kinetic support (R-1) to prevent the complete collapse of the Donetsk defensive vector.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Donetsk Axis remains the main effort and is now in a critical state.

• Donetsk Axis (POKROVSK CRITICAL): RF elements have achieved confirmed infiltration into the urban periphery of Pokrovsk (301448Z NOV, 301458Z NOV). This confirms the operational success of the RF in bypassing or collapsing forward UAF lines near Hryshyne. The battle for the Pokrovsk GLOC is now a close-quarters urban engagement.
• Southern Axis (ELEVATED ALERT): UAF Air Force reports active enemy tactical aviation in the South-Eastern direction (301443Z NOV). This directly correlates with the MDCOA threat to the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky sector, where RF forces are attempting to exploit UAF 33 OShP retrograde.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Sub-freezing temperatures amplify the logistical requirement for both sides, particularly concerning equipment maintenance and casualty handling.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): SKELIA Regiment (425th) is confirmed engaged in localized counter-infiltration operations utilizing FPV drones within Pokrovsk (301442Z NOV, 301458Z NOV). This provides localized kinetic defense but cannot substitute for large-scale fire support. The R-1 decision point remains the single most critical tactical C2 control measure.
• RF (RED): RF is successfully maintaining both front-line equipment readiness (MoD repair report, 301435Z NOV) and non-official logistical supply chains ("Два майора," 301440Z NOV). RF tactical air assets are confirmed active in the south, indicating readiness to escalate kinetic pressure on the secondary axis.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intentions are validated: Force a strategic concession by leveraging kinetic success in Pokrovsk against the strategic communications failure (Umerov post deletion).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed tactical adaptation is the immediate commitment of RF ground assets into the Pokrovsk urban fight, prioritizing rapid severance over slower siege tactics. This indicates RF awareness of the UAF C2 instability window.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are resilient and adapting across multiple vectors: official vehicle repair/modernization (Sever Group) and aggressive private/non-public resupply efforts (Два майора). The Chinese component deal signals a high confidence in sustained BPS technology development.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrating true multi-domain coordination by synchronizing tactical intrusion (Pokrovsk) with strategic information warfare (Umerov amplification).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are engaged in critical localized defense in Pokrovsk. The readiness of the NCA to counter the information warfare thrust (R-10 execution) remains the most urgent indicator of strategic readiness. Tactical UAF units demonstrate high resolve and asymmetric skill (SKELIA FPV strikes).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical): SKELIA Regiment reports successful FPV drone strikes causing "chaos and panic" in the RF infiltration elements within Pokrovsk, providing crucial localized defensive momentum.
• Setback (Operational): RF infiltration into Pokrovsk periphery represents a critical tactical loss, confirming the failure to hold the Hryshyne outer defense line.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Constraint: The 301530Z NOV deadline for R-1 execution is now highly constrained, as FFE must be rapidly adjusted for urban support and potential collateral damage mitigation, rather than open-field suppression. Requirement: Immediate reallocation of Counter-UAS and EW assets to the Southern Axis to mitigate the confirmed threat from active RF tactical aviation (Air Force report, 301443Z NOV).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO focus is total: maximizing the political fallout from the Umerov deletion. RF milbloggers are using the incident to confirm internal UAF strategic collapse and validate the RF negotiation position. TASS messaging focusing on Venezuela's military preparedness against the US serves as a peripheral narrative to frame global resistance against perceived US coercion/intervention.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal uncertainty regarding the NCA's diplomatic strategy is peaking. The visible, active combat in a key city like Pokrovsk (confirmed by UAF sources) requires immediate NCA reassurance to prevent widespread panic and morale collapse, especially in the rear.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Polish diplomatic support against Hungary's position (301454Z NOV) provides a necessary, albeit minor, counter-narrative to the US negotiation pressure, signaling that not all international support is crumbling. However, the crisis remains centered on the US diplomatic track.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Severance and Strategic Messaging Lock-In (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will consolidate kinetic gains inside Pokrovsk NLT 301800Z NOV, effectively severing the critical GLOC and turning the city into a contested operational zone. This kinetic success will be immediately presented to the international community (via RF and aligned Western sources) as a non-negotiable fait accompli to pressure the NCA delegation toward territorial concessions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Southern Axis Air-Ground Coordinated Assault (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF will launch a coordinated ground assault against the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky line NLT 302000Z NOV, utilizing mobilized reserves and guaranteed close air support (CAS)/ISR denial from the confirmed active tactical aviation. This move exploits the UAF high command's necessary focus on the Pokrovsk-NCA crisis, aiming to achieve operational breakthrough in the South while strategic attention is fixed on Donetsk and Washington D.C.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1 (CRITICAL): URBAN COUNTER-INFILTRATION FIRE SUPPORT (J3 Operations)

ACTION: The R-1 fire mission must be executed NLT 301530Z NOV, but targeting coordinates must be immediately reviewed and adjusted to provide precision FFE support to UAF elements (e.g., SKELIA Regiment) engaged in urban defense on the Pokrovsk periphery. Prioritize suppression of RF heavy weapon platforms and logistics columns supporting the infiltration. Accept calculated risk of collateral damage over failure to provide critical CQC fire support. PRIORITY: Prevent total loss of Pokrovsk control (IMMEDIATE, 15 minutes remaining).

R-10 (CRITICAL): STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS EXECUTION (NCA / J5 / J7)

ACTION: Execute R-10 plan NLT 301630Z NOV. The public statement must not only address the deletion but must specifically reference the Pokrovsk fighting, linking UAF resistance (e.g., SKELIA FPV defense) to the diplomatic resolve. The message must be transmitted simultaneously across all major platforms (Presidential Office, MoD, MFA) to overwhelm RF narratives. PRIORITY: Deny RF strategic paralysis victory (IMMEDIATE).

R-12 (NEW): SOUTHERN AXIS AIR DEFENSE REALLOCATION (J3 / EW)

ACTION: In response to confirmed tactical aviation activity, implement immediate, limited reallocation of mobile AD/EW assets from non-critical rear sectors to the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky vector. Specific targeting priority must be given to neutralizing RF ISR and A2A UAVs (Geran-fighters) NLT 301700Z NOV to prevent the MDCOA of a coordinated "blind" assault. PRIORITY: Counter MDCOA threat and maintain Southern FEBA ISR (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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