Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - Stepnohorsk Main Effort (M.E.) Update: Transition to Decisive Phase

DTG: 292245Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Transitions from Kinetic Fixation to M.E. Aerial Denial and Synchronized IO Attack // Stepnohorsk Ground Assault Imminent

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The Russian Federation (RF) has successfully transitioned from the strategic kinetic fixation phase (Kyiv AD saturation) to the tactical aerial preparation phase for the anticipated ground assault at Stepnohorsk. The immediate threat is the combined effect of local UAF tactical "blindness" due to RF A2A UAV deployment and a highly focused RF Information Operation (IO) campaign targeting Ukrainian National Command Authority (NCA) and force cohesion.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (M.E. Focus): CRITICAL. All intelligence indicators point toward an immediate armored ground assault by the RF Vostok Group (MLCOA NLT 300600Z). UAF 33 OShP is conducting a critical retrograde maneuver toward the blocking positions established by the 3rd Assault Brigade.
• Kyiv/Vyshhorod Strategic Rear: Kinetic activity in the capital region has subsided (Air Raid All Clear, 292229Z). Confirmed successful strike on a multi-story residence in Vyshhorod (292209Z), reinforcing the RF "Thermal Denial" strategy and psychological stress.
• Expanded ISR Domain: New, smaller UAV groups detected moving west across Northern Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions (292210Z, 292212Z). This suggests RF is maintaining broad ISR coverage to fix UAF mobile AD assets and mask the exact location of the M.E.
• Logistics Focus (Artsyz): Damage assessment remains the highest priority intelligence gap (CRITICALITY: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions (-3°C to -8°C) persist, favoring RF IO efforts focused on civilian morale via infrastructure damage (Thermal Denial). Clear visibility continues to favor RF ISR and GAB operations preceding the ground assault.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Frontline forces (37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade) are in final staging for the Stepnohorsk assault. BPS (Drone Systems Troops) are actively deploying tactical and A2A UAV assets to establish local aerial denial in the M.E.
• UAF: UAF AD readiness in the capital region is high but exhausted. CRITICAL MEASURE: Immediate execution of Operation SKY SWEEPER (C-UAS/EW redeployment) to the Stepnohorsk sector must be confirmed NLT 300200Z to mitigate the A2A UAV threat.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intention (Operational Synchronization): Confirmed. RF is employing a highly synchronized multi-domain assault: Kinetic Fixation $\rightarrow$ Aerial Denial $\rightarrow$ Ground Assault $\rightarrow$ Cognitive Decapitation. The primary intent is to secure a decisive operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously eroding the NCA’s authority and national cohesion via targeted IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Capability (Aerial Denial): RF A2A UAVs ("Geran-fighters") represent a severe threat to UAF FPV/ISR capability, which is vital for fire correction and identifying RF maneuver axes.
• Capability (IO/EW Synergy): RF IO is now directly targeting the Commander-in-Chief (Syrskyi) and former CINC (Zaluzhnyi), seeking to generate confusion and mistrust in command structures just before the decisive ground action.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF drone deployment shows increasing sophistication. The expansion of tactical UAV operations to Dnipropetrovsk and Northern Kyiv indicates a highly coordinated effort to keep UAF AD/EW assets dispersed and tasked, limiting the massing of C-UAS/EW capability over Stepnohorsk.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic logistics have stabilized through the activation of Kazakh-RF alternative rail corridors. This logistical resilience increases the sustainability of the Vostok Group M.E. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). Failure to confirm the Artsyz damage status prevents effective modeling of RF tactical supply shocks.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGH. The seamless transition of forces and rapid escalation of complex IO indicate a highly effective, centralized operational command structure capable of multi-domain coordination.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is adequate but critically dependent on two factors: 1) The successful execution of the 33 OShP retrograde maneuver, and 2) The timely arrival and operationalization of mobile C-UAS/EW assets at Stepnohorsk. AD stocks are drawn down following the massed strike phase.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS: UAF AD successfully contained the RF kinetic fixation wave over the capital.
• SETBACK: Confirmed loss of residential structure in Vyshhorod (292209Z), providing RF with a significant IO/psychological victory. Tactical setback at Stepnohorsk remains critical due to logistics failure on the Konstiantynivka GLOC.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. C-UAS/EW Force Protection: Immediate requirement to achieve 50% redeployment of mobile EW assets to the M.E. NLT 300200Z.
2. IMINT Verification: Artsyz damage assessment remains the critical operational logistics requirement.
3. IO Counter-Measures: Urgent requirement for NCA to issue a unified command message to counter the escalated RF cognitive attack.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The RF IO campaign has escalated and is now directly targeting high-level authority figures, exploiting existing political tensions to project an image of internal collapse:

1. Targeting Military Leadership (Internal Instability): RF OSINT/Media channels are running narratives targeting CINC Syrskyi's stability (292212Z) and amplifying unverified claims regarding former CINC Zaluzhnyi's disagreement on peace terms (292231Z). This aims to destabilize C2 during the critical operational phase.
2. Unit Cohesion Denial: RF state media (TASS) is projecting fabricated narratives regarding UAF unit refusals at Krasny Liman (292218Z), intended to undermine morale and internal trust.
3. Diplomatic Fissure Amplification: DS Beliefs indicate high confidence (0.224) in the hypothesis of "Disagreement on Peace Terms," validating the effectiveness of the Zaluzhnyi narrative push.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is strained by the persistence of deep strikes (Vyshhorod) and the "Thermal Denial" impact. The synchronized IO attack is intended to convert tactical setbacks into strategic morale erosion. Robust NCA response is required immediately to counter the narrative of political and military division.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF continues to leverage internal UAF division narratives to discourage Western political commitment and suggest the conflict is entering an intractable political phase (peace talks without full victory).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Armored Penetration at Stepnohorsk Under BPS Aerial Cover (NLT 300600Z) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will commence a heavy motorized rifle/armored push against the UAF 33 OShP rear guard and the newly establishing 3rd Assault Brigade blocking line. The RF BPS will provide continuous aerial denial using A2A and tactical ISR UAVs, attempting to prevent UAF fire correction and target acquisition, ensuring a rapid tactical breakthrough.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Command Decapitation and Operational Rout (NLT 301200Z) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF successfully synchronizes the Stepnohorsk ground assault with: 1) Confirmed catastrophic damage at Artsyz (intelligence gap closed negatively), 2) Localized Starlink denial (jamming) over the Stepnohorsk sector, and 3) A focused IO blitz maximizing the narrative of NCA collapse (Zaluzhnyi/Syrskyi). This sequence leads to C2 failure at the tactical level and prevents strategic reserves from being committed, forcing an operational rout.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to secure the Stepnohorsk defensive line against the ground assault by achieving localized aerial parity (Operation SKY SWEEPER) and neutralizing the concurrent cognitive attack.

1. EXECUTE OPERATION SKY SWEEPER (J3/EW):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Confirm 100% of available mobile C-UAS/EW platforms assigned to Operation SKY SWEEPER have reached their designated operational positions in the Stepnohorsk sector NLT 300200Z. Prioritize EW assets capable of disruption against identified BPS frequencies (once SIGINT provides data).
   • RATIONALE: Preventing RF tactical "blindness" is the key to holding the 3rd Assault Brigade blocking position against the MLCOA.

2. NCA COUNTER-IO FORCE PROTECTION (J7/NCA):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE): The National Command Authority must issue a unified, high-profile televised address NLT 300000Z. This address must unequivocally affirm the unity of military and political command (CINC Syrskyi, political leadership) and directly deny all RF claims of internal division (Zaluzhnyi/Syrskyi/Yermak).
   • RATIONALE: Silence or delayed response amplifies the psychological effect of RF IO, fulfilling the requirements for the MDCOA cognitive shock.

3. LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY ACTIVATION (J4/J3):

   • ACTION: Immediately activate FULL LOGISTICAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING, including the use of alternative GLOCs and dispersal of remaining strategic reserves, assuming the Artsyz gap is negative (catastrophic damage). A waiting posture increases vulnerability to the MDCOA.
   • RATIONALE: Proactive logistical shock absorption mitigates the primary vulnerability of the MDCOA.

//END OF REPORT//