Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 301400Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK DECISIVE PHASE // NCA STRATEGIC NARRATIVE FRICTION // AD SUCCESS EXPLOITATION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational environment remains focused on the critical axis at Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia sector), where Russian Federation (RF) Vostok Group maintains peak kinetic pressure. The immediate priority is mitigating the tactical breach risk against the backdrop of sustained RF Hybrid Shock operations targeting civilian infrastructure and exploiting newly apparent strategic-level friction within the Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): Heavy fighting continues. Confirmed RF involvement includes elements of the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Vostok Gp). The main RF effort remains centered on achieving an operational breakthrough into the UAF rear areas via this vector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk Fixation): RF is utilizing overwhelming firepower, including multiple confirmed KAB glide bomb launches (300812Z), to maintain fixation pressure near Pokrovsk. RF Information Operations (IO) claims of Myrnohrad encirclement and "ghostly" UAF defense (300832Z) are currently assessed as IO-driven exaggeration but indicate the strategic RF objective in this area. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• ISR/Recon: UAF aerial reconnaissance (225th Separate Assault Regiment, "Black Swan") confirms continued localized tactical activity, despite reported heavy EW/A2A pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions are exploited by the RF "Thermal Denial" strategy. Confirmed casualties in Vyshhorod (1 confirmed death, 19 wounded, including children) following the saturation attack underscores the continued effectiveness of targeting district heating networks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• Kinetic Activity (FACT): RF executed a massive, synchronized overnight strike totaling 124 adversary targets (122 UAVs, 2 Ballistic Missiles) across six regions (Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kherson).
• Strategic Defense Success (FACT): UAF Air Defense Forces successfully neutralized 104 targets (83.8% kill ratio) from the massed attack. This rate is critical for strategic resilience but unsustainable without accelerated resupply.
• Ground Forces: UAF 3rd Assault Brigade remains committed to the blocking position at Stepnohorsk. Strategic reserves remain constrained by the critical NCA decision timeline.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is confirmed: Achieve operational breach at Stepnohorsk while paralyzing UAF strategic response through cognitive domain attacks.

• Synchronized Hybrid Shock: RF retains the capability to execute massive, multi-domain shock operations, now confirmed to include high-tempo kinetic strikes (124 assets) synchronized with aggressive IO campaigns (NCA paralysis, Myrnohrad encirclement).
• RF Force Identification: Confirmed involvement of the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade validates previous intelligence assessments of the specific units tasked with achieving the operational breach. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Technology Targeting Adaptation: Russian sources are actively reporting the strategic significance of the partial launch of Starlink Direct to Cell (DTC) by KyivStar (300803Z), confirming that this new UAF communication resilience capability is registered by the RF and will likely become a future target priority for EW and cyber operations.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The sustained and high volume of KAB launches into the Donetsk/Pokrovsk sector reinforces RF intent to use overwhelming aerial bombardment to force UAF tactical retreats and fix reserves, preventing their reallocation to the decisive Stepnohorsk axis.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain resilient. The need for long-range strikes against the newly identified Kazakh rail transshipment hubs remains paramount, as failure to interdict these alternative supply routes allows Vostok Group to sustain high-tempo assault operations.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains robust, coordinating the massed strike across multiple theaters. The confirmed operational presence of the 37th GMRB suggests effective tactical integration with BPS (Drone Systems Troops) doctrine, leveraging the A2A UAV threat (per previous report).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high, particularly for AD assets. However, frontline ground forces (3 ABde) are critically exposed due to the lingering NCA decision on strategic reserves. The operational tempo requires immediate high-level political clarity.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Success: The 83.8% kill rate on the massed strike provides a strong defensive anchor and a vital data point for diplomatic efforts.
• Strategic Technological Success: Ukraine and Norway signed a strategic agreement for the joint production of Ukrainian drones (300810Z), securing future supply and technological advantage in the drone domain.
• CRITICAL SETBACK (Cognitive Domain): Widespread public dissemination of strategic assessment by a high-ranking official (Zaluzhnyi) suggesting the "most likely end of the war is a multi-year freeze" (300827Z) creates an immediate risk of strategic narrative friction with the NCA's public intent to liberate all occupied territories. This undermines domestic unity and provides RF IO with critical leverage.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint remains the non-commitment of strategic reserves to the Stepnohorsk axis. The political calculus surrounding this deployment is now complicated by the emerging strategic narrative friction, demanding urgent NCA resolution. EW asset allocation to protect 3 ABde C2 from A2A UAVs is an overdue tactical requirement.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is operating at high tempo, focusing on three themes:

