Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK MAIN EFFORT (M.E.) UPDATE: KINETIC FIXATION COMPLETE

DTG: 292200Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Kinetic Fixation Phase Transitioned // Stepnohorsk Aerial Denial Surge Confirmed // UAF AD Response Successful but Stressed

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The Russian Federation (RF) completed its kinetic fixation phase with high-volume UAV saturation strikes targeting the Kyiv AD envelope. Operational focus is now shifting to tactical aerial preparation and reconnaissance (ISR) near the intended Main Effort (M.E.) axis at Stepnohorsk, indicating imminent ground action. UAF AD assets demonstrated resilience but incurred infrastructure damage in the Vyshhorod area.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (M.E. Focus): CRITICAL. New groups of RF UAVs confirmed moving west into the Donetsk region (292144Z), providing immediate ISR and potential targeting support for the anticipated ground assault by the RF Vostok Group (MLCOA NLT 300600Z).
• Kyiv Strategic Rear (Fixed): UAV strikes hit residential and civilian infrastructure targets in Vyshhorod (292137Z, 292155Z). The immediate massed UAV threat is assessed as neutralized ("минуса" reported 292149Z), confirming high UAF AD expenditure but successful defense against the initial wave.
• Logistics Focus (Artsyz): Damage assessment remains a critical intelligence gap (CRITICALITY: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Sub-freezing temperatures continue to amplify the psychological and infrastructural impact of RF "Thermal Denial" strikes. Visibility remains clear, favoring RF ISR and fixed-wing/GAB operations during the M.E. preparation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Frontline RF forces (37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade) are optimizing forward observation and target acquisition using the newly deployed UAV groups near the Donetsk/Stepnohorsk operational area.
• UAF: UAF AD/C-UAS platforms in the capital region are highly tasked but successful. Immediate focus must be the rapid redeployment of mobile EW/C-UAS assets southward to execute Operation SKY SWEEPER before the Stepnohorsk ground assault commences.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intention (Operational Synchronization): Confirmed. RF is strictly adhering to the kinetic-fixation-to-ground-assault doctrine. The immediate neutralization of the Kyiv UAV wave was synchronized with the deployment of new tactical UAV groups (Donetsk/Westward). The intent is to maintain continuous pressure on UAF AD and establish aerial superiority/denial over the M.E. zone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Capability (Information Warfare): RF IO channels are actively engaged in projecting competence and strategic stability (Belgorod defense reports, cultural outreach) while simultaneously seeking to undermine UAF national resolve by questioning mobilization and the effectiveness of Western support (focus on US MIC changes, Putin statements).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF C2 showed immediate agility by transitioning kinetic assets from the strategic rear (Kyiv AD suppression) to the tactical front (Stepnohorsk ISR/Targeting). This rapid shift confirms high synchronization between RF Drone Systems Troops (BPS) and Vostok Group maneuver units.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistics assessment remains focused on the confirmed reliance on new Kazakh transit corridors. The continued IO focus on strategic affairs (US MIC, EU failures) suggests RF confidence in its ability to sustain the Vostok Group M.E. via these newly activated routes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 synchronization remains HIGH. The speed and seamlessness of the kinetic shift (Kyiv AD task saturation $\rightarrow$ Stepnohorsk ISR surge) validates the assessment of highly effective, centralized operational C2.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF AD readiness is high but resource-constrained following the massed UAV wave. The defensive posture at Stepnohorsk remains contingent on the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade establishing stable blocking positions and successful retrograde of 33 OShP personnel.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS: UAF AD successfully countered the overwhelming majority of Shahed-type UAVs targeting critical infrastructure in Kyiv.
• SETBACK: Confirmed kinetic damage to civilian residences and market in Vyshhorod, indicating the continued vulnerability of soft targets to penetrating UAVs.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. C-UAS Redeployment: The need to immediately redeploy mobile C-UAS/EW assets to the Stepnohorsk axis is now CRITICAL given the confirmed movement of new RF UAV groups west into Donetsk.
2. IMINT Verification: Artsyz damage assessment is the singular most urgent logistical intelligence requirement.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Manpower Narrative (New Threat): RF channels (НгП раZVедка) are actively disseminating content questioning Ukrainian mobilization and national resolve, coinciding with the kinetic stress. This seeks to amplify internal division regarding casualty acceptance and conscription efforts.
2. Strategic Competence Projection (RF): RF IO is focusing on global narratives (e.g., US MIC overhaul, Russian defense successes over Belgorod) to project RF strategic foresight and capability, and to suggest that Western aid is irrelevant against superior technological/strategic adaptation.
3. Diplomatic Fissure Amplification: RF continues to amplify claims regarding EU leaders undermining peace efforts (Putin claims), intended to discourage continued foreign military support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is strained by the continued deep strike threat (Vyshhorod damage) and the sub-freezing "Thermal Denial" strategy. The Ivanivka victory remains a critical, positive counterpoint, but robust NCA messaging is required to preempt the escalating RF mobilization/manpower narratives.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF OSINT channels are using unverified or refuted claims (e.g., Venezuela airspace) to create "strategic noise." A Chinese start-up unveiling a Switchblade-like drone signals growing Chinese technological parity, which RF will leverage as a potential strategic resource.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full-Scale Ground Assault at Stepnohorsk Under Cover of Aerial Denial (NLT 300600Z) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will commence the armored assault. The confirmed deployment of new tactical UAV groups moving into the Donetsk/Stepnohorsk area confirms the immediate final preparation phase. RF will attempt to achieve tactical "blindness" for UAF fire correction by overwhelming local C-UAS/ISR capabilities with A2A UAVs supported by forward reconnaissance drones.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Operational Decapitation and GLOC Severance (NLT 301200Z) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF synchronizes the Stepnohorsk ground assault with confirmed critical logistical damage at Artsyz (if the intelligence gap is closed negatively). This logistical shock is paired with a focused, localized Starlink denial event over the Stepnohorsk sector (jamming/cyber), causing complete C2 collapse for the 33 OShP and preventing effective coordinated deployment of the 3rd Assault Brigade.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to achieve local aerial parity at Stepnohorsk to prevent a rapid, successful armored breach, while managing internal IO threats.

