Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL UPDATE: STEPNOHORSK PREPARATION & IVANIVKA COUNTER-IO

DTG: 292130Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: RF Kinetic Synchronization Confirmed (Ballistic/UAV) // UAF Ivanivka Clearance Neutralizes Dachnoye IO // Stepnohorsk Assault Imminent

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational tempo has sharply increased, confirming the synchronization of preparatory kinetic fires with Information Operations (IO) ahead of the anticipated main effort (M.E.) ground assault at Stepnohorsk. Critically, UAF tactical success has effectively neutralized the RF's high-risk Dachnoye IO campaign.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (M.E. Focus): Remains the anticipated axis of the RF Vostok Group main effort (MLCOA NLT 300600Z). UAF 3rd Assault Brigade continues to consolidate blocking positions.
• Dnipropetrovsk Axis (IO Neutralized): Confirmed successful clearance of Ivanivka by the UAF 37th Separate Marine Brigade (37 ОБрМП). This tactical success (capture of 19 personnel) directly refutes the RF claims of a large-scale deep penetration via Dachnoye/Dnipropetrovsk, shifting the focus from strategic panic to tactical success. (FACT: Ivanivka cleared. JUDGMENT: Dachnoye IO effect minimized.)
• Strategic Rear (High Threat): RF launched ballistic missiles from Crimea, targeting the Odesa region (Artsyz, Tuzly/Zhovtyi Yar), concurrent with UAV launches targeting Kyiv and Odesa. This confirms the multi-domain kinetic suppression attempt against UAF deep logistics and Command and Control (C2) nodes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