1. NCA Paralysis/Vulnerability: Amplifying Western reports of Zelensky being "on the brink" (300807Z) and exploiting domestic political/military divergence (Zaluzhnyi quote).
2. Exaggerated Tactical Success: False claims of Myrnohrad encirclement and Pokrovsk collapse, designed to destabilize the frontline and induce panic reserve deployment.
3. Domestic Normalization: RF state media continues to focus on non-military content (cultural events, Moscow weather) to minimize conflict perception costs.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is strained by the Vyshhorod "Thermal Denial" casualties. The high AD kill rate and the Norway defense deal provide strong positive counter-narratives, which must be immediately and broadly disseminated to counter the impact of the NCA narrative friction.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Norway defense production deal and the proven effectiveness of Western AD systems against mass saturation (83.8% rate) are critical data points for accelerating further AD and drone technology provision.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The situation at Stepnohorsk is reaching culmination. Immediate political and operational decisions are required to shift the tactical equilibrium.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Localized Stepnohorsk Breach via C2 Degradation and Reserve Bypass (301400Z - 301800Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will maintain peak kinetic assault pressure, utilizing KABs for fixation and A2A UAVs/EW to severely degrade 3 ABde C2. Absent confirmed strategic reserve movement by the critical threshold (NLT 301400Z), RF motorized rifle battalions (including 37th GMRB elements) will attempt to exploit the thinning UAF defensive line and establish an operational foothold south of Stepnohirsk, using the Pokrovsk pressure to mask the penetration.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Decapitation Leading to Operational Rout, Amplified by Strategic Narrative Collapse (301400Z - 301800Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF successfully exploits the political/strategic divergence (Zaluzhnyi quote) to freeze the NCA decision on reserve deployment. Concurrently, RF achieves tactical C2 failure at Stepnohorsk, leading to the rout of 3 ABde elements. This operational failure is immediately amplified by RF IO, which portrays the NCA leadership as fractured and paralyzed, leading to widespread domestic and international uncertainty and a critical RF exploitation towards the T0408 highway.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary focus is closing the operational gap at Stepnohorsk and neutralizing the synchronized cognitive threat that enables RF aggression.

1. STRATEGIC RESERVE COMMITMENT & C2 STABILITY (NCA/C-in-C):

   • ACTION (CATASTROPHIC URGENCY): Immediately confirm and publicize the movement of strategic reserves toward the Zaporizhzhia axis. The NLT 301400Z deadline is critical to prevent tactical rout and MDCOA realization.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates operational risk at the decisive point and directly counters RF IO targeting reserve paralysis.

2. STRATEGIC NARRATIVE ALIGNMENT (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION (CATASTROPHIC URGENCY): The NCA must issue a rapid, unified strategic communications release (C-in-C and highest military leadership) that reaffirms the national political goal of complete liberation and manages the narrative implications of the "multi-year freeze" assessment.
   • RATIONALE: Failure to align the strategic narrative provides RF IO with an unassailable advantage in destabilizing the political rear and internal confidence.

3. COUNTER-EW/A2A INTERVENTION (J6 / 3 ABde EW Officer):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE TACTICAL): Priority deployment of mobile EW platforms to the 3 ABde sector, focused on narrow-band jamming of suspected A2A UAV command frequencies (CR P1.0) and C2 hardening.
   • RATIONALE: Direct mitigation of the A2A threat that blinds UAF units at the decisive point.

4. TECHNOLOGICAL COUNTER-PROPAGANDA (J7/J2):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Execute a high-visibility IO campaign focused on the Norway Drone Joint Venture and the 83.8% AD kill rate. Simultaneously, preemptively frame the Starlink DTC launch (300803Z) as a massive strategic advantage, mitigating RF attempts to spin it as a vulnerability.
   • RATIONALE: Reinforces domestic and international confidence in UAF resilience and future technological superiority.

//END OF REPORT//