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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-30 11:04:33Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-11-30 10:34:24Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTSITREP) TIME: 301100Z NOV 25


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia Sector), specifically the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky vector, following the logistical collapse of the UAF 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33 OShP).

  • Southern Axis (Critical): RF Vostok Group is exploiting the logistical strangulation on the Konstiantynivka GLOC. The focus has decisively shifted to Stepnohorsk, bypassing the hardened defense at Huliaipole. UAF 3rd Assault Brigade is confirmed deployed to establish blocking positions to mitigate the operational rout.
  • Eastern Axis (High Pressure): RF forces maintain persistent pressure around Kupyansk (threat of aerial guided weapons) and Vovchansk (multiple ground assault attempts confirmed, repelled by UAF).
  • Northern Axis (ISR/Strike Prep): New sightings confirm multiple RF UAV incursions targeting Sumy (civilian infrastructure strike confirmed) and penetrating towards Chernihiv. This suggests sustained pressure to fix UAF reserves and exploit the "Thermal Denial" strategy.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

Sub-freezing conditions are exacerbating the impact of the RF "Thermal Denial" strategy, confirmed by the strike on civilian infrastructure in the Sumy community. This pressure increases the logistical burden on UAF rear areas and impacts civilian morale.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • UAF (BLUE): Executing coordinated retrograde (33 OShP) and establishment of secondary defensive lines (3rd Assault Brigade) in the South. UAF Air Force is tracking persistent UAV and KAB activity across multiple sectors, confirming an ongoing air defense engagement.
  • RF (RED): Actively surging AD assets (1488th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, SAR Score 13.88) to protect adapted rear logistics. Deploying new BPS (Drone Systems Troops) doctrine, utilizing UAVs for reconnaissance, A2A air superiority, and ground interdiction (Kurier UGVs).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF primary intention remains the operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk combined with strategic logistical stabilization.

CapabilityAssessmentConfidence
Tactical Air Supremacy (UAV)Confirmed fielding of A2A UAVs (Geran-fighters) and coordinated use of ISR/strike UAVs on Northern and Southern Axes. This is designed to create tactical "blindness."HIGH
Standoff StrikeContinued use of KABs (Guided Aerial Bombs) in high-value sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Kupyansk). Indicates high reserve of aviation munitions and ability to avoid UAF AD coverage.MEDIUM
Logistical ResilienceConfirmed activation of alternative Kazakh rail/road corridors successfully mitigating previous UAF deep strikes. This adaptation is critical to sustaining Vostok Group's exploitation.HIGH
Information Operations (IO)Highly synchronized and aggressive IO campaign targeting UAF National Command Authority (NCA) stability. New data confirms RF state media (TASS) and associated channels are actively pushing narratives regarding a criminal case against Yermak and false statements attributed to Zaluzhnyi advocating for capitulation.HIGH

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary tactical shift is the enforcement of the BPS doctrine, coupled with the aggressive and diversified use of ground robotics (Kurier UGVs) to lock down the critical Konstiantynivka GLOC, effectively making it unusable for UAF supply.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The immediate strategic shock to RF POL stocks following the Caspian Pipeline attack is negated by the successful activation of the Kazakh alternate route. RF sustainment is stabilizing. Collection Requirement remains P2 (IMINT) for these transit nodes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high synchronization across domains:

  1. Kinetic: Coordinated air-ground assault at Stepnohorsk.
  2. Logistical: Rapid shift to external supply corridors.
  3. Cognitive (IO): Centralized deployment of high-impact disinformation campaigns targeting key Ukrainian political and military figures simultaneously.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is stressed by the logistical failure in the South and the emerging threat of RF air superiority via A2A UAVs. Readiness remains high in the Eastern sector (successful Vovchansk defense).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Successes:
    • Successful deep strike against the RF shadow fleet tanker (Kairos/ex-Virat) near Turkey, maintaining economic pressure. (Operational Level)
    • Successful repulsion of RF assault forces in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region. (Tactical Level)
    • Continued diplomatic engagement (Presidential call with Finland) ensuring future support pipeline stability. (Strategic Level)
  • Setbacks:
    • Forced retrograde and equipment abandonment by the 33 OShP at Stepnohorsk due to logistics failure. (Tactical/Operational Level)
    • Confirmed loss of access to the Konstiantynivka GLOC due to RF UGV/mining tactics.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate, critical resource requirement is enhanced Counter-UAS (C-UAS) and Electronic Warfare (EW) capability, specifically tuned to detect and defeat the new RF A2A drone platforms.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing an operational-level disinformation campaign focused on decapitation and political paralysis (MDCOA driver).

