Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301445Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Counter-Exploitation Phase PERIOD: H-301430Z NOV 25 to H-301445Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The RF maintains high operational tempo and confirmed technological superiority in the BPS (Drone Systems Troops) domain. The critical vulnerability remains the unconfirmed status of the R-1 reserve deployment for kinetic interdiction of the Pokrovsk GLOC near Hryshyne. Simultaneously, high-level diplomatic activity concerning future peace terms (territory/security guarantees) is coinciding with RF battlefield pressure, validating the previous assessment of a synchronized hybrid warfare effort targeting operational paralysis and strategic coercion. Failure to meet the kinetic deadline (301530Z NOV) will severely degrade the UAF negotiating position.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains fixed on the Donetsk salient.

• Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF forces are consolidating positions in Hryshyne. The required timeline for fire mission initiation (R-1) to protect the Pokrovsk GLOC is 45 minutes from this report (NLT 301530Z NOV).
• Northern Axis (Alert Status Raised): Air Force reports increased RF tactical aviation activity (301334Z NOV) in the Northeast sector, correlating with Russian milblogger claims of minor advances in the Kupyansk sector. This suggests RF is using tactical aircraft for close air support or deep reconnaissance in support of shaping operations.
• Southern Axis (Air Threat): Confirmed deployment and operational use of UAV/drones targeting Mykolaiv (301445Z NOV), confirming RF capability to conduct deep strike/harassment operations outside the immediate FEBA.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Status Quo. Sub-freezing conditions continue to constrain UAF wheeled resupply and evacuation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): R-1 reserve movement remains the most critical control measure. High-level NCA delegation is engaged in crucial diplomatic talks in the US, diverting focus but offering a path for critical strategic alignment.
• RF (RED): RF is leveraging confirmed numerical superiority in drones on key sectors (WSJ via TASS, 301344Z NOV) to maintain persistent intelligence coverage and suppression of UAF maneuver. RF state media is actively broadcasting administrative integration of occupied regions (issuing passports in Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk region) to politically harden current gains.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intentions are characterized by kinetic exploitation backed by overwhelming technological and information superiority.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the increased utilization of manned tactical aviation in the Northeast (N-E) sector, likely supporting ground units involved in Kupyansk/Lyman efforts. This increased air activity must be monitored for potential shifting of RF AD assets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are confirmed resilient (Kazakh route, Chinese BPS components). RF forces possess the requisite POL and munitions to sustain the current offensive tempo in Donetsk through 48 hours (Confidence: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, particularly in synchronizing Information Operations (IO) with kinetic actions (e.g., timing of Krasnoarmiisk passport reports with Hryshyne pressure).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains strained but resolute. The successful operation of the 5 OShB UGV (previous report) provides a crucial tactical counter-narrative to RF drone superiority, but this TTP must be rapidly scaled. The NCA is actively engaged in sensitive diplomatic maneuvering.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Information): Continued high-level diplomatic engagement (Umerov in US) demonstrates commitment to securing long-term support and negotiating framework, countering RF narratives of collapse.
• Setback (Information/Operational): RF aggressively tying the critical GLOC area (Pokrovsk, formerly Krasnoarmiisk) to Russian administrative territory via passport ceremonies, proactively hardening the geopolitical status of the contested zone ahead of potential negotiations.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Resource Constraint: Diplomatic constraint risk (Turkey maritime response, US negotiation pressure) is peaking. Requirement: Immediate confirmation of R-1 fire mission execution is the single highest tactical priority. Resources must be diverted to reinforce Northern Axis C-UAS/EW capability if RF tactical aviation persistence increases.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing a highly synchronized campaign:

1. Territorial Justification: Using state media coverage of passport issuance in occupied Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk to establish de facto annexation and increase the political cost of UAF counter-offensives.
2. Diplomatic Leverage: Pro-RF media (Axios via ASTRA/RBC) emphasizes US impatience with Ukraine regarding the peace plan (territory/security guarantees), aiming to lower UAF morale and constrain the negotiating hand of the NCA delegation currently in the US.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF military solidarity remains visible (message 301335Z NOV). RF attempts to leverage domestic security incidents (Belgorod deserter, previous report) against their own forces are offset by continuous domestic narrative control (e.g., life expectancy propaganda).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• High-Stakes Negotiations: UAF delegation meeting in the US regarding the peace plan is confirmed (Umerov). This meeting is occurring under immediate battlefield pressure, increasing the risk of perceived coercion.
• Maritime Friction Escalation: RF diplomatic sources explicitly state they are developing countermeasures against UAF naval strikes, confirming the criticality of Recommendation R-8 (Turkish diplomatic mitigation).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: GLOC Severance and Diplomatic Hardening (Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will achieve tactical severance of the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301800Z NOV due to the lack of timely UAF counter-fire (R-1 failure). This tactical success will be immediately leveraged in the information domain to solidify the RF negotiating position ahead of the Putin-Witkoff meeting (4-5 DEC), specifically regarding territorial concessions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Operational Paralysis Leading to Tactical Overrun (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF launches synchronized kinetic and electronic attacks against the R-1 reserve movement area W of Hryshyne NLT 301630Z NOV, utilizing BPS (UAV/UGV) coordination for fire direction, while simultaneously launching a high-intensity IO wave suggesting that key strategic decisions (territory/security guarantees) have already been made in the US, prompting local commanders to hesitate or defect.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1 (REITERATED, CRITICAL): ACCELERATED FIRE INTERDICTION (J3 Operations)

ACTION: Command elements responsible for R-1 deployment must confirm FIRE FOR EFFECT (FFE) status against confirmed RF logistics and fire support positions near Hryshyne NLT 301530Z NOV. If mobile artillery assets cannot meet this deadline, contingency long-range strike options (HIMARS, etc.) must be utilized immediately to prevent GLOC closure. PRIORITY: Prevent operational severance (IMMEDIATE, Time is critical).

R-8 (UPDATED): STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND DIPLOMATIC MITIGATION (NCA / J5 / J7)

ACTION:

1. US Talk Synchronization: J5 must immediately relay battlefield urgency (Hryshyne) and the RF information strategy (Krasnoarmiisk passports) to the UAF delegation in the US, ensuring that tactical failure is not allowed to dictate strategic concessions.
2. Public Address: Issue a rapid, synchronized public statement from the highest level of the NCA NLT 301700Z NOV, addressing the ongoing US talks and categorically refuting any narratives suggesting imminent territorial concessions under duress. PRIORITY: Preserve UAF operational freedom and strategic integrity (IMMEDIATE).

R-9 (NEW): NORTHERN AXIS C-UAS/EW ADJUSTMENT (EW Director / J3)

ACTION: Deploy supplementary mobile EW assets (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to the Northeast (N-E) sector, specifically targeting RF tactical aviation reconnaissance/targeting frequencies. This is a preventative measure to negate the risk of RF shifting air assets from the N-E to support BPS-led exploitation in Donetsk. PRIORITY: Deny RF multi-domain synchronization (URGENT).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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