Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP)

TIME: 301430Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) // Counter-Exploitation Phase PERIOD: H-301300Z NOV 25 to H-301430Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: RF forces maintain high operational tempo, focusing on the immediate objective of operational severance at Hryshyne. The most critical development is the strategic solidification of RF’s Drone Systems Troops (BPS) doctrine through confirmed external technological investment (China). While UAF forces registered significant tactical successes in the counter-UGV domain (5 OShB) and deep rear (GUR Berdyansk), these must be rapidly leveraged to delay the Hryshyne exploitation, which remains the deciding factor for the Donetsk axis. Diplomatic risks associated with UAF deep strikes (Kazakhstan, Turkey) are rising and require immediate NCA synchronization.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is stable but deteriorating along the Donetsk salient.

• Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF forces (elements of 27th MRD) are consolidating positions within Hryshyne. The primary decision point is the interdiction of RF fire positions targeting the Pokrovsk GLOC NLT 301530Z NOV.
• Southern Axis (HIGH PRESSURE): Stepnohorsk breach persists. Deep rear security pressure confirmed via GUR sabotage against RF occupation forces near Berdyansk.
• Northern Axis (CONTESTED): UAF forces (57th OMPBr) confirm successful defense and denial of RF attempts to establish advanced positions in Vovchansk (301328Z NOV), reinforcing the tactical denial strategy in Kharkiv.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions continue. No significant change to ground conditions, which favor tracked RF exploitation units but increase friction for UAF wheeled reserve convoys (R-1) on secondary roads.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): R-1 reserve movement toward blocking positions W of Hryshyne is confirmed. C-UAS/EW assets are being diverted to the Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia axes, increasing risk to fixed infrastructure elsewhere. The successful deployment and action of the 5th Assault Brigade’s armed UGV against an RF MT-LB (301323Z NOV) confirms UAF capability to contest the ground robotics domain.
• RF (RED): RF is prioritizing hardening the Hryshyne salient and maintaining C2 redundancy. China’s purchase of a stake in a leading RF drone manufacturer (301333Z NOV) confirms long-term strategic support for the RF BPS doctrine.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intentions remain centered on maximizing operational gain in Donetsk before UAF reserves consolidate.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most critical adaptation is strategic logistical securing of BPS/UAV components via China, ensuring the long-term effectiveness of the newly formalized Drone Systems Troops. Tactically, RF is relying on lower-quality forces (Chechen units confirmed near Berdyansk) for static rear security, which presents an opportunity for UAF asymmetric exploitation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment via the Kazakh route remains stable (previous report). The new Chinese investment ensures a stable supply chain for high-end UAV/UGV components, making the RF BPS capability highly resilient to long-term attrition.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in cross-domain synchronization. However, reports of internal security incidents (Belgorod deserter) suggest potential morale and cohesion friction within the mobilized reserve pool, though this is not impacting current FEBA operations.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains high but strained. The successful tactical defense in Vovchansk and the UGV counter-action in Donetsk provide valuable psychological and operational indicators. Resource mobilization through public appeals (43 OMbR) confirms continued strain on light transport and support assets.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (UGV Domain): 5 OShB successfully employed an armed UGV to destroy an RF MT-LB, demonstrating successful UAF counter-UAS/UGV TTP development. (Counters the RF BPS dominance narrative).
• Success (Asymmetric): GUR sabotage operation in Berdyansk highlights continued UAF deep strike capacity against RF logistics and rear personnel.
• Constraint (Maritime/Diplomatic): Turkish diplomatic concern regarding SBU naval strikes on the RF shadow fleet introduces a new potential constraint on UAF naval operational freedom (301312Z NOV).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Resource Constraint: Diplomatic constraints surrounding deep strike targeting (R-5, Kazakh route) are now compounded by Turkish concerns over maritime strikes. Requirement: Immediate commitment of Anti-Armor and Mobile Artillery for the R-1 mission W of Hryshyne. Requirement for hardened communications (SATCOM/EW) to negate the MDCOA threat of operational paralysis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is actively attempting to fragment UAF strategic resolve:

1. NCA Destabilization: Sustained high-volume narrative questioning the fate and authority of key NCA figures (Yermak/Zelensky), often paired with direct quotes from Putin emphasizing UAF failure.
2. Strategic Wedge Driving: RF sources amplify historical quotes from Ex-CINC Zaluzhnyi regarding "peace without total victory" to create friction between UAF military leadership, political goals, and Western support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF military morale remains firm (Donbas, Vovchansk). Public participation in fundraising (43 OMbR) indicates persistent civilian support. RF morale efforts (Mother's Day tribute) are continuous, but offset by domestic security incidents (Belgorod deserter).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Critical Diplomatic Channel: Confirmation of the upcoming Putin-Witkoff meeting (NLT 4-5 DEC) signals high-stakes diplomatic maneuvering that may affect the strategic environment.
• EU Financial Risk: Estonian PM Kallas's stance on frozen asset utilization (301307Z NOV) indicates continuing EU internal friction regarding long-term financing mechanisms for Ukraine.
• Maritime Friction: Turkey's expressed concern over SBU tanker strikes requires immediate diplomatic engagement to preserve UAF maritime economic pressure capability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: GLOC Interdiction and BPS-Supported Consolidation (Confidence: HIGH) RF maneuver units will continue to leverage BPS assets (UAV/UGV) to suppress UAF counter-attack vectors and interdict the Pokrovsk GLOC from Hryshyne. The critical path remains the rapid deployment of artillery and fire support assets into the salient, backed by strategically secured BPS logistics (China). This course aims for operational severance by 301800Z NOV.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Operational Paralysis (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF launches a kinetic deep strike targeting rear UAF C2 hubs, synchronized with a massed electronic attack against commercial and military SATCOM (Starlink/VSAT) specifically targeting the R-1 reserve movement area W of Hryshyne. This is intended to disrupt R-1's coordinated deployment, creating confusion that allows RF armor to bypass the initial blocking line and achieve a decisive operational breach.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1 (REITERATED): ACCELERATED FIRE INTERDICTION (J3 Planning)

ACTION: R-1 units must initiate Counter-Mobility Fire Missions against confirmed RF transit and fire support concentration points W/SW of Hryshyne NLT 301530Z NOV. The primary goal is asset denial and movement suppression, not direct assault. Use cluster munitions where doctrinally appropriate to maximize area denial effect against RF logistics columns. PRIORITY: Prevent operational severance (IMMEDIATE, Time is critical).

R-7 (UPDATED): COUNTER-BPS DOCTRINE ADAPTATION (J2/J3/EW Director)

ACTION:

1. Exploit Success: Immediately circulate TTPs derived from the 5 OShB UGV engagement to all tactical units engaged in counter-penetration operations.
2. Long-Term Denial: Update the RF Target List (RFTL) to include specific component manufacturing facilities tied to the newly confirmed Chinese supply chain. J2/J5 must accelerate development of targeting packages that mitigate diplomatic risk while striking this essential technological base. PRIORITY: Degrade RF C2 resilience and technological sustainment (URGENT).

R-8 (NEW): MARITIME/STRATEGIC DIPLOMATIC MITIGATION (NCA / J5 / J7)

ACTION:

1. Turkish Engagement: NCA must engage with Turkish leadership immediately to explain the military necessity of SBU shadow fleet strikes (e.g., funding weapons targeting Ukrainian civilians), aiming to prevent formal Turkish maritime restrictions.
2. NCA Communication: Issue a comprehensive address confirming command stability, directly refuting RF disinformation (Yermak/Zelensky rumors), and framing R-1 commitment as a necessary defensive maneuver. PRIORITY: Preserve UAF operational freedom (maritime) and C2 integrity (cognitive domain).

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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