Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK MAIN EFFORT PREPARATION

DTG: 292200Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Kinetic Fixation Shifts to High-Volume UAV // MLCOA Stepnohorsk Ground Assault Confirmed // Artsyz Damage Assessment Required

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The enemy (RF) kinetic preparation phase for the anticipated main effort (M.E.) ground assault at Stepnohorsk is transitioning from the strategic ballistic stage to the localized high-volume drone saturation stage. The successful clearance of Ivanivka by UAF 37th Separate Marine Brigade (37 ОБрМП) has provided a critical tactical victory that must be immediately exploited in the Information Environment.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (M.E. Focus): RF Vostok Group continues preparations for the armored assault (MLCOA NLT 300600Z). UAF 3rd Assault Brigade is establishing blocking positions to secure the line behind the retreating UAF 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33 OShP).
• Donetsk Region (Kinetic Suppression): Confirmed launch of Guided Aerial Bombs (GABs) by RF tactical aviation targeting UAF positions in the Donetsk sector (FACT: GABs launched). This suggests targeted kinetic softening and fixed-position denial immediately adjacent to the Stepnohorsk axis.
• Strategic Rear (Active UAV Threat): The ballistic threat (Odesa/Artsyz) has been declared clear (292112Z), but immediate RF assets shifted to high-volume UAV operations. At least 8+ Shahed-type UAVs are reported inbound/over Kyiv (Brovary, Boryspil, Vyshhorod vectors). (JUDGMENT: This constitutes a coordinated shift to fix UAF AD assets in the capital region, creating a window of opportunity for the M.E. in the South).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

High visibility remains consistent, favoring RF ISR and aerial delivery of GABs and UAVs. Sub-freezing temperatures continue to amplify the impact of RF "Thermal Denial" strikes on civilian infrastructure (Kyiv).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: High engagement rate in the deep rear (UAVs over Kyiv). Frontline forces (37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade and remnants of the 228th Assault Regiment) are posturing for decisive assault at Stepnohorsk.
• UAF: AD assets are highly tasked defending Kyiv against the UAV surge. UAF strategic focus must remain on ensuring the safe retrograde and integration of the 33 OShP and preventing logistics paralysis in the Odesa region until Artsyz damage is confirmed.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intention (Kinetic Fixation Confirmation): RF is executing its plan to draw UAF mobile AD away from the southern front line. The immediate switch from ballistic strikes (Odesa) to high-volume UAV strikes (Kyiv) confirms the intent is maximum AD depletion and distraction prior to the ground assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Capability (Tactical Air Superiority): The deployment of Air-to-Air (A2A) capable UAVs ("Geran-fighters") remains a critical tactical threat over Stepnohorsk, designed to blind UAF ISR and fire correction capabilities during the assault.
• Capability (Propaganda): RF successfully maintains a dual narrative—strategic instability (political rumors, Venezuela diversion) and tactical confidence (video claims of taking strongpoints, motivational morale audio).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF C2 showed immediate agility by shifting kinetic focus following the ballistic threat clearance, prioritizing the most resource-intensive targets (Kyiv AD) with high-volume, lower-cost UAV systems. GAB use in Donetsk confirms continued use of high-yield standoff weapons near the M.E. axis.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains assessed as RESILIENT due to successful activation of alternative Kazakh logistics corridors. The rising SAR score for the 1488th AD Regiment (13.88) confirms RF commitment to protecting these new sustainment routes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF kinetic and IO synchronization remains HIGH. The ability to coordinate deep strikes with immediate IO messaging and near-instant tactical kinetic shifts is notable.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high for tactical defense (Stepnohorsk blocking lines) and C-UAS operations (Kyiv). The priority is maintaining C2 integrity under intense electronic and kinetic pressure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (CRITICAL): UAF 37 ОБрМП cleared Ivanivka, capturing 19 RF personnel (228th Assault Regiment). This is a vital source of immediate HUMINT and a critical strategic communications counter-point.
• SETBACK: UAF AD is heavily engaged and expending interceptors against massed UAVs over Kyiv. The 33 OShP retrograde necessitates the destruction of valuable heavy equipment.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Mobile AD/C-UAS: Extreme pressure on AD systems due to UAV saturation. Immediate requirement to move C-UAS to Stepnohorsk sector to neutralize A2A UAV threat.
2. Logistical Verification: Urgent requirement for confirmed damage assessment at the Odesa/Artsyz logistics hubs to prevent catastrophic supply chain interruption (MDCOA).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. NCA Destabilization: RF IO continues to aggressively amplify false narratives regarding high-level leadership resignations (Yermak) and general political paralysis to discourage UAF strategic reserve commitment.
2. Morale Amplification (RF): Frontline reports (Colonelcassad, Kotenok) emphasize patriotic sacrifice and successful ground maneuver ("Work, brothers"), aiming to convey RF inevitability and resilience.
3. Global Diversion: The amplification of US/Venezuela tensions (Alex Parker Returns) serves as strategic noise to dilute international media focus on the Stepnohorsk crisis.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is bolstered by the Ivanivka victory (37 ОБрМП). However, the widespread air alert and the constant threat of deep strikes (UAVs over Kyiv) maintain a high stress level that requires robust NCA messaging.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The previously reported TASS claim regarding the An-124 transport remains an intelligence gap requiring verification. The current RF IO focus is strongly internal and kinetic/geopolitical distraction.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full-Scale Ground Assault at Stepnohorsk Under Cover of Aerial Denial (NLT 300600Z DEC 25) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will commence the armored assault. The preparatory kinetic phase (Ballistic/UAV saturation) is designed to ensure UAF strategic reserves are delayed and AD is depleted. RF will use A2A UAVs to deny UAF tactical ISR over the breach zone, facilitating the rapid advance of the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade into the gap left by the 33 OShP retrograde.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Hybrid Operational Decapitation (NLT 301200Z DEC 25) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF synchronizes the Stepnohorsk ground assault with confirmation of critical logistical damage in the Odesa/Artsyz area (MDCOA from previous SITREP). Simultaneously, RF Drone Systems Troops execute a coordinated, localized Starlink denial event (jamming/cyber) over the Stepnohorsk sector. Loss of logistical resupply combined with critical C2 failure during the assault phase risks the operational collapse of the Southern Command defense line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary mission is to absorb the RF M.E. assault at Stepnohorsk while preserving strategic logistical and C2 integrity in the deep rear.

