Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 300634Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK KINETIC PHASE 1 // EW-IO SYNCHRONIZATION // UAF AD RESILIENCE

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The RF Vostok Group assault on the Stepnohorsk axis remains the kinetic decisive point. Current operations are characterized by the simultaneous prosecution of the ground assault, a large-scale RF deep-strike saturation attack, and maximum-intensity RF Information Operations (IO) targeting Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA) stability.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Line of Contact (LOC) near Stepnohorsk is under severe pressure. The UAF 3rd Assault Brigade (3 ABde) is confirming contact with RF motorized rifle elements attempting to exploit the gap left by the 33 OShP's retrograde. The operational depth remains critical due to confirmed RF capability to saturate rear areas with drones.

• FACT (UAF AD Success): Ukrainian Air Defense (PPO) forces successfully intercepted over 100 Iranian-made Shahed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) overnight (300611Z).
• JUDGMENT: RF executed a large-scale, retaliatory saturation strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and/or rear area C2 nodes immediately following the UAF deep strikes (Slaviansk NPZ, Samara restrictions). UAF AD performance has significantly mitigated the intended strategic shock. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• FACT (Northern Pressure): RF confirmed strikes against five settlements in Kharkiv Oblast (300630Z) and continued cross-border activity in Belgorod Oblast (300632Z), confirming efforts to fix UAF forces in the Northern sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Weather remains suitable for high-tempo ground maneuver and RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Sub-freezing temperatures amplify the strategic importance of the RF "Thermal Denial" strategy (heating infrastructure targeting).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

3 ABde is in direct contact at the LOC. Confirmation of C2 stability for 3 ABde remains the highest priority collection requirement, as the RF MLCOA relies on C2 denial (EW/A2A UAVs). UAF AD is confirmed to be highly active and effective across the strategic depth.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to achieve immediate kinetic penetration at Stepnohorsk through high-tempo combined arms assault (ground) synchronized with severe C2/ISR degradation (air/EW) and strategic destabilization (IO).

• Synchronization Confirmed: The simultaneous execution of the ground assault (300600Z) and the massive Shahed strike (pre-dawn) confirms highly effective RF synchronization across kinetic and operational domains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustainment Tempo: RF intent is to maintain the ability to execute massive strategic strikes 1-2 times per week (Ignat, 300612Z), indicating no immediate resource constraint on their deep strike capability, despite confirmed UAF logistics interdiction (NPZ/Samara).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is forced to internally acknowledge the success of the UAF deep strike campaign.

• Internal Discourse: Pro-Russian military channels publicly state the "drone threat" requires an urgent review of protection approaches for many objects (300626Z).
• JUDGMENT: This validates the strategic effectiveness of the UAF deep strike campaign in forcing RF resource reallocation and cognitive attention away from the front line. RF logistics protection (AD) will now become a higher priority, potentially drawing AD assets from the forward line. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain highly adaptive, leveraging the Kazakhstan corridor. The confirmed need to use >100 Shaheds in a single night indicates a high expenditure rate of long-range munitions, but also confirms large stocks are available. The primary constraint on RF sustainment is the time required to stabilize Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) stocks arriving via the new Kazakh routes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the synchronized assault/strike/IO actions. Tactical C2 at Stepnohorsk is currently prosecuting the offensive, relying on localized EW superiority and the new Drone Systems Troops (BPS) doctrine (A2A UAVs) to achieve localized superiority.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is defensive and responsive.

• Kinetic Resilience: The successful interception of >100 Shaheds provides immediate evidence of high UAF Air Defense readiness, organizational cohesion, and tactical effectiveness in the rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Frontline Stress: 3 ABde is under extreme pressure to hold the line and establish definitive, secure C2 links to coordinate fire support and reserve deployment. The failure of the NCA to signal strategic survival remains an operational constraint.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Defensive Success: The AD performance is a critical strategic defensive success, preventing the likely widespread damage to thermal/energy infrastructure that RF intended to inflict during the ground assault window.
• Operational Setback: The integrity of the 3 ABde defense hinges on C2 resilience against the EW/A2A threat, which is currently unconfirmed.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate resource requirement is robust, dedicated Electronic Protection (EP) for 3 ABde's command elements and ISR platforms against the new RF A2A UAV threat.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is actively maximizing the previous MDCOA component (C2 Decapitation via Hybrid Shock).

