Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 301200Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK DECISIVE PHASE // HYBRID SHOCK CONTINUATION // AD EXPLOITATION IMPERATIVE

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational crisis on the Southern Axis is now in the decisive phase. Russian Federation (RF) Vostok Group maintains synchronized kinetic pressure at Stepnohorsk, supported by sustained high-tempo fixation operations in the Pokrovsk sector and a continuing Hybrid Shock strategy focused on civilian infrastructure and National Command Authority (NCA) paralysis.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Line of Contact (LOC) remains contested at the critical Stepnohorsk point, which is the immediate operational focus.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Orikhiv Direction): Heavy defensive fighting confirmed near Stepnohirsk and Stepove (300756Z). This area remains the RF main effort to achieve an operational breakthrough into the Zaporizhzhia rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk Fixation): Intense clashes reported across multiple settlements, confirming the sustained effort to fix UAF operational reserves. Fighting reported near Pokrovsk, Udachne, and Rodynske (300756Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kostiantynivka GLOC: Confirmed continued RF pressure and successful interdiction using NRTK "Kurier" UGVs against UAF strongpoints, validating the threat to local logistics integrity (300744Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions (TBC) persist. RF is actively exploiting this environment through continued “Thermal Denial” strikes, confirmed by Presidential reporting of one (1) civilian death and nineteen (19) casualties in Vyshhorod (Kyiv region) following the overnight saturation attack (300741Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF 3rd Assault Brigade (3 ABde) remains heavily engaged in defensive blocking positions near Stepnohorsk. Strategic reserves are positioned but the commitment decision timeline remains critically constrained by RF Information Operations (IO) targeting NCA unity.

• Kinetic Activity: RF executed a massive overnight aerial attack involving 122 UAVs (approx. 75 Shaheds) and 2 Iskander-M Ballistic Missiles (300744Z).
• Strategic Defense Success (FACT): UAF Air Force successfully neutralized/suppressed 104 adversary UAVs (85% kill ratio) (300736Z).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is confirmed: Achieve operational breach at Stepnohorsk via kinetic force and C2 denial, while paralyzing UAF strategic reserve deployment through IO targeting the NCA.

• Synchronized Shock: RF retains the capability to execute massive, multi-domain shock operations (kinetic, thermal, cognitive) targeting infrastructure and command nodes simultaneously.
• A2A UAV Threat: The threat from RF "Geran-fighter" A2A UAVs (per previous reports) remains acute and unmitigated, posing an immediate risk of tactical reconnaissance degradation over Stepnohorsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UGV Tactical Utility: The confirmed use of the NRTK "Kurier" UGV in the Kostiantynivka direction validates RF adaptation in using unmanned ground systems for highly precise, sustained GLOC interdiction, necessitating counter-UGV doctrine development.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is prioritizing localized tactical gains (Siversk, Kupyansk confirmed in GSZSU reports) to reinforce the strategic narrative of UAF collapse (300734Z, 300752Z). The immediate shift of UAV/KAB strike focus toward Sumy and Zaporizhzhia (300755Z, 300759Z) indicates proactive targeting of secondary logistics and potential staging areas, anticipating a UAF reserve commitment.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are demonstrably sustained to support high-tempo assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. The successful activation of alternative Kazakh rail corridors (per previous reports) continues to mitigate the impact of UAF deep strikes, allowing Vostok Group to maintain momentum.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective at the strategic level, successfully coordinating massive, multi-axis strikes. Tactical C2, especially the integration of UGV (Kurier) and UAV assets, is demonstrating local resilience and precision.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains defensive, but localized C2 integrity, particularly for 3 ABde, is under extreme stress due to RF EW/A2A pressure. The successful defense against the 122-asset strike demonstrates high AD system readiness and operator competence.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Success: The confirmed 85% intercept rate (104/122 UAVs) represents a verifiable, tangible success that defends strategic infrastructure from catastrophic failure.
• Operational Setback: The sustained pressure on Stepnohorsk, compounded by the GLOC failure at Kostiantynivka, increases attrition risk and resource constraints for the 3 ABde. The Vyshhorod casualties highlight the enduring vulnerability of the strategic rear to the "Thermal Denial" strategy.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical resource requirement is the immediate commitment of strategic reserves to Stepnohorsk. Failure to confirm movement will lead to a critical tactical C2 collapse and potential rout, aligning with the MDCOA. EW asset reallocation to protect 3 ABde C2 nodes remains an immediate, overdue requirement.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is operating a multi-layered campaign:

1. NCA Capitulation/Paralysis: Exaggerated claims by proxy channels featuring former US officials alleging the need for Zelensky/Yermak to face trial (300743Z). This is designed to sow political doubt and internal paralysis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Exaggerated Tactical Success: Circulation of footage (Siversk, Dymitrov POWs, 300734Z, 300740Z) to project overwhelming momentum and military dominance, degrading frontline morale.
3. Domestic Normalization: RF state channels actively disseminating non-military, normalcy content (Mother’s Day, sports news, cultural announcements) to minimize the perception of conflict costs to the domestic population (300741Z, 300742Z, 300751Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is currently stressed by the Vyshhorod civilian casualties. The high AD kill rate provides the necessary positive counter-narrative, but immediate, high-visibility deployment of this success is mandatory to stabilize morale against RF claims of defensive failure.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The 85% AD success rate is a vital data point for reinforcing the UAF requirement for increased Western AD provision and long-range strike capabilities, proving system effectiveness against mass saturation attacks.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The decision point for strategic reserve commitment has passed its optimal window. Immediate action is required to prevent escalation from a localized breach to an operational rout.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Localized Stepnohorsk Breach via C2 Degradation and Reserve Bypass (301200Z - 301800Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will maintain peak kinetic assault pressure on the Stepnohorsk axis, leveraging A2A UAVs and EW to severely degrade the C2 of 3 ABde. If UAF reserves are not visibly committed by 301400Z, RF motorized rifle battalions will attempt to bypass the hardened defensive line and establish a forward operational foothold south of Stepnohirsk, relying on the Pokrovsk axis to absorb any UAF counter-mobilization.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Decapitation Leading to Operational Rout and Strategic Infrastructure Shock (301200Z - 301600Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF successfully executes tactical C2 failure at Stepnohorsk. This results in the rout of the 3 ABde elements and an uncoordinated retreat. Simultaneously, RF uses the recently launched UAV/KAB assets (targeting Zaporizhzhia/Sumy logistics and staging areas) to prevent the effective mobilization of strategic reserves, leading to a critical RF exploitation towards the T0408 highway corridor.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary focus remains on stabilizing the Stepnohorsk axis and neutralizing the synchronized cognitive threat.

1. C2 STABILITY AND RESERVE COMMITMENT (NCA/C-in-C):

   • ACTION (CATASTROPHIC URGENCY): The Commander-in-Chief must issue an immediate, highly visible message (video address) confirming the allocation and physical movement of strategic reserves towards the Zaporizhzhia axis NLT 301400Z.
   • RATIONALE: This is the single highest leverage decision to prevent the MDCOA, counter RF IO paralysis efforts, and reassure 3 ABde frontline commanders that their sacrifice is supported.

2. COUNTER-EW/A2A INTERVENTION (J6 / 3 ABde EW Officer):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE TACTICAL): Deploy priority mobile EW assets to establish two layered C2 hardening zones at the 3 ABde headquarters and forward operational control nodes, prioritizing anti-UAV/A2A jamming capability over wide-band denial.
   • RATIONALE: Direct mitigation of the kinetic threat driver (C2 failure) at the decisive point.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS EXPLOITATION (J7/J2):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Execute a high-frequency, unified IO campaign emphasizing the 104/122 UAV kill count success immediately. Simultaneously, use the Vyshhorod tragedy to internationally frame Russia’s attacks as intentional war crimes against civilian heating infrastructure ("Thermal Terrorism").
   • RATIONALE: Leverages verifiable success to inoculate against RF NCA paralysis IO and reinforces international pressure/AD supply commitments.

4. URGENT LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION (J2/J3):

   • ACTION (URGENT STRATEGIC): Update and task long-range strike platforms with validated targeting data for the identified Kazakh-RF rail transshipment choke points (CR P3.0). Initiate strikes to degrade RF POL stabilization NLT 301800Z.
   • RATIONALE: Disrupts the RF Vostok Group's medium-term operational momentum by striking their most critical resupply vulnerability.

//END OF REPORT//