1. PRIORITIZE STEPNOHORSK AERIAL DEFENSE (J3/EW):

   • ACTION (IMMEDIATE): Reallocate 50% of mobile C-UAS/EW assets currently defending Kyiv infrastructure (where UAV attacks are ongoing but predictable) to the Stepnohorsk-Vremyevsky sector NLT 300200Z. Prioritize EW platforms capable of disrupting A2A UAV C2/guidance (Operation SKY SWEEPER).
   • ACTION: Utilize short-range MANPADS assets to counter the current Kyiv UAV threat, preserving high-value AD interceptors for potential follow-on ballistic or aviation strikes.
   • RATIONALE: The immediate threat is tactical "blindness" at the M.E. point of contact. Neutralizing RF A2A UAVs is essential for UAF fire correction and defense viability.

2. LOGISTICAL DAMAGE CONTROL (J4/J3):

   • ACTION: Immediately execute contingency plan protocols for logistics supply through the Odesa Operational Area, assuming CRITICAL DAMAGE to the Artsyz node until IMINT confirms otherwise. Activate secondary and tertiary forward supply depots immediately.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the high risk of MDCOA (operational collapse) caused by logistical severance.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS EXPLOITATION (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: Launch the maximum-impact media campaign based on the Ivanivka clearance and personnel capture NLT 300100Z. The campaign must include direct refutation of the political instability rumors (Yermak) and contextualize the current Kyiv UAV attacks as RF desperation prior to the Stepnohorsk failure.
   • RATIONALE: Denies the RF its primary psychological warfare lever and maintains national resilience during the critical kinetic phase.

//END OF REPORT//