Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP) TIME: 301200Z NOV 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis is now manifesting as a two-front operational stress test, requiring immediate reallocation analysis.

• Southern Axis (Critical): Center of gravity remains the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky vector. RF Vostok Group continues exploitation pressure against UAF 3rd Assault Brigade's deployment. RF sources claim successful counter-battery action near Huliaipole (D-30 Howitzer destruction claimed), confirming ongoing shaping operations outside the primary breach zone.
• Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL - NEW/EMERGING THREAT): RF sources (Colonelcassad) claim entry and clearing operations in Hryshyne (Гришино). If verified, this represents a major advance threatening the northern GLOCs supplying the UAF grouping focused on Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk. This movement is designed to fix UAF operational reserves and exploit existing stress.
• Northern Axis (High Threat/Fixation): Confirmed missile danger in the Novhorod-Siverskyi Raion, Chernihiv (UAF Air Force). This action sustains the RF strategy of fixing UAF air defense assets and rear echelon forces.
• Deep Rear (UAF Initiative): GUR confirmed a successful deep strike operation near occupied Berdiansk targeting Kadyrovite forces during a fuel transaction.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Sub-freezing temperatures continue to amplify the impact of RF "Thermal Denial" strikes (e.g., district heating network damage).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF (BLUE): Executing coordinated defense and counter-strike operations (GUR deep strike, IFG UAS operations in Dobropil). UAF National Command Authority (NCA) has initiated a strategic communications counter-measure (Markarova appointment) to signal resilience.
• RF (RED): High synchronization between ground action (Hryshyne advance) and strategic IO (Peskov statement). Internal RF discussions (Podubnyy) confirm growing concern over UAF UAS effectiveness and the necessity of improved Counter-UAS capabilities.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intention is to achieve a critical operational breakthrough that forces UAF to commit strategic reserves prematurely, or to isolate a major UAF grouping.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most critical adaptation is the shift in operational focus to the Hryshyne (Donetsk) sector. This confirms the RF strategy to stretch UAF defensive capacity by creating simultaneous, high-stress focal points on different fronts.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Deep Logistics Interdiction: GUR strike near Berdiansk confirms the effectiveness of UAF SOF in disrupting localized RF fuel supply lines, particularly targeting less disciplined units (Kadyrovites).
• Strategic Logistics: The criticality of interdicting the Kazakh alternate routes (CR P3) is heightened as RF ground forces accelerate exploitation efforts reliant on those stocks.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high effectiveness in synchronizing kinetic advances (Hryshyne) with strategic political messaging (Peskov). The simultaneous activation of these levers is aimed at generating maximum operational shock.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively oriented but executing successful offensive deep-strike operations (GUR). Readiness is stressed by the emergence of the Hryshyne threat requiring potential unscheduled reserve commitment.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Successful deep interdiction strike (GUR Berdiansk). Effective strategic communications counter-IO (Markarova appointment). Successful tactical engagements (IFG, Vovchansk).
• Setbacks (CRITICAL): The potential loss or threat to the GLOCs near Hryshyne poses an immediate operational setback, potentially isolating a significant UAF force grouping in the Pokrovsk area.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint on Electronic Warfare (EW) assets remains critical for Stepnohorsk. The new threat at Hryshyne dictates an urgent requirement for mobile artillery and anti-armor reserves capable of rapid deployment (NLT 301600Z NOV) to prevent a breakthrough on the Donetsk Axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative: Focus is on "inevitable Ukrainian defeat" (Peskov) and capitalizing on political rumors. The RF internal narrative is shifting to emphasize resilience and social support (Mother's Day appeals) while managing internal security anxieties (pipeline terror report).
• UAF Counter-Narrative: The appointment of Oksana Markarova serves as a high-visibility, positive signal of long-term planning, investment security, and institutional stability, directly countering the RF political decapitation effort.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public sentiment remains resilient, supported by aggressive domestic media and documented tactical victories. RF is attempting to use sentimental appeals to stabilize domestic support for its war effort.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmation of the Polish President's cancellation of a meeting with PM Orbán (Hungary) due to the Moscow visit signals reinforced diplomatic pressure on Russian proxies and affirms the solidarity of key NATO eastern flank nations with Kyiv.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Dual Exploitation and Reserve Fixation (Confidence: HIGH) RF will prioritize the consolidation of the Hryshyne advance NLT 302200Z NOV to maximize pressure on the Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmiisk GLOC. Simultaneously, A2A UAVs will continue to suppress UAF ISR capability over Stepnohorsk, enabling a persistent, but perhaps slower, advance against the 3rd Assault Brigade's blocking line. This two-pronged attack is designed to force UAF High Command to divide scarce reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Operational Severance and Encirclement (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF achieves a rapid breakthrough at Hryshyne, cutting the main supply artery to the Donetsk grouping, forcing UAF to choose between abandoning equipment to retrograde or risking encirclement. This operational pressure is paired with maximum hybrid attack (cyber/jamming/IO amplification) aimed at paralyzing UAF strategic decision-making, leading to cascading tactical collapses on both the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia Axes within 72 hours.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: CRITICAL RESERVE REDIRECTION (J3/J5 Planning)

ACTION: Immediately re-evaluate and, if required, reallocate ready strategic reserves currently earmarked for contingency defense (e.g., Northern Axis) to create a mobile counter-attack force for the Donetsk Axis (Hryshyne sector). Authorization for aggressive fire support and pre-emptive denial targeting of RF logistics routes into Hryshyne must be granted NLT 301400Z NOV. FOCUS: Preventing operational isolation of the Pokrovsk grouping.

R-2: URGENT COUNTER-LOGISTICS STRIKE (J2 / J3 Targeting)

ACTION: Execute TRANS-BORDER TARGETING against the confirmed Kazakh-RF rail transshipment hubs NLT 302000Z NOV. This action must be treated as the highest strategic priority to prevent RF Vostok Group's overall stabilization and sustainment of the dual exploitation effort. FOCUS: Strategic logistical degradation.

R-3: EW Deployment and C2 Integration (J3 / EW Director)

ACTION: Maintain the urgency of Operation "SKY SWEEPER." Ensure all mobile C-UAS and EW assets are deployed to protect the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky sector NLT 301800Z NOV, with specific priority on disrupting the A2A UAV C2 loop (P2 CR). FOCUS: Mitigating "tactical blindness" and enabling the 3rd Assault Brigade's defensive consolidation.

R-4: Deep Rear Interdiction Continuation (GUR / SOF)

ACTION: Continue high-tempo SOF/GUR deep strike operations, focusing on localized fuel and high-value munitions transactions in the occupied South (Berdiansk, Melitopol rear areas) to disrupt operational sustainment on the tactical level, complementing the strategic logistical strikes (R-2). FOCUS: Localized force friction and disruption.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

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