Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - ENHANCED THREAT SYNCHRONIZATION

DTG: 292130Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Refined Assessment of RF Kinetic-Hybrid Synchronization // Amplified Dachnoye IO // Critical Vulnerability of Tactical Communication Networks

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational picture confirms the Russian Federation's (RF) intent to achieve strategic paralysis through the synchronized application of kinetic pressure, rear-area disruption, and highly targeted information operations (IO). New intelligence reinforces the high threat level associated with RF attempts to degrade Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) tactical Command and Control (C2) during anticipated ground assaults.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Dnipropetrovsk Axis (CRITICAL CAI): RF military channels (Операция Z, 2010Z) are amplifying claims and disseminating combat footage purportedly showing '🅾️тважные’ (likely elements of Vostok Group, including the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade) advancing and destroying NATO equipment in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This directly supports the Dachnoye IO claim (Previous SITREP) intended to force UAF reserve commitment. (JUDGMENT: This is an active IO campaign masking a high-risk operational penetration or reconnaissance effort. Verification remains Priority 1).
• Donetsk Axis: UAF Air Force reports launching of Guided Aerial Bombs (GAB) by RF tactical aviation (2017Z), indicating sustained, high-intensity close air support for ongoing RF ground efforts near the front line (e.g., Pokrovsk, Siversk).
• Chernihiv Axis: Confirmed sighting of RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) moving west (2023Z). Indicates continued RF ability to penetrate UAF northern airspace for deep reconnaissance or saturation strike preparation against C2 or energy infrastructure.
• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient: Focus remains on stabilizing the defensive line established by the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade. High visibility conditions persist, favoring the imminent RF armored assault.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. High visibility favors RF kinetic exploitation and ISR/UAV operations across all fronts, including the Chernihiv axis.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are actively utilizing IO to amplify local tactical successes and potential deep breaches (Dnipropetrovsk). RF Ministry of Defense (MoD, 2025Z, 2031Z) is projecting highly effective Air Defense (AD) capabilities, claiming 21 UAF UAVs destroyed over Russia/Black Sea.
• UAF: UAF 37th Separate Marine Brigade (37 OBpMP) reports a significant tactical success, capturing 19 RF personnel from the 228th Assault Regiment (2015Z). This tactical win provides immediate intelligence value and a vital counter-narrative against RF collapse claims.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intention (Kinetic/IO): RF intent remains centered on fracturing UAF strategic decision-making. The amplified Dnipropetrovsk advance claims are designed to maximize the psychological effect while the true main effort launches at Stepnohorsk.
• Capability (C2 Denial - Enhanced Threat): RF channels display high-intensity FPV drone usage targeting fiber-optic communication lines in the Donbas (2030Z). This confirms RF capacity and intent to execute localized, systemic C2 denial by targeting the physical backbone of UAF tactical communications, complementing the threat posed by A2A UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Capability (Strategic Logistics): While not confirmed by kinetic action, the high-level RF discussion regarding exporting financial control models to Kazakhstan (2017Z) reinforces the geopolitical importance of the newly activated Kazakh logistics routes identified in the previous daily report.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed focus on fiber-optic disruption for tactical blindness represents an evolution from broad-spectrum jamming (EW) to targeted physical degradation of UAF fixed C2 infrastructure. This necessitates a change in UAF communication defense doctrine.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment status is assessed as RESILIENT due to the confirmed activation of alternative Kazakh logistics corridors. The window for effective UAF counter-logistics strikes against these new routes is rapidly closing.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 across the hybrid domain remains HIGH. Near-instantaneous synchronization between the battlefield (claimed Dnipropetrovsk advance) and the IO apparatus (dissemination of combat footage) is highly effective.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness remains high at the tactical level (37 OBpMP capture success). However, the UAF strategic C2 architecture faces a multi-domain threat: kinetic strikes (UAVs), operational IO (Dachnoye claim), and critical physical comms interdiction (fiber optics).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Capture of 19 RF personnel (228th Assault Regiment). Immediate priority should be INTEL extraction.
• Setback: RF has successfully created significant anxiety and operational confusion regarding the true status of the Dnipropetrovsk rear, consuming critical ISR and command focus.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Physical C2 Protection: Immediate allocation of resources to secure and harden fiber-optic cable nodes and repair teams in high-risk sectors (Donbas/Zaporizhzhia).
2. Diplomatic Amplification: Requirement to rapidly leverage the Moldovan airspace violation to international partners to bolster support narratives.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Regional Spillover: RF aggression is confirmed to be directly impacting regional stability, evidenced by Moldovan President Sandu's condemnation of drone incursions and subsequent high-level security warnings (2009Z, 2021Z). This provides a potent diplomatic counterpoint to RF 'normalization' attempts.
2. Morale Erosion: RF channels are actively promoting specific UAF leadership deaths (2015Z) to undermine trust and morale within UAF ranks.
3. Domestic Normalization: RF state media focuses on extravagant festive displays (Moscow, 2013Z, 2023Z) to project an image of internal stability, prosperity, and continuity, counteracting the effects of war costs on the Russian public.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public sentiment is high regarding tactical successes (37 OBpMP), but vulnerability remains acute regarding strategic loss perception and perceived US diplomatic pressure (Previous SITREP).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed Moldovan reaction (direct condemnation of Russian drone violation) is a major diplomatic opportunity to reinforce the narrative of RF threats to NATO and EU partners, crucial ahead of the US/UA meeting.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Kinetic Assault at Stepnohorsk Under Cover of Coordinated C2 Degradation and Rear-Area Psychological Shock (NLT 300600Z DEC 25) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will commence the armored assault at Stepnohorsk. This action will be preceded by or concurrent with: 1) Intensive A2A UAV operations to blind UAF ISR, and 2) Targeted FPV/explosive action against UAF fixed communications (fiber, microwave links) to prevent coordinated tactical defense and reserve mobilization. The Dachnoye claim will continue to be amplified by IO to anchor UAF attention to the rear.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Successful Operational Penetration into Dnipropetrovsk via Dachnoye, Achieved Through Strategic Communications Decapitation (NLT 301800Z DEC 25) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) If UAF fails to verify the Dachnoye situation rapidly, a factual deep penetration will be synchronized with a widespread communications blackout in the Zaporizhzhia-Dnipropetrovsk joint operational area, achieved via combined EW/Starlink jamming and physical destruction of fiber-optic nodes. This shock effect prevents timely deployment of strategic reserves, risking the collapse of the central rear logistics hub.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority is to simultaneously secure UAF C2 integrity and counter the RF’s information warfare component.

