Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 300715Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK KINETIC PHASE II // POKROVSK FIXING EFFORT // KAZAKH LOGISTICS FRICTION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The Stepnohorsk axis remains the kinetic decisive point, with the RF Vostok Group maintaining a high-tempo ground assault synchronized with intense EW and Information Operations (IO). Concurrent reporting indicates extremely high kinetic activity in the central Donbas, suggesting a concerted RF effort to fix UAF reserves away from the critical breach point.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The primary Line of Contact (LOC) pressure remains focused on the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade (3 ABde) sector near Stepnohorsk, following the retrograde of the 33 OShP.

• Central Fixation: The Pokrovsk direction recorded 76 combat engagements (300649Z), confirming the area (including the Dobropillia salient) is absorbing significant RF and UAF resources.
• Northern Activity: RF 7th Regiment (7 OMSP) claims ongoing offensive actions in the Kharkiv border area (300658Z), confirming the RF intention to fix Northern reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Status Quo. Sub-freezing temperatures amplify the threat of RF "Thermal Denial" strikes (confirmed damage in Vyshhorod, 300701Z). The weather continues to favor RF high-altitude ISR and ground maneuver.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

3 ABde is confirmed engaged in defensive fighting. UAF forces are heavily engaged in the Pokrovsk sector. Critical requirement is confirmation of C2 status for 3 ABde under A2A UAV and EW attack. The UAF AD network demonstrated high effectiveness against the pre-dawn saturation strike (>100 Shaheds intercepted).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to achieve an operational breach at Stepnohorsk through kinetic superiority, facilitated by UAF C2 degradation (EW/A2A) and reserve denial (IO/Pokrovsk fixation).

• Sustained Deep Strike Capability: The Head of UAF PVO confirmed RF maintains the resource capacity to execute 1-2 massive strategic strikes per week (300646Z).
  • JUDGMENT: This confirms that the recent UAF deep strikes against Russian Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) infrastructure have caused interruption but not denial of RF cruise missile and long-range UAV inventories. Strategic shock capacity remains HIGH. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Fixation Effort Confirmed: The extremely high kinetic tempo reported in the Pokrovsk sector confirms RF is executing a coordinated strategy to fix UAF forces in the center, preventing their timely deployment as strategic reserves to the Stepnohorsk decisive point. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No significant tactical change since the deployment of the A2A UAV doctrine and the combined arms assault. RF continues its calculated use of UAVs for cross-border kinetic strikes (Belgorod, 300644Z) to maintain internal narrative of defensive action.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are increasingly adaptive, utilizing alternative transit corridors through Kazakhstan (as identified in previous reports).

• Diplomatic Friction: The condemnation of the Novorossiysk attack by the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (300645Z, 300655Z) suggests diplomatic consequences resulting from UAF deep strikes.
  • JUDGMENT: Kazakhstan’s strong statement reflects concern over its own energy exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) facility, potentially increasing the political/diplomatic cost for RF to secure these alternative routes. This represents a strategic vulnerability UAF can exploit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains robust, synchronizing the ground assault, fixation efforts (Pokrovsk), deep strikes, and the IO campaign. Tactical C2 at Stepnohorsk is aggressive, prioritizing C2 denial over direct attrition.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains defensive and highly reactive. UAF AD readiness is high. Force readiness in the Pokrovsk direction is severely stressed by the 76 daily contacts, increasing the risk of miscalculation or exhaustion in that sector.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Defensive Success: The high rate of AD interception (>100 Shaheds) successfully prevented catastrophic damage to strategic infrastructure and is a critical morale counter-weight.
• Central Stress: The high intensity of fighting on the Pokrovsk axis (76 contacts) diverts high-value UAF assets and command attention from the critical Stepnohorsk axis, increasing the risk of late reserve commitment.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint remains the simultaneous demand for strategic reserves at Stepnohorsk and high-intensity holding action at Pokrovsk. The immediate requirement for enhanced Electronic Protection (EP) assets for 3 ABde's C2 nodes remains paramount.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO remains centered on the Hybrid Shock strategy:

1. NCA Destabilization: Sustained high-volume narrative regarding internal political collapse (Yermak/Zelensky).
2. Domestic Normalization: RF channels are consistently pushing non-kinetic, cultural, historical, and domestic governance content (Sochi tourism, Uglich HPP, Ivan the Terrible history, utility regulation) to assure the Russian populace of normalcy and stability, distancing them from the kinetic reality of the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF leadership (General Staff, KMVA, Office of the Prosecutor) is effectively prosecuting a unified, high-frequency IO campaign centered on the daily national minute of silence and remembrance (300700Z).

