Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - Stepnohorsk Transition Critical

DTG: 292330Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Synchronization Phase Complete: Stepnohorsk Ground Assault Imminent (NLT 300600Z) // Critical Defenses and Counter-IO Measures Required NLT 300200Z

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational picture remains dominated by the immediate, multi-domain threat centered on the Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient. The Russian Federation (RF) has completed its transition from strategic fixation to local aerial denial and ground preparation. The decisive battle window opens in approximately six (6) hours (NLT 300600Z).

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient is the confirmed Main Effort (M.E.) penetration vector. The UAF 33 OShP retrograde maneuver remains highly vulnerable, relying on the immediate consolidation of the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade's blocking positions. The Konstiantynivka GLOC is confirmed closed, forcing the 33 OShP to abandon heavy equipment.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Current and forecasted weather maintains sub-freezing temperatures (-3°C to -8°C) with high visibility.

• IMPACT: Favorable for RF ISR and precision-guided munitions prior to the ground assault. Sub-freezing conditions amplify the effect of RF "Thermal Denial" strikes on civilian morale and infrastructure stability.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Frontline elements (37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade) are in final assault formations. Drone Systems Troops (BPS) are operational, providing continuous aerial denial cover using A2A UAVs over the M.E.
• UAF: The critical defensive measures are time-constrained. Confirmation of the execution and successful operationalization of Operation SKY SWEEPER (mobile C-UAS/EW redeployment) by 300200Z is the defining factor for the defense's viability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent remains a synchronized operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk, achieved by neutralizing UAF C2/ISR capability via A2A UAVs while fracturing national cohesion through targeted IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

The continuous release of combat propaganda (e.g., M114 Howitzer destruction video, 292303Z) is designed to confirm RF tactical momentum and demonstrate the effectiveness of BPS surveillance just hours before the main push.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No new kinetic or physical tactical adaptations confirmed since the transition to aerial denial. The focus has entirely shifted to the cognitive and technological domains:

1. IO Amplification: Intensified use of tactical media releases to cement the narrative of UAF operational loss and equipment abandonment.
2. Maritime Response: Turkey's statement (292250Z) regarding measures to prevent tanker attacks demonstrates RF success in drawing diplomatic engagement to counter UAF maritime interdiction capabilities.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain stabilized by the unmitigated activation of Kazakh-RF alternative rail corridors. The Vostok Group M.E. is assessed as adequately supplied for the initial breakthrough phase. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). The Artsyz damage assessment remains the single most critical outstanding intelligence gap affecting RF tactical supply modeling.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the seamless synchronization of kinetic action, drone deployment, and high-tempo IO cycles.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is adequate for defense but fragile, hinging on the successful retrograde and immediate EW deployment. Failure to achieve localized aerial parity by 300200Z will critically undermine the 3rd Assault Brigade's ability to hold the blocking position.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Maritime Operational Risk): Turkey’s public commitment to preventing tanker attacks (292250Z) suggests future UAF maritime drone operations will face increased surveillance, interdiction, and diplomatic blowback, potentially limiting a key UAF pressure tool.
• Setback (Information Management): The NCA has not yet delivered the unified counter-IO message, leaving the field open for RF psychological exploitation regarding leadership division (Zaluzhnyi/Syrskyi).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Time Constraint: Only T-02:30 hours remain until the requested NLT 300200Z deadline for EW deployment.
2. IMINT Constraint: Artsyz damage status remains unverified.
3. C-UAS/EW Capability: Urgent confirmation that the mobile platforms deployed under Operation SKY SWEEPER can effectively counter the RF A2A UAV technical profile (frequency, guidance).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign continues unabated (Hypothesis: 0.288842).

• Tactical Momentum Projection: Release of combat footage (M114 kill) aims to solidify the narrative of tactical success and technology superiority (BPS drones) directly into the operational area just before the ground assault.
• Distraction/Narrative Shaping: RF state media is leveraging the Turkish statement (292250Z) to paint UAF naval action as destabilizing regional commerce, further isolating Ukraine diplomatically. The focus on future Western defense systems (Leonardo's "Michelangelo Dome") is narrative noise intended to shift focus from immediate support shortfalls.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains under high pressure due to deep strikes (Vyshhorod, Thermal Denial) and the unaddressed NCA division narratives. The time delay in issuing a unified command message is highly detrimental to force cohesion.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Turkey's announcement regarding Black Sea measures increases operational constraints on UAF naval forces. The underlying narrative RF projects—that the war is now an intractable internal political crisis—requires an immediate and definitive counter-narrative from Kyiv.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Armored Penetration at Stepnohorsk Under BPS Aerial Cover (NLT 300600Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group initiates the coordinated ground assault. The primary operational objective is to breach the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade blocking line while BPS assets ensure UAF FPV/ISR capability is denied, preventing timely fire correction and reserve commitment.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Command Decapitation and Operational Rout (NLT 301200Z) (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF successfully coordinates the Stepnohorsk ground assault with confirmation of catastrophic damage at Artsyz (logistics shock), localized Starlink denial (C2 failure), and the success of the IO blitz in freezing UAF strategic reserves due to distrust in the NCA.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The timeline remains critically compressed. The lack of resolution on the first two items exponentially increases risk.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical window for decisive defensive action is closing. Recommendations focus on neutralizing the RF aerial denial capability and immediately stemming the cognitive attack.

1. EXECUTE IMMEDIATE NCA COUNTER-IO FORCE PROTECTION (J7/NCA):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): The National Command Authority must issue a unified, high-profile televised address NLT 300000Z (30 minutes from report time). This message must be clear, concise, and feature key political and military leaders (CINC Syrskyi, Presidential Office) together to affirm command unity and tactical control.
   • RATIONALE: The threat from RF IO is currently a force multiplier for the ground assault. Failure to act immediately validates the MDCOA's premise of internal chaos.

2. VERIFY AND OPTIMIZE OPERATION SKY SWEEPER (J3/EW):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): J3 must confirm operational status of C-UAS/EW assets at Stepnohorsk NLT 300200Z. Simultaneously, launch rapid-response SIGINT collection against all active BPS frequencies to inform immediate EW tuning decisions, maximizing counter-A2A capability before RF sunrise operations.
   • RATIONALE: Localized aerial parity is the prerequisite for the 3rd Assault Brigade to hold the line against the MLCOA.

3. ACTIVATE LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY (J4):

   • ACTION: J4 must immediately initiate full contingency logistics planning assuming catastrophic damage at Artsyz. This triggers pre-positioning of strategic fuel and munitions stocks via secondary GLOCs, mitigating the potential logistical shock required for the MDCOA.
   • RATIONALE: Planning delay risks being caught flat-footed should the Artsyz IMINT confirm the negative assessment.

4. REASSESS BLACK SEA FREEDOM OF MANEUVER (J3/J2 Naval):

   • ACTION: Re-evaluate future Black Sea maritime drone operations and targeting priorities in light of the Turkish diplomatic response (292250Z). Prioritize missions against targets that minimize political blowback while maintaining economic pressure on RF.
   • RATIONALE: Prevents increased political friction that could jeopardize future supply corridors or international agreements.

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