• NCA Destabilization (CRITICAL): RF sources are intensely propagating the narrative of political infighting/collapse between Zelensky and Yermak (300618Z). This is directly intended to trigger paralysis in UAF strategic reserve commitment. (D-S belief: Information Warfare: Disinformation Campaign by Adversary State - 0.210458)
• Domestic Normalization: RF domestic channels continue to push benign, morale-boosting content (Mother's Day tributes, local humanitarian aid in DPR, Bauman University dormitory tour), attempting to divorce the kinetic reality from the home front.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The UAF AD success (100+ Shahed kill count) provides a crucial, high-impact counter-IO opportunity to boost domestic and frontline morale, contrasting RF failure to inflict strategic damage with the confirmed chaos at the front. Morale is assessed as fluctuating highly, dependent on the confirmation of command stability and tactical outcomes at Stepnohorsk.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

UAF must leverage the confirmed internal RF acknowledgment of the "drone threat" (300626Z) to solicit further, more advanced Counter-UAS and Air Defense systems from Western partners, framing the defense as successful but resource-intensive.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Sustained Assault Exploiting Aerial/C2 Blindness (300635Z - 300900Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will continue the high-tempo ground assault, prioritizing the use of Electronic Warfare and A2A UAVs ("Geran-fighters") to disrupt 3 ABde's tactical ISR and fire support coordination. RF will attempt to achieve an operational breach of the 3 ABde line before the full impact of UAF deep strikes forces RF ground operations to slow, or before UAF reserves are effectively committed.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Shock Triggering Strategic Paralysis (300635Z - 300730Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF achieves tactical C2 decapitation of 3 ABde through effective EW/kinetic targeting. Simultaneously, the persistent, high-intensity IO campaign regarding NCA failure (Yermak/Zelensky) successfully triggers political hesitancy, delaying the commitment of strategic reserves beyond the critical 300700Z Decision Point. This leads to the operational rout of 3 ABde and potential RF exploitation towards the operational rear.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical kinetic and cognitive defense window remains open.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus shifts to leveraging kinetic defensive success (AD) to counter cognitive paralysis (IO) while ensuring tactical C2 continuity under EW attack.

1. C2 STABILITY SIGNALING (NCA/J7/C-in-C):

   • ACTION (CATASTROPHIC URGENCY): IMMEDIATE release of a unified leadership statement (C-in-C or General Staff, if NCA remains constrained) NLT 300645Z. The message must confirm two things: Command Continuity AND Commitment of Reserves to Stepnohorsk.
   • RATIONALE: Directly counters the MDCOA by overriding the high-intensity Yermak/Zelensky IO narrative, preventing strategic paralysis.

2. COUNTER-IO EXPLOITATION (J7/J2):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Aggressively market the >100 Shahed shootdown as a decisive defensive victory (Operation "SKY SHIELD"). Disseminate this information immediately to frontline units and international partners.
   • RATIONALE: Converts kinetic success into cognitive resilience, proving UAF capability to defend the homeland while simultaneously attacking the enemy's strategic rear (NPZ/Samara).

3. FORWARD EW ADJUSTMENT (J6 / 3 ABde EW Officer):

   • ACTION (URGENT): Reserve EW assets assigned to the 3 ABde sector must prioritize defending UAF tactical fire control frequencies and GPS links over simple RF comms jamming. Assume RF forces are relying on GPS-enabled targeting assets (Kurier UGVs, precise artillery) following their C2 doctrine (BPS).
   • RATIONALE: Prevents RF from achieving localized fire superiority by neutralizing UAF C2 and fire correction (A2A defense).

4. TACTICAL C2 PROTOCOL ENFORCEMENT (J3 / 3 ABde Commander):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE): Enforce strict EMCON protocols. All tactical maneuver and fire orders must be decentralized or communicated via highly secured/directional means. Assume RF has instantaneous targeting capability on any wide-band emission.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the high-confidence threat of RF tactical C2 decapitation, allowing 3 ABde to fight decentralized until reserves arrive.

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