• JUDGMENT: This consistent focus on national unity, sacrifice, and memory is critical for countering RF destabilization efforts and maintaining institutional cohesion during political IO attacks.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The explicit condemnation by Kazakhstan of attacks on the Novorossiysk terminal introduces diplomatic leverage. UAF must communicate to partners that kinetic actions against RF logistics are producing secondary diplomatic effects, justifying further targeting support (e.g., enhanced long-range ISR/targeting data).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The RF assault is reaching a tipping point where tactical outcome determines operational collapse or containment. The Stepnohorsk window is shrinking.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Continuation of Synchronized Pressure (300715Z - 301200Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will sustain maximum pressure on the Pokrovsk axis (70+ contacts per 24hrs) to fix UAF maneuver reserves. Simultaneously, RF Vostok Group will intensify localized EW/A2A operations to achieve a tactical C2 breach of the 3 ABde defense at Stepnohorsk, enabling exploitation by mobilized reserves before UAF command can consolidate a robust secondary line.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Decapitation and Operational Rout (300715Z - 300900Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF achieves kinetic success at Stepnohorsk (through EW/A2A C2 denial) leading to the disorderly rout of 3 ABde. Simultaneously, the ongoing NCA destabilization IO campaign succeeds in delaying the political decision to release operational reserves (held back due to political infighting rumors) past the critical 300730Z commitment deadline. This results in an uncontested RF exploitation deep into the Zaporizhzhia operational rear.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical decision window remains open, tied to C2 confirmation and reserve commitment.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is C2 survival at Stepnohorsk and unified strategic signaling to counter paralysis.

1. C2 STABILITY AND RESERVE COMMITMENT (NCA/J7/C-in-C):

   • ACTION (CATASTROPHIC URGENCY): The C-in-C must issue a clear, high-visibility operational directive NLT 300730Z confirming that strategic reserves are moving to intercept the Vostok Group exploitation, specifically designating the secondary defensive line deployment area.
   • RATIONALE: Directly counters the MDCOA by demonstrating unity and decisive action, overriding the critical time window for RF IO influence.

2. EW PRIORITY REALLOCATION (J6 / 3 ABde EW Officer):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE): Reallocate mobile EW jamming systems from the Pokrovsk sector (if RF threat is assessed as predominantly kinetic/artillery-based, not C2 denial) to reinforce the 3 ABde sector, focusing strictly on C2 and GPS/Fire Control denial against A2A UAVs and Kurier UGVs.
   • RATIONALE: Stepnohorsk is the kinetic decisive point where C2 failure equals operational rout. EP assets must follow the highest threat concentration.

3. COUNTER-IO AND MORALE EXPLOITATION (J7/J2):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Synch all official channels (Presidential Office, General Staff, Regional Military Administrations) to aggressively package the >100 Shahed AD success alongside the unifying "National Remembrance" campaign. Frame RF as failing strategically while committing atrocities (Vyshhorod).
   • RATIONALE: Maximizes the cognitive impact of the defensive success to boost internal morale and international confidence, providing a unified narrative against RF political destabilization.

4. LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION 2.0 (J2/J3):

   • ACTION (URGENT): Adjust targeting parameters for deep strikes to focus on the Kazakh-RF border rail choke points and transshipment facilities (P2 CR 3.0). This must be presented to partners as a strategy to exploit diplomatic friction and reduce RF kinetic capacity (1-2 major strikes per week).
   • RATIONALE: Target RF logistical resilience at its new point of weakest political friction.

//END OF REPORT//