Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 292030Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Escalation of RF Information Operations (IO) Targeting Diplomatic Integrity and "Forced Peace" Narrative // Confirmed RF UAV Groups Targeting Dnipropetrovsk // Fog Lift Confirms Kinetic Window at Stepnohorsk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational environment remains defined by RF efforts to kinetically isolate key sectors (Siversk, Stepnohorsk) while simultaneously launching a highly synchronized, maximum-effort Information Operation campaign designed to preemptively destabilize the upcoming US/UA high-level delegation meeting. The confirmed lifting of fog/mist at the Stepnohorsk salient increases the kinetic risk profile in the Southern sector.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Stepnohorsk/Vremyevsky Salient (CRITICAL CAI): Fog cover is confirmed to have lifted, exposing UAF 3rd Assault Brigade blocking positions to RF ISR and kinetic exploitation by Vostok Group motorized rifle units. The immediate threat level is elevated.
• Northern/Central Rear Areas (NEW CAI): Air Force intelligence confirms new groups of RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) moving from the Donetsk region toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (291922Z) and towards Chernihiv Oblast (291914Z). This indicates RF intent to strike rear logistics, AD assets, or C2 nodes supporting the main defensive axes.
• Siversk Axis: The threat posed by the RF TOS-2 system near Krasny Liman remains persistent, though currently unconfirmed kinetic activation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather FACT: Fog/mist cover is confirmed lifted/dissipating (291926Z). Rain is reported.
• JUDGMENT: The removal of low-visibility conditions enables more effective RF ISR, potentially supporting the previously predicted armored assault at Stepnohorsk.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are optimizing for kinetic action post-fog lift. RF IO elements have immediately adjusted their targeting, focusing on exploiting President Zelenskyy’s diplomatic statements to portray UA weakness.
• UAF: UAF forces are maintaining defensive lines at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously defending against immediate rear-area drone threats. The National Command Authority (NCA) focus is split between managing the kinetic threat and providing strategic guidance to the delegation en route to the US.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Intentions (Kinetic): RF intent is confirmed to sustain the pressure on the Stepnohorsk breach attempt, likely using A2A UAVs (Geran-Fighters) to blind UAF ISR and enable penetration NLT 300600Z. The redirection of UAVs toward Dnipropetrovsk suggests pre-strike reconnaissance or saturation targeting of a major rear hub.
• Intentions (Information - PRIMARY THREAT): RF intent has pivoted to rapidly establish a "Forced Peace/Capitulation" narrative surrounding the upcoming US/UA delegation meeting. By twisting Zelenskyy’s remarks about "worthily ending the war," RF seeks to delegitimize the UA delegation and suggest internal collapse to Western partners.
• Capability (Unit Discreditation): RF state media (TASS) is actively pushing narratives regarding the potential "liquidation" of Ukrainian assault troops (OShP) due to ineffectiveness (291931Z). This directly targets the morale and reputation of the UAF's most effective shock formations (e.g., 3rd Assault, 33rd OShP). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate kinetic response to the fog lift is anticipated. The documented operational flexibility to redirect UAV groups across multiple axes (Donetsk to Dnipropetrovsk) confirms an effective, centralized C2 structure for the newly formed Drone Systems Troops (BPS).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics resilience via alternative Kazakh corridors remains a FACT. RF logistics support for Vostok Group (Stepnohorsk) is assessed as stabilizing within the next 48-72 hours.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF IO C2 demonstrated near-immediate, high-tempo coordination by pivoting resources to exploit the Presidential statement within minutes of its release. This confirms the centralized control and rapid execution capability noted in the previous report. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively challenged by simultaneous, synchronized threats across kinetic and cognitive domains. Frontline units are adapting to the increased visibility post-fog. Strategic readiness is highly dependent on the success of the information defense effort over the next 36 hours.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Tactical): Combat videos confirm continued effective tactical drone strikes against enemy assaults, suggesting local defensive capability remains strong despite strategic setbacks.
• Setback (Cognitive/Strategic): The widespread immediate RF distortion of President Zelenskyy’s diplomatic statement is a temporary strategic communications setback, as it imposes an additional burden of clarification and defense on the delegation before they even begin talks.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Immediate Air Defense Assets: Requirement to re-task mobile AD units and EW capabilities to protect critical infrastructure/C2 nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk/Chernihiv areas against the confirmed UAV groups.
2. High-Level Counter-IO Vetting: The UA delegation requires immediate, fully vetted talking points to counter the "forced peace" narrative and the continued pressure regarding US commitment (e.g., Trump envoy/FT report).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

The Information Environment is currently saturated with RF IO designed to cast doubt on the UAF's diplomatic legitimacy and internal cohesion.