1. PRIORITIZE STEPNOHORSK AERIAL DENIAL (J3/EW):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE): Confirm C-UAS/EW asset redeployment completion (50% from Kyiv infrastructure defense) to the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky sector NLT 300200Z. Prioritize mobile EW assets capable of targeting A2A UAV and forward reconnaissance drone frequencies.
   • ACTION: Advise frontline units (UAF 3rd Assault Brigade) to utilize all available passive thermal and acoustic detection systems for early warning against both A2A and newly deployed tactical ISR UAVs.
   • RATIONALE: The confirmed UAV surge in Donetsk necessitates immediate counter-ISR measures to prevent UAF "blindness" during the crucial defensive maneuver.

2. CRITICAL LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY (J4/J3):

   • ACTION: Execute contingency plan protocols immediately, assuming CRITICAL DAMAGE at the Artsyz logistical node, regardless of the intelligence gap status. This means activating secondary GLOCs and tertiary forward supply depots now.
   • RATIONALE: Proactive logistical adaptation mitigates the catastrophic risk associated with the MDCOA.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-MANPOWER (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: The National Command Authority (NCA) must launch a targeted counter-IO campaign NLT 300400Z that directly addresses the RF narrative questioning mobilization and manpower commitment. This must be synchronized with the positive messaging regarding the Ivanivka victory and the resilience shown during the Kyiv UAV attack.
   • RATIONALE: Direct denial of the manpower crisis narrative is essential to maintaining domestic stability and discouraging strategic reserve freezing.

//END OF REPORT//