Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301515Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Integrated Hybrid Conflict Phase PERIOD: H-301445Z NOV 25 to H-301515Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The operational environment has transitioned from high kinetic threat to CRITICAL HYBRID COERCION. The RF is exploiting the imminent operational deadline (Pokrovsk GLOC interdiction NLT 301530Z NOV) in perfect synchronization with a highly destabilizing strategic communications failure (Umerov post deletion), suggesting a concerted RF effort to force a strategic decision regarding territorial concessions under duress. Immediate UAF action is required to stabilize C2 and execute kinetic protective measures.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Donetsk Axis remains the main effort.

• Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF forces are confirming positions for operational severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC near Hryshyne. RF sources are reporting civilian evacuation from Krasnoarmeisk/Pokrovsk (301406Z NOV), indicating RF readiness for sustained offensive action or occupation.
• Southern Axis (Contested): RF Vostok Group continues combined kinetic and psychological operations near Huliaipole (301430Z NOV), targeting the stability of retreating UAF elements (33 OShP) and preventing the consolidation of blocking positions by the 3rd Assault Brigade.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Status Quo. Sub-freezing temperatures persist, complicating UAF counter-mobility and casualty evacuation TTPs.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): R-1 Fire Mission Status remains UNCONFIRMED and is the single most urgent kinetic control measure. The UAF delegation in the US is undergoing extreme political duress, evidenced by the deletion of the official commencement post (301410Z NOV).
• RF (RED): RF C2 is effectively synchronizing political narratives (territorial negotiation deadlines) with tactical pressure (Pokrovsk GLOC), validating the high-confidence assessment of hybrid warfare execution.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intentions have shifted from simple kinetic gains to maximizing strategic coercion against the National Command Authority (NCA).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF appears to be using deliberate media leaks (via pro-Russian and mainstream Western sources like Axios) to define the negotiation timeline and outcomes, effectively seizing the information initiative from UAF diplomatic efforts.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

No change. RF logistics remain resilient via alternative Kazakh corridors.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 shows high effectiveness in synchronizing Information Operations with battlefield geometry. UAF C2 is currently challenged by internal friction related to strategic negotiations, threatening paralysis.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is under extreme duress. The NCA delegation is in a high-risk diplomatic environment.

• Personnel Adaptation: UAF command (Palisa) has announced new policies for distributing newly mobilized personnel (301429Z NOV). This indicates necessary long-term force generation adaptation but requires clear internal messaging to maintain morale during the changeover.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical/Tech): Confirmed successful engagement using a UAF UGV (Browning M2) against an RF MT-LB in Donetsk Oblast (301413Z NOV). This demonstrates localized counter-BPS capability.
• Setback (Strategic/IO): The deletion of Umerov's post confirming the start of US negotiations is a major strategic communications failure, immediately validating RF narratives of friction over territorial concessions and lowering UAF negotiating leverage.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Constraint: Critical time constraint on R-1 execution (NLT 301530Z NOV). Strategic communications vacuum is now the most severe non-kinetic constraint. Requirement: Immediate NCA public clarity and firm articulation of red lines to counter the strategic paralysis threat.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO theater is defined by the synchronization of the US diplomatic meeting with RF kinetic pressure.

1. Forced Timeline: Axios reports (relayed 301418Z NOV) that the US delegation aims to "close all territorial disputes today" to deliver a plan to Putin NLT Tuesday. This creates maximum pressure on the UAF delegation to make concessions under a fabricated, urgent timeline.
2. C2 Instability: Umerov's deleted post (301410Z NOV) is being instantly leveraged by RF war correspondents (Kotsnews, Colonelcassad) to confirm NCA instability and disagreement over the terms (territory/security guarantees).
3. Refugee Framing: RF reporting of civilian evacuation from Krasnoarmeisk/Pokrovsk (301406Z NOV) aims to pre-justify the upcoming RF offensive as a necessary humanitarian action.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale is immediately threatened by the visible discord and uncertainty surrounding the US talks, feeding the RF "capitulation" narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

High-stakes negotiations are at a breaking point. The strategic risk of perceived US coercion is peaking, especially given the explicit RF framing of the US role as enforcing the "spirit of Anchorage" (territorial transfer).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Paralysis and GLOC Severance (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will achieve operational severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301800Z NOV, leveraging the anticipated failure of the R-1 fire mission deadline (301530Z NOV). Simultaneously, RF IO will amplify the collapse of UAF strategic C2 (Umerov deletion fallout) to freeze UAF strategic reserve commitment in the Donetsk sector and increase the political cost of resisting future territorial demands.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Kinetic/Cyber Exploitation (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF launches a localized, high-intensity BPS-coordinated ground assault in the Southern Axis (Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky) NLT 302000Z NOV, utilizing reserves stabilized by Kazakh logistics. This assault is accompanied by localized Starlink/C2 denial measures, designed to capitalize on the C2 instability triggered by the NCA diplomatic fallout. The goal is to collapse the Southern FEBA while UAF High Command is distracted by political maneuvering.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1 (REITERATED, CRITICAL): ACCELERATED FIRE INTERDICTION (J3 Operations)

ACTION: Command elements must confirm FFE status against confirmed RF logistics and fire support positions near Hryshyne NLT 301530Z NOV. If mobile artillery cannot meet this deadline, contingency long-range strike options (HIMARS, etc.) must be utilized immediately. Failure to execute R-1 will confirm operational severance and solidify the RF tactical gain ahead of strategic talks. PRIORITY: Prevent operational severance (IMMEDIATE, 15 minutes remaining).

R-10 (NEW, CRITICAL): STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS STABILIZATION (NCA / J5 / J7)

ACTION: The National Command Authority must issue an immediate, synchronized public statement NLT 301630Z NOV. This statement must:

1. Address the Deletion: Provide a rapid, credible explanation for the deletion of the Umerov post (e.g., correcting procedural language, securing information flow), minimizing the perception of internal strategic discord.
2. Reiterate Red Lines: Categorically re-affirm that UAF will not make territorial concessions under kinetic or diplomatic duress, directly addressing the Axios leak and RF coercion narratives.
3. Re-establish Focus: Immediately shift the public focus back to UAF tactical achievements (e.g., UGV successes) and long-term resolve (e.g., new personnel distribution policy). PRIORITY: Stabilize NCA C2 and deny RF a critical information victory (IMMEDIATE).

R-11 (NEW): PERSONNEL POLICY INTEGRATION (J1 / Brigade Commanders)

ACTION: J1 and relevant Brigade Commanders must draft and execute an internal, transparent communication plan detailing the rationale and methodology behind the new recruit assignment policy (Palisa). This must be disseminated to all frontline units NLT 302000Z NOV to prevent RF IO from exploiting the change as a sign of desperate mobilization measures. PRIORITY: Maintain unit cohesion and morale (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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