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Forced Peace Narrative (NEW PRIMARY THREAT): RF sources (e.g., Операция Z) are aggressively characterizing Zelenskyy’s statements about determining "how to worthily end the war" as a sign of immediate political collapse or capitulation under US pressure.
2. Unit Discreditation: TASS narratives seeking to preemptively dismantle the credibility of the UAF Assault Troops (OShP).
3. Diplomatic FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt): Ukrainian sources are expressing deep alarm regarding future US policy and the rumored impact of figures aligned with the Trump orbit (FT report/RBC-Ukraine), indicating successful RF influence operations targeting long-term US support viability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Domestic morale is likely under pressure due to mixed messages: tactical successes (drone videos) versus strategic anxiety (US/RF secret talks, TASS discrediting frontline units).
• RF normalization IO continues (Mariupol sports complex opening), aiming to demonstrate the permanency of occupation.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The upcoming high-level US/UA delegation meeting is the immediate focus (confirmed by Reuters/UA sources). The content of this meeting is now being defined by RF IO narratives ("forced peace," "US betrayal") before it even takes place.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Kinetic Exploitation Post-Fog Lift Combined with Diplomatic Sabotage (NLT 301200Z DEC 25) (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF Vostok Group will execute localized probing attacks and possibly a renewed armored thrust at the Stepnohorsk salient, leveraging superior ISR (now aided by better visibility) and A2A UAV cover. Concurrently, RF will execute synchronized UAV/Shahed strikes against rear logistics and AD nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk region. The IO apparatus will reach peak output on Sunday, ensuring the US/UA meeting is perceived globally as a discussion of surrender terms.

• Focus: Force UAF to commit AD and reserve forces to the rear (Dnipropetrovsk) while the main ground effort stabilizes the Stepnohorsk breach.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Integrated C2/AD Decapitation via Cyber-Kinetic Synchronization (NLT 011200Z DEC 25) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF synchronizes the main ground assault at Stepnohorsk with a localized, severe communication denial event (Starlink jamming/cyber-intrusion) targeting the C2 hierarchy in the sector. This is combined with a high-intensity, synchronized long-range strike package (Ballistic/Cruise/Shahed) aimed at the JFC C2 headquarters or the primary ADOC, exploiting the known vulnerability of rear AD coverage due to UAV redirection.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary immediate goal is to kinetically defend rear-area critical nodes (UAV strikes) and strategically dominate the information space to protect the integrity of the upcoming diplomatic meeting.

1. AIR DEFENSE PRIORITY SHIFT (J3/J4):

   • ACTION: Immediately implement an Emergency Reallocation Order for 50% of mobile, short-range Air Defense and EW assets from secondary rear areas to the projected flight paths and potential strike zones in Dnipropetrovsk and Chernihiv Oblasts.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the high-risk threat posed by confirmed UAV groups targeting rear-area sustainment and C2 infrastructure, ensuring these critical nodes remain functional during the Stepnohorsk crisis.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS DEFENSE - PEAK IO (NCA/J7/J2):

   • ACTION: NCA must issue a Strategic Defiance Statement NLT 300200Z (before the delegation arrives). This statement must explicitly define "worthy completion of the war" solely as VICTORY, RESTORATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY, forcefully denying and pre-bunking the RF "forced peace" narrative. Simultaneously, launch a specific counter-narrative to defend the integrity and effectiveness of the UAF Assault Troops (OShP) against TASS propaganda.
   • RATIONALE: Neutralizes the strategic IO attack on the delegation before talks begin, protecting domestic and allied confidence in Ukraine's objectives.

3. TOS-2 COUNTER-BATTERY (J3/G2):

   • ACTION: Maintain TOS-2 Hunter-Killer mission as the highest kinetic priority for long-range precision fires (MLRS, ATACMS). Use the lifting fog conditions to task high-altitude ISR platforms to acquire specific firing positions in the Krasny Liman/Siversk area NLT 300600Z.
   • RATIONALE: Eliminates the concentrated shock fire capability RF intends to use to draw UAF reserves away from the Southern main effort.

4. TACTICAL FORCE PROTECTION (J3):

   • ACTION: Reissue the directive for maximum vigilance and low-signature defense at Stepnohorsk. Mandate the aggressive use of short-burst EW transmissions, limiting C2 chatter, and implementing dismounted patrols ahead of blocking positions to prevent SpN infiltration now that visibility has increased.
   • RATIONALE: Counters RF exploitation of improved visibility and specialized anti-thermal tactics.

//END OF REPORT//