  • Target Yermak: TASS confirmed reporting on the initiation of a criminal case against the former Head of the Presidential Office by RF-controlled authorities in Kharkiv. This provides actionable legal documentation for the internal RF narrative of UAF political collapse.
  • Target Zaluzhnyi: Dissemination of false reports claiming the former Commander-in-Chief advocates for "peace without full victory," designed to fracture UAF military-political unity and demoralize frontline troops.
  • Counter-Narrative: RF state channels are aggressively utilizing narratives of UAF civilian targeting (Belgorod claims) and sentimental appeals (Mother’s Day) to sustain internal recruitment and public support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is resilient, but the perceived political instability (amplified IO) and the thermal denial strikes in winter conditions pose a significant risk to long-term civilian endurance. RF is actively boosting internal morale through fundraising and appeals to sacrifice.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic channels remain active (President/Finland). Continued sanctions work confirms UAF commitment to non-kinetic pressure on the RF economy and supply chains.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Tactical Exploitation and Air Control Consolidation (Confidence: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will continue immediate pressure on the Stepnohorsk sector, aiming to prevent the 3rd Assault Brigade from consolidating a viable blocking line. This ground assault will be supported by:

  1. BPS Aerial Clearance: Continuous use of A2A UAVs NLT 301800Z NOV to suppress UAF ISR capability, resulting in fire-correction loss.
  2. KAB Saturation: Pre-emptive strikes (KABs/Aviation) on anticipated UAF secondary defensive depth (Zaporizhzhia rear areas) to degrade mobility and concentration.
  3. Logistical Buffer: RF Vostok Group stocks will begin stabilization within 48 hours unless the newly established Kazakh transit nodes are interdicted.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Synchronized Operational Collapse via Hybrid Shock (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF simultaneously achieves an operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk (leading to potential encirclement of UAF elements) while launching a major cyber/jamming attack (e.g., Starlink denial) across the Southern and Central axes. This kinetic and non-kinetic shock is paired with a highly intensified political IO campaign (amplifying the Yermak/Zaluzhnyi narratives) aimed at freezing NCA decision-making and preventing timely release of strategic reserves.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical window for UAF counter-action is 48 hours (NLT 020000Z DEC 25), coinciding with the projected stabilization of RF logistical stocks via the Kazakh corridor.

Decision PointDescriptionTimeline (NLT)
EW Countermeasure DeploymentFull-scale initiation of Operation "SKY SWEEPER" to counter A2A UAVs over Stepnohorsk.301800Z NOV
Trans-Border Strike AuthorizationAuthorization and launch of deep strike packages against confirmed Kazakh-RF rail transshipment hubs.302000Z NOV
NCA Unified ResponseDefinitive, public political action to debunk Yermak/Zaluzhnyi narratives and confirm UAF strategic resilience.301500Z NOV

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: Tactical EW Prioritization (J3 / EW Director)

ACTION: IMMEDIATELY execute the resource reallocation of mobile C-UAS and EW assets (Operation "SKY SWEEPER") to the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky sector as planned. Priority target is the RF BPS A2A C2/Relay nodes (P3 collection requirement). FOCUS: Protect ground forces and tactical ISR platforms.

R-2: Urgent Counter-Logistics Execution (J2 / J3 Targeting)

ACTION: AUTHORIZE TRANS-BORDER TARGETING against the confirmed Caspian/Volga rail and road classification yards being utilized for the Kazakh logistical corridor. The interdiction must be executed NLT 302000Z NOV to maximize shock and prevent RF stock stabilization. FOCUS: Strategic logistical degradation.

R-3: Defensive Retrograde Control (J3 Command)

ACTION: Ensure UAF 33 OShP executes a rapid, disciplined "SCORCHED EARTH" withdrawal, ensuring all non-recoverable heavy equipment is destroyed to deny RF battlefield material. Prioritize deployment of SOF/Hunter-Killer teams to clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC of Kurier UGVs and IEDs for casualty extraction. FOCUS: Personnel preservation and sanitization of abandoned AO.

R-4: Strategic Communications Offensive (NCA / J9)

ACTION: Initiate a coordinated political-military media push NLT 301500Z NOV. The NCA must deliver a unified address directly challenging the RF prosecution of Yermak and the false claims regarding Zaluzhnyi. Use specific, documented evidence of RF IO to turn the cognitive attack against the adversary. FOCUS: Maintain NCA credibility and counter MDCOA political paralysis.


INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

PriorityDomainRequirementDescription/Implication
P1TECHINT/SIGINTA2A UAV ParametersRequired frequency, guidance, and countermeasures for RF "Geran-fighters" to tune UAF EW systems.
P2IMINT/GEOINTKazakhstan Transit NodesPrecise locations (geocoordinates) of active rail transshipment yards in the Caspian/Volga region facilitating RF logistics.
P3HUMINT/SIGINTBPS C2 NodesGeolocation of the Command and Control centers for the newly formed RF Drone Systems Troops in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-11-30 10:34:24Z)

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