Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK AERIAL DENIAL PHASE

DTG: 292345Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Operational Synchronization Confirmed // NCA Communications Failure Heightens MDCOA Risk // T-minus 6 hours to Stepnohorsk Breach

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational tempo is dominated by the pre-assault synchronization phase by the Russian Federation (RF) Vostok Group. The critical defensive decisions are currently delayed, rapidly compressing the margin for error before the anticipated ground assault (NLT 300600Z).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient remains the confirmed Main Effort (M.E.). The Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) via Konstiantynivka remains closed. The UAF 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33 OShP) retrograde is exposed to continuous RF ISR until Operation SKY SWEEPER achieves localized aerial denial.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Temperatures remain sub-freezing (-3°C to -8°C) with high visibility.

• Judgment: High visibility remains favorable for RF Drone Systems Troops (BPS) Air-to-Air (A2A) UAV operations and precision strikes during the decisive assault window. The cold weather amplifies the psychological effect of RF "Thermal Denial" strikes (Vyshhorod).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: The 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade is in final assault staging. The RF is leveraging maximum Information Operations (IO) output concurrent with kinetic preparation, confirming a highly synchronized multi-domain approach.
• UAF: The defense hinges entirely on the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade establishing firm blocking positions and the successful, timely deployment of mobile Counter-UAS (C-UAS)/Electronic Warfare (EW) assets under Operation SKY SWEEPER (NLT 300200Z).
• Fact: The National Command Authority (NCA) missed the critical 300000Z deadline for issuing a unified counter-IO address.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to achieve a critical operational breach at Stepnohorsk by utilizing BPS A2A UAVs to neutralize UAF ISR/fire correction capability, while simultaneously freezing UAF strategic reserves through a cognitive attack on command unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

• Fact (Kinetic): RF forces are postured for a ground assault (NLT 300600Z).
• Fact (Hybrid): RF IO is running high tempo, focused on projecting political stability (Mironov’s proposal) and military success (M114 kill video).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to demonstrate highly effective synchronization across domains:

1. IO Diversion: Utilization of non-military state media (TASS, regional police) to push feel-good/domestic narratives (Mother's Day, Mironov's proposal) during the critical pre-assault phase. This seeks to divert OSINT/IO analyst attention and project stability contrary to kinetic reality.
2. Psychological Warfare: The confirmed casualties in Vyshhorod (1 KIA, 11 WIA) are collateral results of the "Thermal Denial" strategy, serving the IO objective of depressing civilian morale immediately preceding the main kinetic effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain assessed as resilient due to the confirmed activation of alternative rail corridors via Kazakhstan.

• Intelligence Gap: The damage assessment at the Artsyz logistics hub remains the single largest operational intelligence gap impacting the RF Vostok Group's immediate supply model. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is assessed as highly effective and synchronized across kinetic, technological (BPS), and information domains. The concurrent political/military IO output suggests a robust, centralized decision-making loop driving the hybrid operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is currently sub-optimal. The 3rd Assault Brigade’s tactical readiness is jeopardized by the unresolved logistical status of the 33 OShP retrograde and the dependency on the time-critical EW deployment.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Information Management): Failure to issue the unified NCA counter-IO message by 300000Z represents an operational setback in the cognitive domain. This provides the RF with uncontested ground to cement narratives of command division and systemic failure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Success (Deep Pressure): Confirmed drone activity in occupied Donetsk Oblast (292333Z) demonstrates UAF ability to maintain operational pressure on RF rear logistics and C2 nodes, forcing RF asset diversion.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Time Constraint (EW): Only T-02:15 hours remain until the requested NLT 300200Z deadline for Operation SKY SWEEPER EW deployment.
2. Resource Requirement (Data): Urgent requirement for technical specifications of the RF A2A UAV to optimize jamming profiles (TECHINT/SIGINT).
3. Constraint (Political/IO): The leadership communication gap is now a tactical constraint affecting unit cohesion and strategic reserve commitment.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO strategy is currently executing a dual-track operation:

1. External/Tactical: Projection of military superiority (drone footage) and infliction of civilian pain (Vyshhorod strike) to degrade will to fight at the operational edge.
2. Internal/Strategic: Use of political messaging (Mironov) and domestic PR (Police Mother's Day video) to project stable governance and normalization of the conflict/occupation to the domestic Russian audience.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is critically pressured by the Vyshhorod casualty report, reinforcing the narrative that Kyiv cannot protect the civilian rear while the front line is collapsing. The NCA's silence amplifies RF claims of leadership disunity.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

International focus remains fragmented between long-term defense planning (Leonardo/Michelangelo Dome references) and regional security issues (Turkish maritime focus). The immediate operational crisis at Stepnohorsk is being overshadowed by RF strategic IO efforts.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Coordinated Ground Assault under Aerial Denial (NLT 300600Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The RF Vostok Group initiates the armored penetration at Stepnohorsk. BPS assets are successfully denying UAF tactical ISR, preventing timely engagement of the RF 37th Guards MRB by UAF artillery or FPV forces. The 3rd Assault Brigade is forced into a costly, high-attrition defensive action without effective C4ISR support.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Operational Paralysis via Hybrid Shock (NLT 301200Z) (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF coordinates the kinetic breakthrough with:

1. Confirmed catastrophic logistics failure at Artsyz.
2. A localized communications blackout (Starlink/C2 jamming).
3. The NCA’s failure to deliver the unified address being leveraged by IO to induce strategic reserve commitment paralysis (based on perceived command instability).

• Judgment: The failure to meet the 300000Z IO deadline significantly increases the probability of this MDCOA achieving its psychological objective.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The defense is operating under extreme time compression. Immediate action is required to salvage the cognitive domain defense.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The critical operational window is defined by the failure to meet the 300000Z IO deadline and the approaching 300200Z EW deadline. Recommendations prioritize neutralizing the cognitive threat and achieving local aerial parity.

1. EXECUTE IMMEDIATE NCA COUNTER-IO FORCE PROTECTION (J7/NCA):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Reschedule and execute the unified NCA televised address NLT 300030Z. Due to the time delay, the message must now explicitly reference the Vyshhorod casualties and affirm command unity in the face of RF psychological warfare. Utilize secondary media channels (Telegram, official accounts) to disseminate immediate short video clips confirming operational control.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the increased risk of the MDCOA by denying the RF IO campaign its primary leverage point (internal division).

2. PRIORITIZE OPERATION SKY SWEEPER OVER ALL ELSE (J3/EW/SIGINT):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): All available signals intelligence assets (SIGINT) must be dedicated to rapid frequency sweeping and analysis in the Stepnohorsk sector to support EW tuning for the A2A UAV threat. The deadline for confirming 50% operational capability (300200Z) cannot be missed.
   • RATIONALE: Localized aerial denial is the non-negotiable prerequisite for the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade's defensive viability against the MLCOA.

3. EXPLOIT RF REAR AREA PRESSURE (J3/SOF):

   • ACTION: Immediately amplify the UAF narrative regarding drone strikes in occupied Donetsk Oblast (292333Z). Frame these strikes as evidence of successful counter-pressure operations, forcing RF to divert AD assets from the front and undermining the RF domestic narrative of total control.
   • RATIONALE: A proactive counter-IO move to leverage a tactical success against RF strategic IO efforts.

4. LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY (J4):

   • ACTION: Proceed with full logistical contingency planning assuming total loss of critical POL/Munitions storage at Artsyz until positive IMINT confirmation is received NLT 300030Z. Activate secondary fuel depots and prepare rail-to-road transshipment nodes further West.
   • RATIONALE: Preempts operational paralysis should the P1 intelligence gap confirm the worst-case logistical shock.

//END OF REPORT//