1. C2 HARDENING AND PHYSICAL DEFENSE (J3/J6):

   • ACTION: Immediately implement Operation "HARDLINE". Deploy armed Quick Reaction Force (QRF) patrols to physically secure key fiber-optic relay nodes and primary communication towers identified by J6 in the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk operational area NLT 292300Z.
   • ACTION: J6 must issue immediate guidance to frontline units (3rd Assault Brigade, elements near Stepnohorsk) on maximizing redundant communications, minimizing reliance on fixed-line infrastructure, and utilizing frequency-hopping to defeat localized jamming.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the newly confirmed threat of physical C2 degradation, which is essential to coordinating the defense at Stepnohorsk and managing the potential Dachnoye breach.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-IO (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION: NCA and the MFA must issue a coordinated diplomatic statement NLT 300100Z that forcefully links the RF’s tactical aggression (Dnipropetrovsk IO/Drone Incursions) directly to the immediate regional security threat (Moldovan airspace violation). This frames the upcoming US/UA meeting as a necessity for collective defense, not capitulation.
   • RATIONALE: Maximizes diplomatic leverage against RF regional aggression and neutralizes the RF "Forced Peace" narrative by demonstrating escalating kinetic threats.

3. STEPNOHORSK KINETIC PREPARATION (J3):

   • ACTION: Ensure the tactical intelligence derived from the 19 captured RF personnel (228th Assault Regiment) is immediately cross-referenced with anticipated RF fire support and maneuver plans for the Vostok Group assault at Stepnohorsk (NLT 300600Z).
   • RATIONALE: Provides UAF commanders with critical, immediate intelligence on enemy disposition and probable intent for the main effort.

//END OF REPORT//