Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP) TIME: 301230Z NOV 25 OPERATION: Joint Defensive Maneuver (JDM) PERIOD: H-301200Z NOV 25 to H-301230Z NOV 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF operational objective is confirmed as simultaneous GLOC interdiction and strategic reserve fixation across two critical axes.

• Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL - Exploitation Vector): RF activity is converging on the strategic choke point created by the advance into Hryshyne (Гришино). Recent kinetic activity (MoD Russia claim of artillery strike on UAF PVD near Krasnoarmeysk direction) validates the immediate threat to the Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmiisk logistical hub. RF is successfully shaping the battle space adjacent to the main supply routes supporting the eastern UAF grouping.
• Southern Axis (CRITICAL - Reserve Fixation): Pressure remains high along the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky vector, utilizing A2A UAV doctrine to enforce tactical blindness. The defense by UAF 3rd Assault Brigade remains contested.
• Northern Axis (Fixation/Thermal Denial): Confirmed missile strike targeting energy infrastructure in the Sumy region (РБК-Україна). This action reinforces the RF strategy of "Thermal Denial" and forces UAF air defense and repair/logistics resources to be fixed far from the primary operational fronts.
• Deep Rear (UAF Initiative): UAF deep strike capability remains active and effective (GUR Berdiansk strike, naval pressure on shadow fleet).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing temperatures persist across the theater. The confirmed RF strike on Sumy energy infrastructure, following previous strikes in Kyiv, confirms the sustained strategy to leverage cold weather to degrade civilian morale and pressure military logistics (sparing capacity for thermal support).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): UAF forces are executing a stressed, coordinated defense. The immediate requirement is the reallocation of reserves (R-1) to the Donetsk Axis to counter the Hryshyne/Krasnoarmiisk threat, preventing operational severance. Internal communications suggest increasing reliance on grassroots financial support (donation appeals), signaling high operational resource consumption.
• RF (RED): High synchronization between ground forces (27th MRD artillery strike confirmed near Krasnoarmeysk) and C-UAS/AD assets (Colonelcassad mobile C-UAS teams) in support of BPS doctrine. RF domestic IO tempo remains high (Mother's Day/VDV appeals).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intention is now demonstrably focused on operational severance by threatening the Pokrovsk grouping's GLOCs (Hryshyne) while exhausting UAF tactical reserves through persistent pressure (Stepnohorsk).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most critical tactical confirmation is the direct application of artillery fire in the Krasnoarmiisk direction by the RF 27th Motorized Rifle Division (Tsentr Group). This confirms that RF is not merely testing the Hryshyne sector but committing significant, organized firepower to enable a deep advance aimed at the Pokrovsk hub.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adapting and stabilizing via the Kazakh alternative routes (P3 CR). UAF delay in interdicting these routes (R-2) directly facilitates the increased kinetic activity observed on the Donetsk Axis.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, integrating combat claims (27th MRD strike) with political IO, while simultaneously managing internal demands (domestic fundraising appeals, Mother's Day PR). The complexity of managing two simultaneous operational attacks (Donetsk/Southern) is currently well within RF C2 capability.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high but severely strained by the simultaneous threats. The UAF must prioritize resource allocation to the Donetsk Axis (R-1) immediately, risking vulnerability on the Southern Axis if EW deployment (R-3) is delayed. Force posture remains defensive but with demonstrated offensive reach (deep strikes).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks (CRITICAL): Artillery fire striking targets near Krasnoarmiisk indicates the tactical success of the RF Hryshyne advance and the narrowing window to prevent GLOC severance.
• Successes: UAF drone units (Ptakhy Madiara) continue to execute highly effective and demoralizing kinetic operations, evidenced by the release of graphic combat footage designed to degrade RF troop morale and domestic support. UAF political leadership is maintaining continuity and high-level diplomatic outreach (Zelenskyy/Stubb).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most immediate constraint is time for reserve reallocation. The financial/material constraint is underlined by multiple unit commanders issuing appeals for donations (Operatyvny ZSU, Shtirlitz), indicating that centralized supply cannot fully meet the high consumption rate of the dual-axis defense.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative: The primary focus is dual:
  1. External/UAF: Amplifying messages of defeatism and division (Ukrainian blogger quote on "peace treaty") to delegitimize the UAF war effort.
  2. Internal/Domestic: Leveraging strong patriotic/familial themes (Mother's Day, VDV fundraising drives) to stabilize internal morale and secure grassroots financial support for the war effort, distracting from combat losses.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: Focuses on kinetic dominance (Madyar video) and strategic diplomatic continuity (Zelenskyy meeting on US negotiations), projecting stability and efficacy to both domestic and international audiences.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public sentiment remains active and engaged in supporting the war effort (donation appeals). RF domestic morale shows signs of requiring sustained emotional and patriotic reinforcement (Dempster-Shafer confirmed Social Media Campaign).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic engagement between President Zelenskyy and President Stubb (Finland) confirms coordinated planning for crucial US negotiations. This signals high-level commitment to long-term strategic support and diplomatic alignment, directly countering RF narratives of international isolation.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Severance through Converged Pressure (Confidence: HIGH) RF Vostok Group, sustained by Kazakh logistics (R-2 delay), will prioritize consolidating artillery and motorized rifle unit positions in the Krasnoarmiisk direction NLT 301800Z NOV to maximize fire support for the Hryshyne advance. Simultaneously, RF will utilize A2A UAVs to suppress UAF counter-fire and ISR assets over Stepnohorsk, forcing UAF High Command to commit reserves to the Donetsk Axis under tactically blind conditions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Full Operational Isolation (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF achieves a rapid tactical breach at Hryshyne, cutting the main logistical axis (Pokrovsk GLOC) within 48 hours. This success is paired with a massive, synchronized Thermal Denial strike package (similar to Sumy, but higher volume) targeting multiple regional power distribution centers supplying the reserve deployment areas (e.g., Dnipro/Kharkiv), resulting in paralyzing UAF forward movement and C2 disruption.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE RESERVE REDIRECTION (J3/J5 Planning)