High visibility conditions continue to favor RF kinetic exploitation, ISR/UAV operations, and ground maneuver across the southern front.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Active execution of synchronized long-range kinetic strikes (Ballistic/UAV) against high-value rear targets (Odesa, Kyiv). RF IO is attempting to pivot from the failed Dnipropetrovsk narrative by focusing on National Command Authority (NCA) stability rumors.
• UAF: UAF forces achieved a critical tactical/IO victory at Ivanivka. AD assets are currently stressed by the simultaneous UAV threat on Kyiv and the ballistic threat on Odesa. Force protection measures against fiber-optic disruption (Operation HARDLINE) remain paramount.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intention (Kinetic Fixation): The primary RF intention is to fix UAF mobile Air Defense (AD) assets and strategic reserve movement through rapid, simultaneous kinetic strikes against dispersed high-value targets in the rear (Kyiv, Odesa). This creates a permissive environment for the Stepnohorsk ground assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Capability (Tactical IO Response): RF information channels are attempting to instantly pivot from the failed Dachnoye/Ivanivka narrative by amplifying domestic political instability rumors (Yermak). This demonstrates the speed and resilience of the RF hybrid C2 apparatus.
• Capability (Ballistic Strike): Confirmed use of ballistic systems (likely Iskander or similar) from Crimea against Odesa region targets (Artsyz), indicating intent to disrupt logistics critical to the Southern Operational Command.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has immediately replaced the Dnipropetrovsk 'deep breach' narrative with confirmed kinetic action across the strategic depth. The use of ballistic assets from Crimea adds stress beyond the previously confirmed UAV/GAB threat.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains assessed as RESILIENT. No new data on the Kazakh logistics corridors, but the ongoing SAR surge assessment (1488th AD Regiment score 13.88) confirms RF commitment to protecting these rear routes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF kinetic-IO synchronization remains HIGH. Near-instantaneous execution of ballistic strikes concurrent with high-volume UAV operations and IO narratives confirms operational effectiveness.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high regarding tactical counter-assault and local defense (Ivanivka success). Critical vulnerability remains the exposure of strategic C2 and logistics hubs (Odesa/Artsyz) to ballistic and drone attacks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (CRITICAL): UAF 37 ОБрМП cleared Ivanivka, capturing 19 RF personnel (228th Assault Regiment). This is a tactical victory providing intelligence and a critical strategic communications counter-point.
• SETBACK: RF achieved successful ballistic launch and drone penetration toward high-value targets (Artsyz, Kyiv), drawing down limited AD interceptor stocks.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Mobile AD/C-UAS: Immediate requirement for reallocation to cover confirmed ballistic threat vectors (Odesa region) and ongoing UAV incursions (Kyiv/Odesa).
2. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM): Requirement to immediately package and disseminate the Ivanivka victory details to counter RF morale campaigns.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. NCA Destabilization: RF media (TASS, proxied through jailed Ukrainian politician Dubinsky) aggressively pushes false narratives regarding high-level leadership resignations (Yermak) to imply strategic paralysis and political weakness.
2. Global Diversion: RF sources continue to amplify peripheral geopolitical tensions (Venezuela/US) to divert international attention from the critical situation on the Ukrainian front lines.
3. Counter-UAF IO: RF actively defends against UAF counter-attacks, claiming successful AD operations in Belgorod and amplifying video messages about UAF desertions (Lyman area).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is expected to surge due to the confirmed Ivanivka tactical success. NCA must capitalize on this victory immediately to combat the pervasive political instability rumors.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The report of a Ukrainian An-124 transporting US equipment from Israel to the UAE (TASS) is likely an RF attempt to generate mistrust regarding UAF resource management or to expose sensitive logistical routes. This requires rapid verification and strategic management.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full-Scale Ground Assault at Stepnohorsk Under Cover of Deep Kinetic Barrage (NLT 300600Z DEC 25) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will commence the armored assault at Stepnohorsk as planned. The preparatory phase—using synchronized ballistic strikes on Odesa/Artsyz and UAV/GAB operations across the South and North—is now underway. The goal is maximum tactical surprise and C2 confusion at the moment of contact. RF IO will continue to focus heavily on political instability rumors to prevent UAF strategic reserve commitment.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Ballistic Strike Decapitation and Logistical Severance in Odesa/Artsyz Operational Area (NLT 301200Z DEC 25) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The ballistic strike targeting Artsyz, if successful, could severely damage or destroy critical logistics nodes (POL/Munitions depots) essential for sustaining the entire Southern Operational Command. This successful strike, synchronized with C2 denial efforts (fiber-optic targeting/EW), risks a logistical and C2 failure, making the defense at Stepnohorsk unsustainable and risking operational collapse in the southern flank.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus is pivoting from defending against IO to defending against synchronized kinetic fires and maximizing the Ivanivka victory.

1. C2 HARDENING AND AD REALLOCATION (J3/J6):

   • ACTION: Immediately reallocate 40% of available mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) to cover high-value logistical nodes and identified Command Posts in the Odesa Operational Area, prioritizing defense against further ballistic strikes and low-altitude UAVs (Artsyz, Tuzly).
   • ACTION: J6 must enforce the strictest EMCON (Emission Control) and switch communications to highly resilient, redundant mesh networks in the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk operational area, minimizing reliance on fixed-line infrastructure currently under kinetic threat.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the immediate MDCOA threat of logistical and C2 failure caused by successful ballistic strikes and physical comms degradation.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS EXPLOITATION (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: Immediately launch a maximum-impact media campaign based on the Ivanivka clearance and personnel capture (37 ОБрМП) NLT 300100Z. This campaign must directly address the previous "Dnipropetrovsk penetration" rumors and forcefully refute NCA destabilization claims (Yermak rumors).
   • RATIONALE: Converts a critical tactical success into a strategic IO victory, maintaining internal morale and denying the RF its primary psychological warfare lever ahead of the Stepnohorsk assault.

3. STEPNOHORSK KINETIC PREPARATION (J3):

   • ACTION: Utilize the immediate HUMINT (captured 228th Regiment personnel) to refine Electronic Warfare (EW) profiles and anti-armor staging plans for the Stepnohorsk defense NLT 300600Z.
   • RATIONALE: Provides UAF commanders with tailored, timely intelligence for the anticipated main armored effort.

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