ACTION: Execute Immediate Reallocation of Reserves (NLT 301400Z NOV) to the Donetsk Axis to establish a linear blocking position West of Hryshyne and North/East of the Krasnoarmiisk-Pokrovsk hub. This mobile force must be equipped with modern anti-armor systems and mobile artillery for rapid counter-battery fire against the confirmed RF 27th MRD elements. PRIORITY: Prevent operational severance.

R-2: URGENT COUNTER-LOGISTICS INTERDICTION (J2 / J3 Targeting)

ACTION: The threat from the Kazakh-RF logistical routes is now directly enabling the Donetsk exploitation. AUTHORIZE AND EXECUTE the TRANS-BORDER TARGETING strike packages against confirmed rail transshipment hubs (P3 CR) NLT 302000Z NOV. Delay risks the operational stability of the entire Vostok Group effort. PRIORITY: Degrade RF sustainment capacity.

R-3: EW AND C-UAS SURGE (J3 / EW Director)

ACTION: Maintain R-3 deployment urgency for Operation "SKY SWEEPER." Due to confirmed RF adaptation (mobile C-UAS teams, A2A doctrine), prioritize deployment of systems capable of wide-spectrum jamming and anti-A2A specific frequencies to the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky sector NLT 301800Z NOV. This is essential to prevent the tactical blindness that enables ground exploitation. PRIORITY: Counter RF technological escalation.

R-4: INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE AND SOF INTERDICTION (J2 / J3 / SOF)

ACTION: Immediately increase security and air defense posture around critical energy infrastructure in the Northern/Eastern oblasts (e.g., Sumy, Kharkiv) to mitigate the effects of the RF Thermal Denial strategy. Simultaneously, SOF operations (GUR) should focus on interdicting RF forward fuel/maintenance caches in the occupied Southern rear (Melitopol/Berdiansk) to create localized friction, complementing the strategic logistical strikes (R-2). PRIORITY: Force RF resource dispersal and mitigate hybrid impacts.

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

//END OF REPORT//